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Modern cryptographic systems provide provable security guarantees as long
as secret keys of the system remain confidential. However, if adversary learns some
bits of information about the secret keys the security of the system can be breached.
Side-channel attacks (like power analysis, timing analysis etc.) are one of the most
effective tools employed by the adversaries to learn information pertaining to cryp-
tographic secret keys.An adversary can also tamper with secret keys (say flip some
bits) and observe the modified behavior of the cryptosystem, thereby leaking infor-
mation about the secret keys. Dziembowski et al. (JACM 2018) defined the notion
of non-malleable codes, a tool to protect memory against tampering. Non-malleable
codes ensure that, when a codeword (generated by encoding an underlying message)
is modified by some tampering function in a given tampering class, if the decoding
of tampered codeword is incorrect then the decoded message is independent of the
original message.
In this dissertation, we focus on improving different aspects of non-malleable
codes. Specifically, (1) we extend the class of tampering functions and present ex-
plicit constructions as well as general frameworks for constructing non-malleable
codes. While most prior work considered “compartmentalized” tampering func-
tions, which modify parts of the codeword independently, we consider classes of
tampering functions which can tamper with the entire codeword but are restricted
in computational complexity. The tampering classes studied in this work include
complexity classes NC0, and AC0. Also, earlier works focused on constructing non-
malleable codes from scratch for different tampering classes, in this work we present
a general framework for constructing non-malleable codes based on average-case
hard problems for specific tampering families, and we instantiate our framework for
various tampering classes including AC0. (2) The locality of code is the number of
codeword blocks required to be accessed in order to decode/update a single block in
the underlying message. We improve efficiency and usability by studying the opti-
mal locality of non-malleable codes. We show that locally decodable and updatable
non-malleable codes cannot have constant locality. We also give a matching up-
per bound that improves the locality of previous constructions. (3) We investigate
a stronger variant of non-malleable codes called continuous non-malleable codes,
which are known to be impossible to construct without computational assumptions.
We show that setup assumptions such as common reference string (CRS) are also
necessary to construct this stronger primitive. We present construction of contin-
uous non-malleable codes in CRS model from weaker computational assumptions
than assumptions used in prior work.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Cryptographic systems play an instrumental role in providing provable security
guarantees in situations where sensitive data is handled or transferred. Tradition-
ally, such systems assume that the adversarial entities interact with the system in
a black-box manner. Specifically, it is crucial for the security proof that some se-
cret internal state of the system cannot be manipulated (or even inferred) by the
attacker. Unfortunately, adversarial capabilities in practice often allow much more
access. Such attacks, often called side channel attacks, aim to recover the internal
secret state by analyzing extra information learned via side-channels such as power
consumption, timing analysis of certain computations etc. [28, 95]. An adversary
can also tamper with secret state (say flip some bits) in order to learn about the
secret by studying the modified input-output behavior; such attacks are known as
tampering attacks [24, 27,112,115].
In their seminal work in 2010, Dziembowski et al. [66] defined the notion of
non-malleable codes as an extension of error-correcting codes to achieve tamper
resilience. Whereas error-correcting codes provide the guarantee that (if not too
many errors occur) the receiver can recover the original message from a corrupted
codeword, non-malleable codes are essentially concerned with security. In other
1
words, correct decoding of corrupted codewords is not guaranteed (nor required),
but it is instead guaranteed that if the decoding is incorrect then it is independent of
the original message. Non-malleable codes can be used to encode the secret key in
the memory of a device such that a tampering adversary interacting with the device
does not learn anything more than the input-output behavior. Unfortunately, it
is impossible to construct non-malleable codes secure against arbitrary tampering,
since the adversary can always apply the tampering function that decodes the entire
codeword to recover the message m and then re-encodes a related message m′. Thus,
non-malleable codes are typically constructed against limited classes of tampering
functions F .
Somewhat formally, non-malleable codes are defined via a Ideal-Real paradigm
definition. In the real world, a challenger creates a codeword c by encoding some
underlying message m. The challenger then applies an adversarial tampering func-
tion f from a specific tampering class F , on the codeword c, and then decodes the
tampered codeword. The adversarial view in the real world comprises of the decoded
message obtained after the decoding the tampered codeword. On the other hand,
in an ideal world, there exists a simulator which is given the adversarial tampering
function f . The simulator then samples the decoded message from a distribution
which depends only on f . The simulator can also output a special symbol same∗, to
indicate that decoding of the tampered codeword matches the original message m
(note that, in the ideal world the simulator must indicate this without any knowl-
edge of m). The view of the adversary in the ideal world consists of the simulator’s
output. The coding scheme is called non-malleable if the adversarial views in the two
2
cases are indistinguishable from each other for all messages, and for all tampering
functions in the tampering class F .
Tampering Classes and Complexity Prior work, due to the impossibility re-
sult mentioned above, focused on providing resilience against split-state tampering
functions, where an attacker is allowed to arbitrarily modify two (or more) parts of
the secret key independently. In this dissertation we introduce a novel formalization
of tampering functions based on well-studied complexity classes which are known
to be strictly weaker from the class of all polynomial time algorithms (P). Studying
the tampering classes through the lens of complexity theory, allows us to achieve
security against attackers with limited computational resources, who can corrupt
the codeword in a non split-state manner. The work presented in this dissertation
is the first work to specifically investigate tampering functions that correspond to
well-studies classes in complexity theory. This research direction has generated sig-
nificant research interest and has been followed up by several important advances
in the study of non-malleable codes [15–18,36].
We begin, in chapter 4, by constructing explicit, efficient, and uncondition-
ally secure non-malleable codes against a powerful tampering class which includes
all bounded-depth circuits with bounded fan-in and unbounded fan-out; the well-
studied complexity class NC0 is a special case of this tampering class. The class of
bounded depth circuits is natural both as a complexity class and as a stepping stone
towards modeling practical tampering attacks, where an adversary has limited time
or other computational resources to tamper with memory before the memory gets
3
overwritten and/or refreshed.
The work presented in chapter 4, is based on a paper co-authored with Marshall
Ball, Dana Dachman-Soled, and Tal Malkin [17]; which is published in Eurocrypt
2016.
In chapter 5, we extend the previous direction and present general frameworks
for constructing non-malleable codes for encoding one and multiple bits against
broad classes of tampering functions F for which average case hardness results are
known. Note that one cannot simply use the NMC for encoding single bit, in order
to encode multiple bits by encoding each bit individually. This is because, a simple
tampering function which re-orders the encodings will reveal a related message after
decoding. Our frameworks include both a generic construction, which requires that
certain underlying primitives are instantiated in a suitable way, as well as a proof
“template.” We instantiate our framework for particular tampering classes F in
both the computational and information theoretic setting such as: (1) tampering
functions that are represented by polynomial size, constant-depth, unbounded fan-in
and unbounded fan-out circuits, such tampering functions correspond to AC0 circuits
(2) tampering functions represented by bounded-depth decision trees (3) tampering
functions that are represented by read-once, bounded-width branching programs,
such tampering functions correspond to the space-bounded, streaming setting.
The work presented in chapter 5, is based on a paper co-authored with Marshall
Ball, Dana Dachman-Soled, and Tal Malkin [18]; which is published in Eurocrypt
2018.
4
Improving Efficiency Standard non-malleable codes are not suitable in settings
where, say, an entire database must be protected; because they do not allow for
random access. For example, the entire database would have to be re-encoded even
if only a single entry is read/written by the user. Dachman-Soled et al. [54] proposed
a new notion called locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes, which
informally speaking, provides the security guarantees of a non-malleable code while
also allowing for efficient random access. In chapter 6 we analyze the theoretical
upper and lower bounds on such constructions. In particular we show that any
locally decodable and updatable code must have super-constant locality in order to
be secure, as we show an efficient, explicit attack on schemes with lower locality. We
also improve the performance of the scheme presented by Dachman-Soled et al. [54]
and match the lower bound of super-constant locality.
The work presented in chapter 6, is based on a paper co-authored with Dana
Dachman-Soled, and Aria Shahverdi. A preliminary version of this work [53] is
published in Public Key Cryptography 2017, and the full version has been accepted
for publication in the Journal of Information & Computation.
Tamper Resilience Against Stronger Adversaries Recently, Faust et al. [71]
introduced the notion of continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC), which provides
stronger security guarantees than standard non-malleable codes, by allowing an
adversary to tamper with the codeword in a continuous way instead of one-time
tampering. They also showed that CNMC with information theoretic security can-
not be constructed in 2-split-state tampering model, and presented a construction
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of the same in CRS (common reference string) model using collision-resistant hash
functions (CRHF) and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK).
Since it is known that 2-split-state CNMC imply one-way functions (OWF),
OWF is the minimal computational assumption necessary to construct CNMC. The
computational assumptions used in prior constructions (NIZK and CRHF) are be-
lieved to be stronger than one-way functions. Therefore, an interesting research
question is to reduce this gap by constructing 2-split-state CNMC from weaker
assumptions.
In chapter 7, we ask if it is possible to construct CNMC from such weaker
assumptions. We answer this question by presenting lower as well as upper bounds.
Specifically, we show that it is impossible to construct 2-split-state CNMC, with no
CRS, for one-bit messages from any falsifiable assumption with black-box reduction,
thus establishing the lower bound. Black-box reduction here means, that the security
reduction has only input/output (black-box) access to the adversary breaking the
security of CNMC. We additionally provide an upper bound by constructing 2-split-
state CNMC for one-bit messages, assuming only the existence of a family of injective
one way functions, which is believed to be a significantly weaker computational
assumption than NIZK. We also present a construction of 4-split-state CNMC for
multi-bit messages in CRS model from the same assumptions. Additionally, we
present definitions of the following new primitives: 1) One-to-one commitments, and
2) Continuous Non-Malleable Randomness Encoders, which may be of independent
interest.
The work presented in chapter 7, is based on a paper co-authored with Dana
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Dachman-Soled [52]; which is published in Public Key Cryptography 2019.
We next give an outline of the dissertation, followed by overview of the chapters
presenting technical results.
1.1 Organization
The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 gives an overview of prior
work. It is followed by some preliminaries and standard definitions in chapter 3.
Chapter 4, presents the construction of non-malleable codes for bounded depth
bounded fan-in circuits, which is followed by presentation of general framework
for constructing non-malleable codes from average-case hardness in chapter 5. In
chapters 6 and 7 we present the upper and lower bounds on variants of standard
non-malleable codes (locally decodable and updatable NMC in chapter 6, and con-
tinuous non-malleable codes in chapter 7). We conclude by presenting conclusions
in chapter 8
1.2 Non-Malleable Codes for Bounded Depth, Bounded Fan-in Cir-
cuits
In chapter 4, we give a construction of non-malleable codes where the attacker
is allowed to tamper with the key arbitrarily in a non split-state manner, but is
constrained in the computational complexity of the tampering function. This model
is inspired from the need to capture real world attacks where an attacker usually
gets chance to tamper with the entire secret key but has limited time to carry out
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the attack. In this work, we devise explicit, efficient, and unconditionally secure
non-malleable codes against a powerful tampering class which includes all bounded-
depth circuits with bounded fan-in and unbounded fan-out. This tampering class
includes NC0 . Specifically, we consider the class Localdo , consisting of all functions
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that can be computed with output locality do(n), where each
output bit depends on at most do(n) input bits. Note that this class includes all
fan-in-b circuits of depth at most logb do. Moreover, the class of bounded output
locality functions is a natural class in its own right, and is in fact much broader,
including arbitrarily complex functions (even those outside of P), as long as the
output locality constraint is maintained; we do not impose any constraints on the
number or type of gates in the circuit. Finally, as we discuss in chapter 4, our
constructions actually hold for an even broader class, that also includes all split
state functions, and beyond.
1.3 Non-Malleable Codes from Average-Case Hardness:
AC0, Decision Trees, and Streaming Space-Bounded Tampering
In chapter 5,we continue this line of research and consider constructing non-
malleable codes against various complexity classes, including: (1) AC0 tampering,
where the tampering function is represented by a polynomial size constant-depth,
unbounded fan-in/fan-out circuit, (2) tampering with bounded-depth decision trees,
where the tampering function is represented by a decision tree with n variables and
depth nε for ε < 1, (3) streaming tampering with quadratic space, where the tam-
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pering function is represented by a read-once, bounded-width (2o(n
2)) branching
program, (4) small threshold circuits: depth d circuits of majority gates with a
quasilinear number of wires, (5) fixed polynomial time tampering: randomized tur-
ing machines running in time O(nk) for any fixed k. Constructing non-malleable
codes against a wide array of complexity classes is desirable since in practice, the
capabilities of a tampering adversary are uniquely tied to the computational setting
under consideration and/or the physical device being used. AC0 circuits, which are
constant-depth circuits, model attackers with limited time, since the propagation
delay of a circuit is proportional to the length of the longest path from input to
output.
We also present general frameworks for constructing non-malleable codes for
encoding one and multi-bits against various tampering classes F for which average
case hardness results are known. Our frameworks (one for single-bit and one for
multi-bit) include a generic construction, which requires suitable instantiations of
underlying primitives, along with a proof “template.” Our frameworks are inspired
by the well-known double-encryption paradigm for constructing CCA2-secure public
key encryption schemes [99,102,111].
1.4 Tight Upper and Lower Bounds for Leakage-Resilient, Locally
Decodable and Updatable Non-Malleable Codes
Another aspect of tamper and leakage resilient cryptography is the efficiency
of these schemes. The earlier works suffered from the severe drawbacks on this
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front since those constructions did not support the random access of data., For
example, the entire database was needed to be re-encoded even if only a single file
was read/written by the user. This is not practical in setting such as cloud based
data storage systems where updates to data are often quite small in size compared to
overall data stored. The recent work of Dachman-Soled et al [54], addressed this by
introducing the locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes (LDUNMC).
These codes allow the user to access only few blocks of data to be accessed (or
re-encoded) when the data is read (or updated). These codes therefore are useful in
large databases where random access to the data is desired, which is the case with
all practical systems.
Locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes, (LDUNMC) informally
speaking, provides the security guarantees of a non-malleable code while also al-
lowing for efficient random access. In more detail, we consider a message m =
m1, . . . ,mn consisting of n blocks, and an encoding algorithm E(m) that outputs a
codeword Ĉ = ĉ1, . . . , ĉn̂ consisting of n̂ blocks. As introduced by Katz and Tre-
visan [92], local decodability means that in order to retrieve a single block of the
underlying message, one does not need to read through the whole codeword but
rather, one can access just a few blocks of the codeword. Similarly, local updata-
bility means that in order to update a single block of the underlying messages, one
only needs to update a few blocks of the codeword. Dachman-Soled et al. in [54]
considered LDUNMC that are also leakage-resilient (LR-LDUNMC), thus allowing
for adversaries who continually leak information about D in addition to tampering.
The locality achieved by the construction of [54] is Θ(log(n)), meaning that when
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encoding messages of length n number of blocks, the decode and update procedures
each require access to Θ(log(n)) number of blocks of the encoding. Thus, when us-
ing the encoding scheme of [54] to compile a RAM program into its secure version,
the overhead is at least Ω(log(n)) memory accesses for each read/write access in the
underlying program. In practice, such an overhead is often prohibitive. 1
In chapter 6, we ask whether it is possible to construct leakage-resilient, locally
decodable and updatable non-malleable codes (LR-LDUNMC)that achieve signifi-
cantly better locality. When considering both leakage and tampering attacks (even
just a single leakage query followed in a later round by a single tampering query)
so-called rewind attacks become possible. In a rewind attack, the attacker does the
following (1) leak information on only a “few” blocks of memory in rounds 1, . . . , i;
(2) wait during rounds i + 1, . . . , j until these memory locations are (with high
probability) modified by the “updater” (the entity that models the honest compu-
tation on the data); (3) re-write the old information into these memory locations
in round j+ 1, with the goal of causing the state of the computation to be rewound.
Rewind attacks can be thwarted by ensuring that when the old information is writ-
ten back, it becomes inconsistent with other positions of the codeword and an error
is detected.
Our results show that any construction of LDUNMC in a threat model which
allows for a rewind attack as above will require “high locality.” Specifically, we
1Although the ORAM scheme used in the compiler also has ω(log(n)) overhead, in many appli-
cations of interest, properties of the specific RAM program can be leveraged so that the overhead of
ORAM can be reduced such that it becomes practically feasible. On the other hand, the Θ(log(n))
overhead of the encoding scheme of [54] is entirely agnostic to the RAM program being run on top
and thus, the high overhead would be incurred in all applications.
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show tight upper and lower bounds: (1) Every such construction will require super-
constant locality, moreover; (2) Super-constant locality is sufficient for achieving
constructions in the same threat model as [54] (which, as discussed, allows for
rewind attacks). In this work, we assume that the decode and update procedures
are non-adaptive in the sense that the next block of the codeword accessed during
decode/update does not depend on the contents of the previous blocks accessed.
For non-adaptive decode and update we consider both deterministic as well as ran-
domized access patterns, for more details refer chapter 6.
1.5 Upper and Lower Bounds for Continuous Non-Malleable Codes
In chapter 7, we study continuous non-malleable codes which is a stronger
variant of non-malleable codes.
Standard non-malleable codes achieve security only against one-time tamper-
ing. This means that in applications, the non-malleable encoding of a secret key
must be continually decoded and re-encoded, each time the device is run, incurring
overhead in computation and in generation of randomness for re-encoding. This mo-
tivated a stronger notion of non-malleable codes, known as continuous non-malleable
codes (CNMC), introduced by Faust et al. [71]. This definition allows many-time
tampering, which means that the adversary can continuously tamper with the code-
word and observe the effects of the tampering. Due to known impossibility results,
there must also be a “self-destruct” mechanism. This means that if, upon decode,
the device detects an error, then a “self-destruct” mechanism, which erases the secret
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key, is triggered, rendering the device useless.
The notion of CNMC with respect to a tampering class F is as follows: Given
a coding scheme Π = (E,D), where E is the encoding function and D is the decoding
function, the adversary gets to interact with an oracle OΠ(C), parameterized by
Π and an encoding of a message m, C ← E(m). We refer to the encoding C as
the “challenge” encoding. In each round, the adversary gets to submit a tampering
function f ∈ F . The oracle evaluates C ′ = f(C). If D(C ′) = ⊥, the oracle outputs
⊥ and a “self-destruct” occurs, aborting the experiment. Otherwise, if C ′ = C, the
oracle outputs a special message “same.” Otherwise, the oracle outputs C ′. We
emphasize that the entire tampered codeword is returned to the adversary in this
case. A CNMC is secure if for every pair of messages m0,m1, the adversary’s view
in the above game is computationally indistinguishable when the message is m0 or
m1.
The original CNMC paper of [71] showed an information-theoretic impossibil-
ity result for 2-split-state CNMC. This shows that the CNMC setting is distinguished
from other NMC settings, since information-theoretic (unconditional) security is im-
possible. Prior work [71] constructed 2-split-state CNMC in the CRS model using
collision-resistant hash functions and NIZK. On the other hand, CNMC’s imply com-
mitment schemes, which in turn imply OWF. It remains to determine where CNMC
lies in terms of complexity assumptions and what are the minimal computational
assumptions needed to achieve CNMC.
In chapter 7, we present upper and lower bounds for CNMC in the 2-split-state
model. First, we show that with no CRS, single-bit CNMC in the 2-split-state model
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(with a black-box security proof) is impossible to construct from any falsifiable
assumption. On the other hand, in the CRS model, we show how to achieve single-
bit CNMC in the 2-split-state model from injective one-way functions.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
In this chapter we give an overview of some related prior work.
2.1 Non-Malleable Codes
Study of non-malleable cryptography was initiated by Dolev, Dwork and Naor
in [59]. It has been studied in both computational and information theoretic set-
ting. Error-correcting codes along with early works on tamper resilience [77,87,88],
motivated the study of non-malleable codes.
Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [66] introduced and formalized the notion
of non-malleable codes. Non-malleable codes have also been studied in both the
computational and information-theoretic setting. In their seminal work [66] also
introduced the split-state tampering function class, which allows the adversarial
tampering function to tamper with different parts of the codeword independently.
They showed the existence of such codes for the class of all bit-wise independent
tampering functions (which can be viewed as split state with n parts).
Liu and Lysyanskaya [100], presented an efficient construction of computation-
ally secure non-malleable codes for split state functions, in the CRS model. Their
construction also provided security against continual split-state leakage.
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Further studies on non-malleable codes for split state classes focused on im-
provements in terms of achieving information-theoretic security, gain stronger tam-
per resilience by reducing the number of states, and by improving the efficiency by
increasing the rate. Information theoretic non-malleable code for 1-bit messages
against 2 state split state functions, were constructed in [64], which was followed
by Aggarwal et.al [4], who used results from additive combinatorics to construct
information-theoretic non-malleable code for k-bit messages. Aggarwal et.al [3] pre-
sented an elegant framework for proving results about non-malleable codes via com-
posable non-malleable reductions.
Studies improving the efficiency of non-malleable codes include [4, 39], which
presented constructions for a constant (> 2) number of states with constant rate.
For computationally secure 2-split-state non-malleable codes [2] improved the rate to
1−o(1) (which is optimal). Since then a long line of research [2,10,38,90,97,98] has
improved the state-of-the-art. Recently, Kanukurthi et.al [91], gave a construction
for 3-split-state non-malleable codes with rate 1
3
.
Beyond Split-State Tampering While most of the research on non-malleable codes
prior to this work focused on split-state tampering we note few exceptions here.
Agrawal et.al. [8] gave a construction of non-malleable codes against tampering
functions which permute individual bits of the codeword (in addition to bit-wise in-
dependent tampering). Chabanne et.al [29] considered subclass of linear tampering
functions.
Prior to this work, other studies presented some existential [66], randomized
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constructions (or efficient constructions in CRS model) of non-malleable codes [42,
73] for more general tampering classes.
For example, non-malleable codes secure against any ‘small-enough’ tampering
family (< 22
n
) were proved to exist in [66].
Faust et.al [73] constructed information theoretically secure, efficient non-
malleable codes in CRS model, for tampering function families F with size |F| ≤
2poly(n), where n is the length of codeword. Their construction was based on t-wise
independent hashing for t proportional to log |F|. Note that the construction of [73]
does not achieve security against the tampering functions f ∈ AC0 in general, rather
provides tamper resilience against specific families in AC0 (ACC0, etc.) This is be-
cause, the bound on the size of F is required to be fixed before t-wise independent
hash function h (CRS) is chosen. Whereas, AC0 contains all poly-size and constant
depth circuit families,
Cheraghchi and Guruswami [42] gave the first characterization of the rate
of non-malleable codes. They showed that non-malleable codes with information
theoretic security exist for tampering families F of size |F| ≤ 22αn . Moreover, they
also showed that these existential NMC have optimal rate of 1 − α. The efficiency
of the encoding and decoding algorithms in [42] construction, is proportional to
poly(1/ε) where ε is the error probability, this leads to inefficient instantiations
when error is negligible.
Following on the work presented in Chapter 4, Chattopadhyay and Li [36]
constructed non-malleable codes using seedless non-malleable extractors. They also
construct efficient NMC against t-local tampering functions, with deterministic de-
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coding algorithm. (in contrast, the result in 4 has randomized decoding). We achieve
better locality parameters than [36]. They [36], also constructed inefficient non-
malleable codes for AC0 tampering functions. The length of the codeword for [36]
construction, is super-polynomial in the message length. Whereas, in chapter 5 we
present a construction of computationally secure efficient non-malleable code for
AC0 tampering functions in CRS model.
Recently, Faust et.al [70] considered larger tampering classes by considering
space bounded tampering adversaries in random oracle model. They defined a
new notion of leaky continuous non-malleable codes, where the adversary can learn
bounded information (log(|m|) bits) about the underlying message m, and gave
construction in random oracle model. In chapter 5 we present information theo-
retically secure NMC (with standard non-malleability definition in plain model) for
streaming space-bounded tampering functions.
Block-wise non-malleable codes (variant of standard NMC) was considered by
Chandran et.al in [31]. In this model, the codeword consists of number of blocks
and the adversary receives the codeword block-by-block. The tampering function
also consists of various function fis, where each fi can depend on codeword blocks
c1, . . . , ci and modifies ci to c
′
i. It can be observed that standard non-malleability
cannot be achieved in this model since, the adversary can simply wait to receive all
the blocks of the codeword and then decode the codeword as part of last tampering
function. Therefore, [31] define a new notion called non-malleability with replace-
ment which relaxes the non-malleability requirement and considers the attack to be
successful only if the tampered codeword is valid and related to the original message.
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This work is followed by [15, 16, 19], which improves on the results in chap-
ters 4 and 5. In [15], Ball et.al construct efficient, information-theoretic NMC for
AC0 tampering functions, and further improvements are shown in [19] where they
construct NMC for tampering functions which can be modeled as sub-exponential
size AC0 circuits. Note that both [15, 19], consider tampering functions with depth
O(logn/log logn) which includes AC0 . Ball et.al in [16], present computational NMC
in plain (no-CRS) model, for tampering functions which run in any fixed bounded
polynomial-time, based on de-randomization assumptions, with inverse polynomial
adversarial advantage (instead of negligible). We view these results as complemen-
tary to the work presented in this dissertation, since together they highlight how
different choices of parameters such as size of the tampering circuit, security model
(CRS vs. plain vs. information-theoretic), and desired rate (codeword length), can
result in achieving tamper-resilience against adversaries with limited computational
resources.
Other works Several other variants and enhanced models were considered. For ex-
ample, [46], in the context of designing UC secure protocols via tamperable hardware
tokens, consider a variant of non-malleable codes which has deterministic encoding
and decoding. Locally decodable and updatable non-malleable code were intro-
duced by [54]. Faust et.al [71] considered stronger variant which allows continual
tampering, and [6] allow for bounded leakage model.
Other works on non-malleable codes include [7, 34,35,37,43,72,93,94,109].
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2.2 Locally Decodable and Updatable Non-Malleable Codes
Locally Decodable Codes Katz and Trevisan [92] introduced locally decodable
codes. Where,they considered the problem of recovering individual bits of a code-
word from accessing a small number of bits from a (possibly) corrupted error cor-
recting codeword. They [92] also showed the impossibility of achieving the above
for schemes with linear codeword length. This work was followed by various works,
including [40, 67, 119] who achieved constant locality with super-polynomial code
length, while on the other hand locally decodable codes with constant rate and sub-
linear locality have been constructed by [81,84,96]. See [120] for a survey on locally
decodable codes.
Locally Updatable and Locally Decodable Codes The notion of locally up-
datable and locally decodable codes was introduced by Chandran et al. in [32] where
the constraint of locality, i.e. restricting the number of bits accessed, is further ap-
plied to updating any codeword obtained from encoding of another message. [32]
gave information theoretic construction with amortized update locality of O(log2 k)
and read locality of (super-linear) polynomial in k, where k is the length of input
message. Another variant called locally updatable and locally decodable-detectable
codes was also introduced in the same work which ensures that decoding never
outputs an incorrect message. [32] gave the construction of such codes in the com-
putational setting with poly-logarithmic locality.
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Locally Decodable and Updatable Non-Malleable Codes Dachman-Soled
et al. introduced the notion of locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes
in [54] and presented a construction in the computational setting. The construction
of [54] also achieves leakage resilience in addition to the tamper resilience. [54] then
used this notion to construct compilers that transform any RAM machine into a
RAM machine secure against leakage and tampering. This application was also
studied by Faust et al. [72], who presented a different approach which does not use
locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes. Recently, Chandran et al. [33]
gave a construction of locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes in the
information-theoretic setting. However, they addressed only the one-time leakage
and tampering case, and to achieve continual leakage and tampering, require a
periodic refresh of the entire memory.
Bounds on Non-Malleable Codes. Surprisingly, understanding the limitations and
bounds on NMC has received relatively less attention. While there have been a few
previous works exploring the lower and upper bounds on NMC and its variants [31,
42,66], most of the effort has been focused on understanding and/or improving the
bounds on the rates of NMC [2,8, 10,50,90,98]
Perhaps the closest to this work are the results of [42]. Cheragachi and Gu-
ruswami [42] studied the “capacity” of non-malleable codes in order to understand
the optimal bounds on the efficiency of non-malleable codes. They showed that
information theoretically secure efficient NMC exist for tampering families F of size
|F| if loglog|F| ≤ αn for 0 ≤ α < 1, moreover these NMC have optimal rate of 1−α
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with error ε ∈ O(1/poly(n)).
In chapter 6, we study the bounds on the locality of locally decodable and
updatable NMC. We show that for any locally decodable and updatable NMC which
allows rewind attacks, the locality parameter of the scheme must be ω(1), and give
an improved version of [54] construction to match the lower bound in computational
setting.
In chapter 7, we study the bounds on continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC),
and show that 2-split-state CNMC cannot be constructed from any falsifiable as-
sumption without CRS. We also give a construction of 2-split-state CNMC from
injective one-way functions in CRS model. Faust et al. [71] showed the impossibility
of constructing information-theoretically secure 2-split-state CNMC.
2.3 Continuous Non-Malleable Codes
Continuous Non-Malleable Codes Continuous Non-Malleable codes (CNMC)
were introduced by Faust et.al. in [71]. They gave a construction of CNMC
based on existence of collision resistant hash functions (CRHFs) and non-interactive
zero knowledge proof systems (NIZKs) in common reference string (CRS) model.
They also showed the impossibility of constructing 2-split state CNMC informa-
tion theoretically. Subsequent to the original Faust et.al construction, Jafargholi
and Wichs [89] presented a general study of CNMCs and its variants with some
existential results. Recently, Aggarwal et. al. [5] gave first information theoretic
construction in 8-split-state model.
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Recently, Ostrovsky et. al. [105] introduced a relaxed notion of CNMC,1 which
is sufficient for many applications. In the work of Ostrovsky et. al. [105], they refer
to the original notion as “continuous super-non-malleability” (since it is analogous
to “super-non-malleability”, a notion that was introduced in the non-continuous
setting [73]). They then presented a construction achieving the relaxed definition
(which they simply call “continuous non-malleability”), against 2-split-state tam-
pering functions, assuming the existence of injective one-way functions in the plain
model (without CRS).
The difference between the two CNMC notions is that in the original CNMC
notion, the tampering oracle returns the entire modified codeword C ′ if C ′ = f(C) 6=
C and D(C) 6= ⊥, whereas the relaxation only requires the oracle to return D(C ′)
but not C ′ itself. The original notion captures stronger types of tampering attacks;
specifically, it provides security against an adversary who learns arbitrary additional
information about the modified codeword C ′ through other side-channels.
Our result and the result of [105] are complementary and together give a full
picture of the landscape of assumptions required for CNMC. Our work shows that
it is necessary to rely on setup assumptions (CRS) in order to achieve the original,
stronger security definition of CNMC. Moreover, if one is willing to assume the
existence of a CRS, we show that this type of CNMC can be achieved from nearly
minimal computational assumptions. In contrast, if one is not willing to assume the
existence of a CRS, the work of [105] achieves weaker security guarantees in the
1A similar relaxed definition was previously given for a variant of CNMC, known as R-
CNMC [69], but in this setting it was shown that it is actually impossible to achieve the stronger
notion.
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plain model (with no setup assumptions) from the same computational assumptions.
We also note that the work of Ostrovsky et. al. [105] explicitly lists the question we
address in this work as an interesting open problem. They state:
“Interesting open questions related to our work are, for instance, whether
continuous non-malleability can be achieved, under minimal assump-
tions, together with additional properties, such as strong non-malleability,
super-non-malleability, augmented non-malleability, and locality . . . ”
Other works on non-malleable codes include [50,69].
Non-Malleable Randomness Encoders (NMRE) NMRE were introduced
recently by Kanukurthi et. al. [91] as a building block for constructing efficient
(constant-rate) split-state NMC. In this work, we present the stronger variant Con-
tinuous NMRE which allows continual tampering in split-state model.
Black-Box Separations. Impagliazzo and Rudich ruled out black-box reduc-
tions from key agreement to one-way function in their seminal work [86]. Their
oracle separation technique was subsequently used to rule out black-box reductions
between various primitives such as collision resistant hash functions to one way
functions [114], oblivious transfer to public key encryption [79] and many more.
The meta-reduction technique (cf. [1, 22, 51, 74–76, 78, 106, 107, 113]) has been use-
ful for ruling out larger classes of reductions—where the construction is arbitrary
(non-black-box), but the reduction uses the adversary in a black-box manner. The
meta-reduction technique is often used to provide evidence that construction of some
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cryptographic primitive is impossible under “standard assumptions” (e.g. falsifiable
assumptions or non-interactive assumptions).
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Chapter 3: Preliminaries and Definitions
In this chapter we will present background material and definitions related
to non-malleable codes and its variants. We will also present definitions related to
boolean circuits and other cryptographic primitives which will be used in construc-
tions presented in chapters 4, 5 , 6, and 7
3.1 Notation
Firstly, we present some standard notations that will be used in what follows.
Let N be the set of all natural numbers, i.e., N = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. For n ∈ N, we
write [n] = {1, . . . , n}. If x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Σn (for some set Σ), then xi:j :=
(xi, xi+1, . . . , xj−1, xj) for i ≤ j. If Σ is a set, then ΣΣ := {f : Σ→ Σ}, the set of all
functions from Σ to Σ. We say two vectors x, y ∈ Σn are ε-far if they disagree on at
least ε · n indices, |{i : xi 6= yi}| ≥ εn. Conversely, we say two vectors x, y ∈ Σn are
(1 − ε)-close if they agree on at least (1 − ε) · n indices, |{i : xi = yi}| ≥ (1 − ε)n.
Alternatively, for x, y ∈ GF(2)n define their distance to be d(x, y) := ‖x+y‖0
n
. (I.e. x
and y are ε-far if d(x, y) ≥ ε.)
For a set S, x ← S denotes, sampling an element x uniformly at random
from the set S. For an algorithm A, y ← A(x) is the output obtained on execution
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of A on input x. If A(·, ·) is a randomized algorithm, then y ← A(x, r), is the
output random variable for input x and randomness r. We also write, A(x) instead
of A(x, r) if it is clear from the context for the brevity. A function δ(·) is called
negligible if for all sufficiently large n and for every polynomial p(·), it holds that
δ(n) < 1/p(n). We will denote a negligible function by negl(·).
For a random variable X, we sometimes also denote the corresponding prob-
ability distribution by X. An ensemble of probability distributions {Xλ}λ∈N is
a sequence of probability distributions. For two probability ensembles {X}λ and
{Y }λ, defined over a domain S with finite support we say that {X}λ and {Y }λ are
statistically indistinguishable if there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that





|Pr [Xλ = s]− Pr [Yλ = s]| ≤ negl(λ)
We denote statistical indistinguishability by Xλ ≈s Yλ.
Similarly, we say that two probability ensembles {X}λ and {Y }λ, defined over
a domain S with finite support we say that {X}λ and {Y }λ are computationally
indistinguishable if for all probabilistic polynomial time distinguishersD, there exists
a negligible function negl(·) such that for all λ ∈ N,
∣∣∣∣ Prx←Xλ[D(x) = 1]− Pry←Yλ[D(y) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ)
We denote computational indistinguishability by Xλ ≈c Yλ.
If S is a set, we denote by US the uniform distribution over S. For λ ∈ N, we
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denote by Uλ the uniform distribution over λ-bit strings.
Remark 3.1.1. If a distribution D with support S of size 2` is statistically 2−λ-close
to the uniform distribution over S, denoted US , then for every x ∈ S,∣∣PrX←D[X = x]− 1/2`∣∣ ≤ 1/2λ. This implies that 1/2` − 1/2λ ≤ PrX←D[X = x] ≤
1/2` + 1/2λ.
Where appropriate, we interpret functions f : S → {±1} as boolean functions
(and vice-versa) via the mapping: 0↔ 1 and 1↔ −1. The support of vector ~x is the
set of indices i such that xi 6= 0. A bipartite graph is an undirected graph G = (V,E)
in which V can be partitioned into two sets V1 and V2 such that (u, v) ∈ E implies
that either u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2 or v ∈ V1 and u ∈ V2.
3.2 Non-Malleable Codes
In this section we define the notion of non-malleable codes and its variants. In
this work, we assume that the decoding algorithm of the non-malleable code may be
randomized and all of our generic theorems are stated for this case. Nevertheless,
only our instantiations in Chapter 4, and Section 5.5 requires a randomized decoding
algorithm, while our other instantiations enjoy deterministic decoding. We note
that this definition differs from the original one given in [66], in that we allow
the decoding to be randomized, while they required deterministic decoding. While
this technically weakens our definition (and a code with deterministic decoding
would be preferable), we feel that allowing randomized decoding fits the spirit and
motivation of non-malleable codes.More importantly, it may allow for a wider classes
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of functions.
Definition 3.2.1 (Coding Scheme). Let Σ, Σ̂ be sets of strings, and κ, κ̂ ∈ N be some
parameters. A coding scheme consists of two algorithms (E,D) with the following
syntax:
• The encoding algorithm (perhaps randomized) takes input a block of message
in Σ and outputs a codeword in Σ̂.
• The decoding algorithm (perhaps randomized) takes input a codeword in Σ̂
and outputs a block of message in Σ.
We require that for any message m ∈ Σ, Pr[D(E(m)) = m] = 1, where the probability
is taken over the choice of the encoding algorithm. In binary settings, we often set
Σ = {0, 1}κ and Σ̂ = {0, 1}κ̂.
We next provide definitions of non-malleable codes of varying levels of security.
The following Definitions 3.2.2, 3.2.3 are the standard definitions of non-malleability
and strong non-mallebility, appropriate for the information theroetic setting (with-
out CRS). These definitions are special cases of the corresponding Definitions 3.2.4,
3.2.5, presented in Section 3.2.1; when taking crs to be ⊥ and G to be the set of all
functions (namely the adversary is not restricted, and there’s no CRS).
Definition 3.2.2 (Non-malleability [66]). Let k be the security parameter, F be







c← E(m), c̃ := f(c), m̃ := D(c̃).
Output : m̃.
 ,
where the randomness of the experiment comes from the encoding algorithm. We
say a coding scheme (E,D) is non-malleable with respect to F if for each f ∈ F ,





m̃ ∪ {same∗} ← Simf(·).
Output : m if output of Sim is same∗; otherwise m̃.

Here the indistinguishability can be either computational or statistical.
Definition 3.2.3 (Strong Non-malleability [66]). Let k be the security parameter,






c← E(m), c̃ := f(c), m̃ := D(c̃)
Output : same∗ if c̃ = c, and m̃ otherwise.

The randomness of this experiment comes from the randomness of the encoding
algorithm. We say that a coding scheme (E,D) is strong non-malleable with respect





where ≈ can refer to statistical or computational indistinguishability.
3.2.1 Non-Malleable Code in CRS Model
Here, we present general, game-based definitions that are applicable even for
NMC that are in a model with a crs, or that require computational assumptions.
The corresponding original definitions of non-malleability (presented in Section 3.2),
appropriate for an unconditional setting without a CRS, can be obtained as a special
case of the following definitions when setting crs = ⊥ and taking G to include all
computable functions.
Definition 3.2.4 (Non-malleability). Let Π = (CRSGen,E,D) be a coding scheme.
Let F be some family of functions. For each attacker A, m ∈ Σ, define the tampering
experiment TamperΠ,FA,m(n):
1. Challenger samples crs← CRSGen(1n) and sends crs to A.
2. Attacker A sends the tampering function f ∈ F to the challenger.
3. Challenger computes c← E(crs,m).
4. Challenger computes the tampered codeword c̃ = f(c) and computes m̃ =
D(crs, c̃).
5. Experiment outputs m̃.
Figure 3.1: Non-Malleability Experiment TamperΠ,FA,m(n)
We say the coding scheme Π = (CRSGen,E,D) is non-malleable against tam-
pering class F and attackers A ∈ G, if for every A ∈ G there exists a PPT simulator
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Sim such that for any message m ∈ Σ we have,
TamperΠ,FA,m(n) ≈ IdealSim,m(n)
where IdealSim,m(n) is an experiment defined as follows,
1. Simulator Sim has oracle access to adversary A and outputs m̃∪{same∗} ←
SimA(·)(n).
2. Experiment outputs m if Sim outputs same∗ and outputs m̃ otherwise.
Figure 3.2: Non-Malleability Experiment IdealSim,m(n)
Definition 3.2.5 (Strong Non-malleability). Let Π = (CRSGen,E,D) be a coding
scheme. Let F be some family of functions. For each attacker A, m ∈ Σ, define the
tampering experiment StrongTamperΠ,FA,m(n):
1. Challenger samples crs← CRSGen(1n) and sends crs to A.
2. Attacker A sends the tampering function f ∈ F to the challenger.
3. Challenger computes c← E(crs,m).
4. Challenger computes the tampered codeword c̃ = f(c).
5. Compute m̃ = D(crs, c̃).
6. Experiment outputs same∗ if c̃ = c, and m̃ otherwise.
Figure 3.3: Strong Non-Malleability Experiment StrongTamperΠ,FA,m(n)
We say the coding scheme Π = (CRSGen,E,D) is strong non-malleable against
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for any A ∈ G, m0,m1 ∈ Σ.
3.2.2 Medium Non-Malleability
We now introduce an intermediate variant of non-malleability, called Medium
Non-malleability, which informally gives security guarantees “in-between” strong
and regular non-malleability. Specifically, the difference is that the experiment is
allowed to output same∗ only when some predicate g evaluated on (c, c̃) is set to
true. Thus, strong non-malleability can be viewed as a special case of medium non-
malleability, by setting g to be the identity function. On the other hand, regular
non-malleability does not impose restrictions on when the experiment is allowed to
output same∗. Note that g cannot be just any predicate in order for the definition
to make sense. g must be a predicate such that if g evaluated on (c, c̃) is set to true,
then (with overwhelming probability over the random coins of D) D(c̃) = D(c).
Definition 3.2.6 (Medium Non-malleability). Let Π = (CRSGen,E,D) be a coding
scheme. Let F be some family of functions.
Let g(·, ·, ·, ·) be a predicate such that, for each attacker A ∈ G, m ∈ Σ, the out-
put of the following experiment, ExptΠ,FA,m,g(n) is 1 with at most negligible probability:
For g as above, each m ∈ Σ, and attacker A ∈ G, define the tampering exper-
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1. Challenger samples crs← CRSGen(1n) and sends crs to A.
2. Attacker A sends the tampering function f ∈ F to the challenger.
3. Challenger computes c← E(crs,m).
4. Challenger computes the tampered codeword c̃ = f(c).
5. Challenger samples r ← U`.
6. Experiment outputs 1 if g(crs, c, c̃, r) = 1] ∧ D(crs, c̃; r) 6= m).
Figure 3.4: The experiment corresponding to the special predicate g.
iment
MediumTamperΠ,FA,m,g(n) as shown in figure 3.5:
1. Challenger samples crs← CRSGen(1n) and sends crs to A.
2. Attacker A sends the tampering function f ∈ F to the challenger.
3. Challenger computes c← E(crs,m).
4. Challenger computes the tampered codeword c̃ = f(c).
5. Challenger samples r ← U` and computes m̃ = D(crs, c̃, r).
6. Experiment outputs same∗ if g(crs, c, c̃, r) = 1, and m̃ otherwise.
Figure 3.5: Medium Non-Malleability Experiment MediumTamperΠ,FA,m,g(n)
We say the coding scheme Π = (CRSGen,E,D) is medium non-malleable against





for any A ∈ G, m0,m1 ∈ Σ.
The following Definition 3.2.7 corresponds to a special case of Definition 3.2.6
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of medium non-malleability that we introduced, appropriate for the information
theroetic setting (without CRS). Again,when taking crs to be ⊥ and G to be the set
of all functions (namely the adversary is not restricted, and there’s no CRS).
Definition 3.2.7 (Medium Non-malleability). Let k be the security parameter, F
be some family of functions. Let c← E(m) and let g(c, c̃, r) be a predicate such that,
for every c in the support of E(m) and every c̃,
Pr[g(c, c̃, r) = 1] ∧ D(c̃; r) 6= m] ≤ negl(n).






c← E(m), c̃ := f(c), r ← U`, m̃ := D(c̃; r)
Output : same∗ if g(c, c̃, r) = 1, and m̃ otherwise.

The randomness of this experiment comes from the randomness of the encoding
algorithm and r (the random coins od decoding). We say that a coding scheme (E,D)
is medium non-malleable with respect to the function family F if there exists a g as




where ≈ can refer to statistical or computational indistinguishability.
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It is straightforward to check that Medium Non-Malleability implies non-
malleability.
3.2.3 Continuous Non-Malleable Codes (CNMC)
Here, we present the definition of coding scheme, and continuous non-malleable
codes.
Definition 3.2.8 (Coding Scheme [66]). A coding scheme, Code = (E,D), consists
of two functions: a randomized encoding function E : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}n, and a
deterministic decoding function D : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λ ∪ [⊥] such that, for each
m ∈ {0, 1}λ, Pr [D(E(m)) = m] = 1 (over the randomness of encoding function).
Next, we present the definition of continuous non malleable codes in CRS
model for codes with split-state encoding schemes.
Definition 3.2.9 (Split-State Encoding Scheme in the CRS model [71]). A split-
state encoding scheme in common reference string (CRS) model is a tuple of algo-
rithms, Code = (CRSGen,E,D) specified as follows:
• CRSGen takes the security parameter as input and outputs the CRS, crs ←
CRSGen(1λ).
• E takes a message x ∈ {0, 1}λ as input along with the CRS crs, and outputs a
codeword consisting of two parts (X0, X1) such that X0, X1 ∈ {0, 1}n.
• D takes a codeword (X0, X1) ∈ {0, 1}2n as input along with the CRS crs and
outputs either a message x′ ∈ {0, 1}λ or a special symbol ⊥.
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Before defining the continuous non malleable codes consider the following ora-
cle, OCNM((X0, X1), (T0,T1)) which is parametrized by the CRS crs and “challenge”
codeword (X0, X1) and takes functions T0,T1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as inputs.




If (X ′0, X
′





1) = ⊥, return ⊥ and “self destruct”
Else return (X ′0, X
′
1).




1) outputs ⊥, the oracle an-
swers all the future queries with ⊥.
Definition 3.2.10 (Continuous Non Malleability [71]). Let Code = (CRSGen,E,D)
be a split-state encoding scheme in the CRS model. We say that Code is q-continuously














crs← CRSGen(1λ); (X0, X1)← Ecrs(x);
outA ← AOCNM(crs,(X0,X1),(·,·)); output : outA

and A asks total of q queries to OCNM.
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The following is an equivalent formulation
Definition 3.2.11 (Continuous Non Malleability [71], equivalent formulation). Let
Code = (CRSGen,E,D) be a split-state encoding scheme in the CRS model. We say
that Code is q-continuously non-malleable code, if for all messages m0, m1 ∈ {0, 1}λ,
all PPT adversary A and all PPT distinguishers D it holds that
Pr[D(outbA) = b] ≤ 1/2 + negl(λ)





1),(·,·)) : crs← CRSGen(1λ); (Xb0, Xb1)← Ecrs(mb)
and A asks total of q queries to OCNM.
3.2.4 Locally Decodable and Updatable Non-Malleable Codes
(LDUNMC)
Definition 3.2.1 (Locally Decodable and Updatable Code). Let Σ, Σ̂ be sets of
strings, and n, n̂, p, q be some parameters. An (n, n̂, p, q) locally decodable and updat-
able coding scheme consists of three algorithms (E,D,UP) with the following syntax:
The encoding algorithm E ( perhaps randomized) takes input an n-block (in Σ)
message and outputs an n̂-block (in Σ̂) codeword.
The (local) decoding algorithm D takes input an index in [n], reads at most p
blocks of the codeword, and outputs a block of message in Σ. The overall decoding
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algorithm simply outputs (D(1),D(2), . . . ,D(n)).
The (local) updating algorithm UP ( perhaps randomized) takes inputs an index
in [n] and a string in Σ∪{ε}, and reads/writes at most q blocks of the codeword.
Here the string ε denotes the procedure of refreshing without changing anything.
Let Ĉ ∈ Σ̂n̂ be a codeword. For convenience, we denote DĈ ,UPĈ as the pro-
cesses of reading/writing individual block of the codeword, i.e. the codeword oracle
returns or modifies individual block upon a query. Here we view Ĉ as a random
access memory where the algorithms can read/write to the memory Ĉ at individual
different locations. In binary settings, we often set Σ = {0, 1}κ and Σ̂ = {0, 1}κ̂.
Definition 3.2.2 (Correctness). An (n, n̂, p, q) locally decodable and updatable cod-
ing scheme (with respect to Σ, Σ̂) satisfies the following properties. Let
Ĉ = (ĉ1, ĉ2, . . . , ĉn̂)← E(M) be a codeword output by the encoding algorithm for any
message M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) ∈ Σn. Then we have:
for any index i ∈ [n], Pr[DĈ(i) = mi] = 1, where the probability is over the
randomness of the encoding algorithm.
for any update procedure with input (j,m′) ∈ [n]×Σ∪{ε}, let Ĉ ′ be the resulting
codeword by running UPĈ(j,m′). Then we have Pr[DĈ
′
(j) = m′] = 1, where the
probability is over the encoding and update procedures. Moreover, the decodings
of the other positions remain unchanged.1
Remark 3.2.1. The correctness definition can be directly extended to handle any
1Our lower bound rules out even constructions with 1 − negl(n) correctness. We present the
correctness definition in terms of perfect correctness, as this is the standard notion in the coding
literature, including the non-malleable codes literature, see for example [30,33,43,54,66,71].
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sequence of updates.
Definition 3.2.3 (Continual Tampering and Leakage Experiment). Let k be the se-
curity parameter, F ,G be some families of functions. Let (E,D,UP) be an (n, n̂, p, q)-
locally decodable and updatable coding scheme with respect to Σ, Σ̂. Let U be an
updater that takes input a message M ∈ Σn and outputs an index i ∈ [n] and
m ∈ Σ. Then for any blocks of messages M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) ∈ Σn, and any
(non-uniform) adversary A, any updater U , define the following continual experi-
ment CTamperLeakA,U ,M :
The challenger first computes an initial encoding Ĉ(1) ← E(M).
Then the following procedure repeats, at each round j, let Ĉ(j) be the current
codeword and M (j) be the underlying message:
• A sends either a tampering function f ∈ F and/or a leakage function g ∈ G
to the challenger.
• The challenger replaces the codeword with f(Ĉ(j)), or sends back a leakage
`(j) = g(Ĉ(j)).
•We define ~m(j) def=
(
Df(Ĉ




• Then the updater computes (i(j),m)← U(~m(j)) for the challenger.
• Then the challenger runs UPf(Ĉ(j))(i(j),m) and sends the index i(j) to A.
• A may terminate the procedure at any point.
Let t be the total number of rounds above. At the end, the experiment outputs
(




Definition 3.2.4 (Non-malleability and Leakage Resilience against Continual At-
tacks). An (n, n̂, p, q)-locally decodable and updatable coding scheme with respect to
Σ, Σ̂ is continual non-malleable against F and leakage resilient against G if for all
ppt(non-uniform) adversaries A, and pptupdaters U , there exists some ppt(non-
uniform) simulator Sim such that for any M = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Σn,
CTamperLeakA,U ,M is (computationally) indistinguishable to the following ideal
experiment IdealSim,U ,M :
The experiment proceeds in rounds. Let M (1) = M be the initial message.
At each round j, the experiment runs the following procedure:





~w(j) if I(j) = [n]
~m(j)|I(j) := ⊥, ~m(j)|Ī(j) := M (j)|Ī(j) otherwise,
where ~x|I denotes the coordinates ~x[v] where v ∈ I, and the bar denotes the
complement of a set.
• The updater runs (i(j),m)← U(~m(j)) and sends the index i(j) to the simu-
lator. Then the experiment updates M (j+1) as follows: set M (j+1) := M (j)
for all coordinates except i(j), and set M (j+1)[i(j)] := m.
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Let t be the total number of rounds above. At the end, the experiment outputs
(
`(1), `(2), . . . , `(t), ~m(1), . . . , ~m(t), i(1), . . . , i(t)
)
.
3.3 Boolean Circuits and Related Definitions
We now present the definitions of boolean circuits, circuit complexity classses
NC0 and AC0 . We also define input/output local functions in this section.
Definition 3.3.1 (Boolean Circuit). [14] For every n1, n2 ∈ N, a Boolean Circuit C
with n1 inputs and n2 outputs is a directed acyclic graph. It contains n1 nodes with 0
incoming edges; called input nodes and n2 nodes with 0 outgoing edges, called output
nodes. All other nodes are called gates correspond to one of the logical operations
(AND, OR, and NOT).
The AND and OR gates have fan-in 2, whereas NOT gate has fan-in 1.
The size of boolean circuit C, is the total number of nodes in the DAG. The depth
of the circuit is the length of the longest directed path from an input node to the
output node.
Definition 3.3.2 (Circuit Family). [14] Let p : N → N be a function. A circuit
family of size p(n) is a sequence of boolean circuits {Cn}n∈N, where Cn has n inputs
and a single output, such that size of each circuit Cn ≤ p(n) for all n.
Let f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a polynomially bounded function, i.e. ∃ some
constant c > 0, such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗, f(x) < |x|c. We call f implicitly
logspace computable if the mapping x, i → f(x)i can be computed in logarithmic
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space, where f(x)i denotes the i-th bit of the output f(x).
Definition 3.3.3 (Logspace Uniform Circuit Families). [14]
A circuit family {Cn} is logspace uniform if there is an implicitly logspace
computable function mapping 1n to the description of the circuit Cn.
We now define the complexity classes NC0 and AC0 .
Definition 3.3.4 (NC). [14]
A language is in NCi if there are constants c, i > 0 such that it can be decided
by logspace uniform circuit family {Cn} where circuits Cn are of size O(nc) and
depth O(login).
The class NC is ∪i≥0NCi.
NC0 corresponds to constant-depth bounded fan-in circuit family.
Definition 3.3.5 (AC). [14]
The class ACi is similar to NCi except that the gates in circuit Cn can have
unbounded fan-in.
The class AC is ∪i≥0ACi.
AC0 corresponds to constant-depth unbounded fan-in circuit family.
Next, we present definitions related to local functions.
3.3.1 Local Functions
We next define a class of local functions, where the number of input bits that
can affect any output bit (input locality) and the number of output bits that depend
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on an input bit (output locality) are restricted. Loosely speaking, an input bit xi
affects the output bit yj if for any boolean circuit computing f , there is a path in the
underlying DAG from xi to yj. The formal definitions are below, and our notation
follows that of [12]
Definition 3.3.6. We say that a bit xi affects the boolean function f ,
if ∃ {x1, x2, · · ·xi−1, xi+1, · · ·xn} ∈ {0, 1}n−1 such that,
f(x1, x2, · · ·xi−1, 0, xi+1, · · ·xn) 6= f(x1, x2, · · ·xi−1, 1, xi+1, · · ·xn).
Given a function f = (f1, . . . , fn) (where each fj is a boolean function), we
say that input bit xi affects output bit yj, or that output bit yj depends on input bit
xi, if xi affects fj.
Definition 3.3.7 (Output Locality). A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is said to
have output locality m if every output bit fi is dependent on at most m input bits.
Definition 3.3.8 (Input Locality). A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is said to have
input locality ` if every input bit fi is affects at most ` output bits.
Definition 3.3.9 (Local Functions). [12] A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is said
to be (m, `)-local, f ∈ Localm` , if it has input locality ` and output locality m. We
denote the class Localmn (namely no restriction on the input locality) by Local
m.
The above notions can be generalized to function ensembles {fn : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n}n∈Z with the following corresponding locality bound generalizations: `(n),m(n).
Recall that NC0 is the class of functions where each output bit can be computed
by a boolean circuit with constant depth and fan-in 2 (namely in constant parallel
time). It is easy to see that NC0 ⊆ LocalO(1).
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We also recall some definitions and results related to boolean analysis and
present them next.
3.3.2 Background on Boolean Analysis
Definition 3.3.10. A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} has correlation c with a function
g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} if
| Pr
x←Un
[f(x) = 1|g(x) = 1|]− Pr
x←Un
[f(x) = 1|g(x) = 0|]| ≤ c.
Where, Un is the uniform random distribution over {0, 1}n.
Note that this is equivalent up to absolute value for a more common definition
of correlation in the literature when g is taken to be balanced (Pr[g(x) = 1] = 1/2)
Definition 3.3.11. A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} has correlation c with a function
g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} if
Pr
x←Un




Where, Un is the uniform random distribution over {0, 1}n.





c = 2 Pr[f(x) = g(x)]]− 1
= 2 Pr[f(x) = 1|g(x) = 1] Pr[g(x) = 1] + 2 Pr[f(x) = 0|g(x) = 0] Pr[g(x) = 0]− 1
= Pr[f(x) = 1|g(x) = 1] + (1− Pr[f(x) = 1|g(x) = 0]− 1
= Pr[f(x) = 1|g(x) = 1]− Pr[f(x) = 1|g(x) = 0]
Theorem 3.3.1 ( [83,85]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be computed by a depth-d circuit
of size S. Then the correlation of f with parity is bounded by
2−cdn/ log
d−1(S),
where cd is a positive constant dependent only on d.
Definition 3.3.12 (Random Restriction [82]). A random restriction ρ parameter-
ized by a small positive real number p is mapping which sets the elements xi of
a vector ~x independently as follows: Pr [xi = 0] =
1−p
2




Pr [xi = ?] = p.
Definition 3.3.13 (Boolean Function Restriction). For a vector v ∈ {0, 1, ∗}n and
a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n the restriction of f to v, f̃ |v is defined as
f̃ |v(x) = f(z) where,
zi =

xi vi = ∗
vi vi ∈ {0, 1}
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Let f : D → {0, 1}r be a function. Then, we denote by fi the function
which outputs the i-th output bit of f . Let f : D → {0, 1}r be a function and let
v ∈ {0, 1}r be a vector. Then, we denote by fv the function which outputs all fi
such that vi = 1.
Lemma 3.3.1 ( [82, 118]). Let f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} be a function computable by a
depth-d AC0 circuit of size s. Let ρ be a random restriction with Pr[?] = q < 1/9d.
The probability over ρ that fρ cannot be written as a decision tree of depth t is
≤ s(9q1/dt)t.
We next recall some standard definitions of public-key encryption (PKE), pseu-
dorandom generator (PRG), and non-interactive zero knowledge proof systems with
simulation soundness.
3.4 Public Key Encryption Scheme and PRG
In this section, we present the definitions of well known cryptographic primi-
tives such as public key encryption scheme and pseudorandom generator which are
used as building blocks for particular instantiations. A public key encryption scheme
E consists of three algorithms: (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt).
• Gen(1n) → (pk, sk). The key generation algorithm takes in the security pa-
rameter and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
• Encrypt(pk,m) → c. The encryption algorithm takes in a public key pk and
a message m. It outputs a ciphertext c.
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• Decrypt(sk, c) → m. The decryption algorithm takes in a ciphertext c and a
secret key sk. It outputs a message m.
Correctness. The PKE scheme satisfies correctness if Decrypt(sk, c) = m with all
but negligible probability whenever pk, sk is produced by Gen and c is produced by
Encrypt(pk,m).
Security. We define IND-CPA security for PKE schemes in terms of the following
game between a challenger and an attacker. We let n denote the security parameter.
Setup Phase. The game begins with a setup phase. The challenger calls Gen(1n) to
create the initial secret key sk and public key pk.
Challenge Phase. The attacker receives pk from the challenger. The attacker chooses
two messages m0, m1 which it gives to the challenger. The challenger chooses
a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts mb, and gives the resulting ciphertext to
the attacker. The attacker then outputs a guess b′ for b. The attacker wins
the game if b = b′. We define the advantage of the attacker in this game as∣∣∣12 − Pr[b′ = b]∣∣∣.
Definition 3.4.1 (IND-CPA security). We say a Public Key Encryption scheme
E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is IND-CPA secure if any probabilistic polynomial time
attacker only has a negligible advantage (negligible in n) in the above game.
Definition 3.4.2 (α-correctness [63]). For any function α : N→ [0, 1], a public-key
encryption scheme E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is α-correct if
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Pr [Decrypt(sk, (Encrypt(pk,m)) 6= m] ≤ 1 − α(n), where the probability is taken
over the random coins of Gen used to generate (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n), for uniform
random message m ∈ {0, 1}n, and for all possible random coins of Encrypt.
Definition 3.4.3 (Almost-all-keys Perfect Decryption [63]). A public-key encryp-
tion scheme E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is almost-all-keys perfectly correct if with
all but negligible probability over the random coins of Gen used to generate (pk, sk)←
Gen(1n), for uniform random message m ∈ {0, 1}n, and for all possible random coins
of Encrypt, it holds that Pr [Decrypt(sk, (Encrypt(pk,m)) 6= m] = 0.
3.4.1 Pseudorandom Generators of Space-Bounded Computation
Definition 3.4.4 (Pseudorandom Generator). A pseudorandom generator is an
efficient, deterministic map prg : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`(n), where `(n) > n such that
for all PPT distinguishers D; |Pr [D(G(x)) = 1] − Pr [D(y) = 1]| ≤ negl(n), when
x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}`(n) are chosen uniform randomly.
Definition 3.4.5. [103] A generator prg : {0, 1}m → ({0, 1}n)k is a pseudorandom
generator for space(w) and block size n with parameter ε if for every finite state
machine, Q, of size 2w over alphabet {0, 1}n we have that
|Pr
y
[Q accepts y]− Pr
x
[Q accepts prg(x)]| ≤ ε
where y is chosen uniformly at random in ({0, 1}n)k and x in {0, 1}m.
Theorem 3.4.1. [103] There exists a fixed constant c > 0 such that for any w, k ≤
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cn there exists an (explicit) pseudorandom generator prg : {0, 1}O(k)+n → {0, 1}n2k
for space(w) with parameter 2−cn. Moreover, prg can be computed in polynomial
time (in n, 2k).
3.5 Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge
Another important cryptographic primitive used in the constructions of non-
malleable codes in Chapter 5 is non-interactive zero knowledge proof systems.
Definition 3.5.1 (Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge [111]). Π = (`,P,V, Sim =
(Sim1, Sim2)) is an efficient adaptive single-theorem non-interactive zero knowledge
proof system for language L ∈ NP with witness relation W , if ` is a polynomial and
the following are true:
• Completeness: For all x ∈ L, and all w such that W (x,w) = 1, for all strings
crs of length `(|x|), we have V(x,P(x,w, crs), crs)) = 1
• Soundness: For all adversaries A, if crs ∈ {0, 1}`(k) is chosen randomly, then
Pr[V(x, π, crs) = 1] ≤ negl(k). Where, (x, π)← A(crs) and x /∈ L.
• Single-Theorem Zero Knowledge: For all non-uniform polynomial-time adver-
saries A = (A1, A2) we have that |Pr[ExptA(k) = 1] − Pr[ExptSimA (k) = 1]| ≤












π ← Sim2(x, κ)
returnA2(π, τ)
Definition 3.5.2 (Weak Simulation Soundness [111]). Let Π = (`,P,V, Sim =
(Sim1, Sim2)) be an efficient adaptive single-theorem non-interactive zero knowledge
proof system for language L. We say that Π is simulation-sound if for all non-
uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A = (A1, A2), Pr[Expt
Sim
A,Π(k) =




π ← Sim2(x, crs, κ)
(x∗, π∗)← A2(x, π, crs, τ)
Output 1 iff (π∗ 6= π) and (x∗ /∈ L) and (V(x∗, π∗, crs) = 1)
We say Π is one-time weak simulation sound if the above holds for any prob-
abilistic polynomial time A only allowed a single query to Sim.
Sahai [111] constructed one-time simulation sound NIZK proof system from
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any given efficient non-interactive single-theorem adaptive zero knowledge proof sys-
tem, and strong one-time signature schemes (which was built from one-way functions
in the same work).
Definition 3.5.3 (Same-String NIZK [55]). A NIZK argument system is called
same-string NIZK if it satisfies the following property for all k:
• (Same-String Zero Knowledge): For all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaries A, we have that
|Pr[X = 1]− Pr[Y = 1]| ≤ negl(k)
where X and Y are as defined in (and all probabilities are taken over) the
experiment Expt(k) below:
Expt(k):
1. (crs, τ)← Sim1(1k)
2. X ← AP(·,·,crs)(crs)
3. Y ← ASim′(·,·,crs,τ)(crs)
where Sim′(x,w, crs, τ)
def
= Sim2(x, crs, τ)
• (Same-String Zero Knowledge,cont.): The distribution on crs produced
by Sim1(1
k) is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}`(k).
Definition 3.5.4 (Non-Interactive Simulatable Proof System). A tuple of prob-
abilistic polynomial time algorithms ΠNI = (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) is a non-
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interactive simulatable proof system for language L ∈ NP with witness relation
W if (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) have the following syntax:
• CRSGenNI is a randomized algorithm that outputs (crsNI, τsim).
• On input crs, x ∈ L and witness w such that W (x,w) = 1, PNI(crs, x, w)
outputs proof π.
• On input crs, x, π, VNI(crs, x, π) outputs either 0 or 1.
• On input crs, τsim and x ∈ L, SimNI(crs, τsim, x) outputs simulated proof π′.
Completeness: We require the following completeness property: For all x ∈ L, and
all w such that W (x,w) = 1, for all strings crsNI of length poly(|x|), and for all
adversaries A we have
Pr
(crs
NI, τSim)← CRSGenNI(1n); (x,w)← A(crsNI);
π ← PNI(crsNI, x, w) : VNI(crsNI, x, π) = 1
 ≥ 1− negl(n)
Soundness: We say that ΠNI enjoys soundness against adversaries A ∈ G if: For




(x, π)← A(crsNI) : VNI(crsNI, x, π) = 0
 ≥ 1− negl(n)
The security properties that we require of ΠNI will depend on our particular
non-malleable code construction as well as the particular class, F , of tampering
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functions that we consider. The exact properties needed are those that will arise from
Theorems 5.3.1 and 5.4.1. In subsequent sections, we will show how to construct
non-interactive simulatable proof systems satisfying these properties.
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Chapter 4: Non-Malleable Codes for Bounded Depth, Bounded Fan-
in Circuits
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we devise explicit, efficient, and unconditionally secure non-
malleable codes against a powerful tampering class which includes all bounded-depth
circuits with bounded fan-in and unbounded fan-out. Specifically, we consider the
class Localdo , consisting of all functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that can be computed
with output locality do(n), where each output bit depends on at most do(n) input
bits. Note that this class includes all fan-in-b circuits of depth at most logb do.
We prove the following.
Main Theorem (informal): For any do = o(
n
logn
), there is an explicit,
unconditionally secure non-malleable code for Localdo, which encodes a
2k bit string into a string of length n = Θ(kdo) bits. The encoding and
decoding run in time polynomial in n, namely poly(k, do).
This construction can be instantiated for any do = o(n/ log n), and the resulting code
has rate Θ(1/do). In general, since the the output length is n = Θ(kdo) bits, this
may result in super-polynomial length encoding. However, using sublinear locality
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nδ yields an efficient code. We highlight this, as well as the special cases of constant
depth circuits (a subset of LocalO(1)), in the following.
Corollaries: There are efficient, explicit, and unconditionally secure
non-malleable codes for the following classes:
• Localnδ for any constant 0 ≤ δ < 1, with inverse-polynomial rate.
• NC0 with rate Θ(1/do) for any do = ω(1).
• NC0c for any constant c, with constant rate.
The first corollary follows by instantiating the main theorem with do = n
δ, the
second by using any do that is super constant (e.g., log
∗(n)), and the third by using
do = 2
c (a constant).
While our result for NC0 correspond to constant depth circuits, the first corol-
lary above implies as a special case that the code is also non-malleable against any
δ log n depth NC circuit, for any constant 0 ≤ δ < 1. Note that, since separations be-
tween P and NC1 are not known, constructing (unconditional) non-malleable codes
against NC1 is unlikely, since an attacker in P can always decode and re-encode a
related message, thus immediately breaking non-malleability.
Intermediate Results for (Input-and-Output) Local Functions. To prove
our results, we use the concept of non-malleable reduction, introduced by Aggarwal
et al. [3]. Informally, a class of functions F reduces to the class G, if there is an
encoding and decoding algorithms satisfying the following: applying the encoding
to the input, then applying any f ∈ F , and then applying the decoding, can be
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simulated by directly applying some function g ∈ G to the input. [3] prove that in
this case a non-malleable code for G can be used to construct one for F , and further
prove a composition theorem, providing an elegant and powerful way to construct
non-malleable codes.
Following this technique, we start by proving two separate results, and com-
pose them (together with known results for the class of split state functions), to
obtain a restricted variant of the main theorem above. We then use the same ideas
to show a single construction allowing for a better combined analysis that achieves
the full main theorem (via reduction to the class of split state functions). We believe
our techniques are more comprehensible presented in this modular fashion, and the
intermediate results are of independent interest.
First, we consider the class Localdodi of local functions, with output locality
do as well as input locality di (namely each input bit influences at most di output
bits). This class includes bounded-depth circuits with bounded fan-in and bounded








a larger, leaky version of it) can be non-malleably reduced to the class of split
state functions. Plugging in known results for non-malleable split state codes, we
obtain a non-malleable code for this class. Our second result shows a non-malleable
reduction of the class LocalÕ(
√
n) to the above class (thus giving a non-malleable
code for functions with output locality Õ(
√
n)). Finally, we combine the encoding
schemes presented previously to a single encoding scheme (via a reduction to split
state class), and improve the analysis to show resilience against o(n/ log n) output
locality.
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We remark that our first technical result for (input and output) local functions
is of independent interest, and although as stated it is strictly weaker than our
output-local results, the construction can have advantages in terms of complexity
and concrete parameters, and has stronger resilience to leakage and to tampering
functions that are both local and split-state, as we discuss next. We believe that both
Localdodi and Local
do are interesting classes, capturing natural types of tampering
adversaries.
Extended Classes: Combining with Split State and Beyond. Our results
are in fact broader than presented so far. First, every one of our results works not
only for the class of functions claimed, but also for any split state function. This
is because for all of our schemes, encoding is applied independently on each half of
the input, and thus can handle a split-state tampering function trivially.
Furthermore, our intermediate result for (input-output) local functions can
handle any function that applies arbitrary changes within each part and has bounded
input and output locality between the two parts (this class is much broader than
all functions that are either split state or local). More precisely, we can handle
functions where any bit on the left affects at most Õ(
√
n) bits on the right (and
vice-versa), and any bit on the left is affected by at most Õ(
√
n) bits on the right
(and vice-versa).
Finally, our constructions can also handle some leakage to the tampering func-
tion, capturing an adversary that first leaks some bits, and can then select a tam-
pering function. For our input-output local tampering result, the leakage can be a
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constant fraction of the bits, while for our output-local tampering result, the leakage
is more limited.
Relation of Our Class to Previous Work. As mentioned above, almost all
previous results presenting explicit and efficient non-malleable codes, do so for a
split state tampering class (with two or more states). These classes are a special
case of ours, as we explained, which is not surprising given that we use results for
split state functions as a starting point to prove our result. As for the exceptions
that go beyond split state, we note that the class of functions that permute the bits
or apply bitwise manipulations, introduced by [9], is also a special case of our class,
as it is a subset of Local1 (in fact, even a subset of Local11). The restricted linear
tampering class considered by [29], on the other hand, seems incomparable to our
class of output-local functions.
Thus, in terms of the tampering class captured, our results simultaneously
encompass (and significantly extend) almost all previously known explicit, efficient
constructions of non-malleable codes (we are aware of only one exception). This is
not the case in terms of the rate, where several previous works focus on optimizing
the rate for smaller classes of functions (e.g., [43] achieve rate 1−o(1) non-malleable
codes for bit-wise tampering functions, and [2] do so for split-state functions under
computational assumptions), while we only achieve a constant rate for these classes.
We also mention that the original work of Dziembowski et al. [65] already con-
sidered the question of constructing non-malleable codes against the class Localδ·n,
where n is the length of the codeword and δ < 1 is a constant. We emphasize,
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however, that in [65] (and an improvement in [42]), they showed a construction of
non-malleable codes against Localδ·n in a non-standard, random oracle model where
the encoding and decoding functions make queries to a random oracle, but the ad-
versarial tampering function does not query the random oracle. Our work shows
that it is possible to construct non-malleable codes for Localδ·n for δ = o(1/ log n)
in the standard model, with no random oracle.
On Randomized Decoding. Our constructions require the decoding function of
the non-malleable code to be randomized. We note that, unlike the case of error
correcting codes and encryption schemes, deterministic decoding for non-malleable
codes does not seem to be without loss of generality, even in the case where the
encoding scheme enjoys perfect correctness. To see why, note that while perfect
correctness guarantees that all possible coins of the decoding algorithm produce the
same output on a valid codeword, correctness provides no guarantees in the case
when the codeword is corrupted and so it is not possible to derandomize by simply
fixing an arbitrary sequence of coins for the decoder. Moreover, since the decoder
holds no secret key in the non-malleable codes setting, it is also not possible to
derandomize the decoding process by including the key of a pseudorandom function
in the secret key. Since the standard definition of non-malleable codes already allows
for randomized encoding, and since the standard definition of non-malleable codes
only guarantees security in the one-time setting—wherein each time the codeword
is decoded it must be refreshed by re-encoding the original message—we believe
that allowing randomized decoding is the natural and “correct” definition for non-
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malleable codes (although the original definition required deterministic decoding).
Interestingly, we can combine our technical building blocks into a construc-
tion of non-malleable codes against Localdo for any do ≤ n1/4, using deterministic
decoding. Unfortunately, when compared to our construction utilizing randomized
decoding, this construction has a lower rate of O(1/do
2) (instead of O(1/do)), and





efficient or Localo(n/ logn) inefficient).
We therefore leave as an interesting open question to resolve whether ramdom-
ized decoding is necessary for achieving security against certain tampering classes,
F , or whether there is a generic way to derandomize decoding algorithms for non-
malleable codes.
4.1.1 Technical Overview
We give a high level technical overview of our constructions. We use as an
underlying tool a so called “reconstructable probabilistic encoding scheme”, a code
that can correct a constant fraction of errors (denoted cerr), and enjoys some addi-
tional secret-sharing like properties: given a (smaller) constant fraction csec of the
codeword gives no information on the encoded message, and can in fact be completed
to a (correctly distributed) encoding of any message. This or similar tools were used
in previous works either implicitly or explicitly, e.g., the construction based on Reed
Solomon codes and Shamir secret sharing with Berlekamp-Welch correction, as used
already in [23] is a RPE (any small enough subset of shares is distributed uniformly
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at random, and any such collection of shares can be extended to be the sharing of
any message of our choice). Other RPE schemes with possibly improved parameters
can be constructed from, e.g., [44, 45,49,57].
Handling Local Functions.
Local functions are functions that have both small input and small output
locality (i.e. each input bit affects a small number of output bits and each output
bit depends on a small number of input bits). Our goal is to show a non-malleable
reduction from a class of local functions with appropriate parameters, to the class
of split-state functions. Loosely speaking, a non-malleable reduction from a class F
to a class G, is a pair (E,D) of encoding/decoding functions along with a reduction
that transforms every f ∈ F into a distribution Gf over functions g ∈ G, such that
for every x, the distributions D(f(E(x))) and Gf (x) are statistically close. In the
case of reductions to split-state, we let x = (L,R) where L,R ∈ {0, 1}k. We want
to construct (E,D) such that, informally, given any local f , the effect of applying f
to the encoding E(x) and then decoding D(f(E(x))), can be simulated by applying
some split state function g = (gL, gR) directly to x = (L,R).
We will use an encoding that works on each half of the input separately, and
outputs E(L,R) = (EL(L), ER(R)) = (sL, sR), where |sL| = nL, |sR| = nR (we will re-
fer to these as “left” and “right” sides, though as we will see they will not be of equal
lengths, and we will have appropriately designed decoding algorithms for each part
separately). Now for any given local f , consider f(sL, sR) = (fL(sL, sR), fR(sL, sR)).
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Clearly, if fL only depended on sL and fR only depended on sR, we would be done
(as this would naturally correspond to a distribution of split state functions on the
original x = (L,R)). However, this is generally not the case, and we need to take
care of “cross-effects” of sR on fL and sL on fR.
Let’s start with fL, and notice that if its output locality is at most do, then
at most nLdo bits from s
R could possibly influence the output of fL. Thus, we will
use ER that is an RPE with nLdo ≤ csecnR. This means that we can just fix the
relevant nLdo bits from s
R = ER(R) randomly (and independently of R), and now
fL will only depend on sL, while sR can still be completed to a correctly distributed
encoding of R. Note that this requires making the right side larger than the left side
(nR ≥ nLdocsec ).
Now let’s consider fR. Clearly we cannot directly do the same thing we did
for fL, since that technique required nR to be much longer than nL, while applying
it here would require the opposite. Instead, we will take advantage of the smaller
size on the left, and its limited input locality. Specifically, if the input locality of fL
is di, then at most nLdi bits on the right side can be influenced by s
L.
A first (failed) attempt would be to just make sure that the encoding on the
right can correct up to nLdi errors, and hope that we can therefore set s
L arbitrarily
when computing fR and the resulting encoding would still be decoded to the same
initial value R. While this argument works if the only changes made to sR (a valid
codeword) are caused by the “crossing bits” from sL, it fails to take into account
that fR can in fact apply other changes inside sR, and so it could be that sR is
malformed in such a way that applying fR will cause it to decode differently in a
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way that crucially depends on sL. The issue here seems to be that there is an exact
threshold for when the decoding algorithm succeeds or not, and thus the function
can be designed so that fR is just over or under the threshold depending on the left
side.
To overcome this problem, we use randomized decoding and a “consistency
check” technique introduced in [44], and a forthcoming version by the same au-
thors [45], in a different context. Roughly speaking, we make the right side encod-
ing redundant, so that any large enough subset of bits is enough to recover R. An
RPE has this property due its error correction capabilities. The decoding algorithm
will decode via the first such subset, but will check a random subset of bits were
consistent with a particular corrected codeword. This will yield similar behavior, re-
gardless of which subset is used to decode. This construction has various subtleties,
but they are all inherited from previous work, so we do not explain them here. The
main point is that, like in [44, 45], while the real decoding algorithm uses the first
subset large enough, it can be simulated by using any other large enough subset.
Now, using the fact that “large enough” is not too large, and that at most
nLdi bits on the right side can be influenced by s
L, we can show that with high
probability, there is a large enough “clean” subset of sR that has no influence from
sL. The real decoding algorithm could be simulated by a decoding that uses this
clean subset, which in turn means that the output of the decoding on fR(sL, sR) is
in fact independent of sL, as needed.
Putting the above together provides us the first result, namely a non-malleable
reduction from local to split state functions. We note that the proof above in
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fact works for a more general class of functions (a fact we will use in our second
construction). In particular, the first part requires a limit on the output locality of
fL, and the second part requires a limit on the output locality of fR and the input
locality of fL, where all of these only refer to “cross-over” influences (within each
part separately f can be arbitrary). Moreover, due to our use of encoding, security
is maintained even with leakage, as long as the leakage is a constant fraction of bits
on the left and a constant fraction on the right, independently. Similarly, security
is maintained even when a constant fraction of bits on the left do not adhere to the
input locality bound.
Removing Input Locality.
We next present a non-malleable reduction from output local functions (which
have no restriction on input locality) to local functions. Now let f be an output
local tampering function. Since the input and output to f are the same size, note
that the average input locality of f can be bounded by its output locality, do.
Our local construction above requires low input locality for the left side, but also
requires the left side to be much shorter than the right side. Unfortunately, what
this means is that the input locality of all bits on the left side of the local encoding
described above can be far higher than average. So, in order to bound the average
input locality of the left side, we must increase the length of the left side, but this
destroys our analysis from the first construction.
In order to achieve the best of both worlds, our idea is to construct a non-
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malleable reduction which increases the size of the left side of the underlying local
encoding by adding dummy inputs. The “relevant” inputs, which correspond to bits
of the left side of the underlying local encoding, are placed randomly throughout the
left side of the new encoding. The idea is that since the adversary does not know
which bit positions on the left side are “relevant,” it cannot succeed in causing too
many “relevant” positions to have input locality that is too much above average.
But now, in order to decode properly, the decoding algorithm must be able to
recover these “relevant” locations, without sharing a secret state with the encoding
algorithm (which is disallowed in the standard non-malleable codes setting). In
order to do this, the first idea is to encode the relevant positions on the left side of
the new encoding in an additional string, which is then appended to the left side
during the new encoding procedure. Unfortunately, it is not clear how to make
this work: Since this additional string is long, it can depend on a large number of
input bits from both the left and right sides; on the other hand, in order to obtain a
reduction from output local to local functions, the reduction must be able to recover
this (possibly tampered) additional string so that it “knows” which output bits of
X̃L are relevant.
The solution is to use a PRG with a short seed. The seed of the PRG is now
the additional string that is appended to the left side and the output of the PRG
yields an indicator string which specifies the “relevant” locations for decoding. Note
that now since the PRG seed of length r is short, we can, using the leakage resilient
properties of the underlying local code, leak all r · do ≤ csec · nL ≤ csec · nR number
of bits affecting these output locations from both the left and right sides.
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Moreover, because the tampering attacker is very limited, in the sense that
it must choose the tampering function before learning any information about the
output of the PRG, we are able to show that Nisan’s PRG (see Definition 3.4.5), an
unconditional PRG is sufficient for our construction. Thus, our construction does
not rely on any computational assumption.
Improving the parameters.
Ultimately the technique sketched above and presented in the body of the
paper imposes two restrictions on output locality (modulo smaller terms): (1)
nLdo ≤ nR (2)do ≈ di ≤ nL. Together these restrictions imply tolerance against out-
put locality of approximately
√
n. The first restriction follows from the asymmetric
encoding to handle bits on the left dependent on the right. The second restriction
results from handling bits on the left of affecting the right side’s consistency check.
To bypass this
√
n barrier, we consider the two encoding schemes as a single
scheme. Then in analysis, we can use the pseudorandom hiding of the left side
encoding to relax the second bound. Namely, with high probability only a small
portion of the left side RPE affects the consistency check, even if the consistency
check and/or output locality is large with respect to nL. This simple change in
analysis gives resilience against o(n/ log n) output locality.
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4.2 Preliminaries
In this section we will provide some more definitions and background required
for our constructions and results presented in chapter 4.
4.2.1 Non-Malleable Codes: Alternate Definitions
Recall that, non-malleable codes were defined in the following manner:
Definition 4.2.1 (Non-Malleable Code). [3] Let F denote a family of tampering
functions. Let E : B → A, D : A → B be a coding scheme. For all f ∈ F and all
x ∈ B define:
Tamperfx := {c← E(x); c̃← f(c); x̃← D(c̃); output: x̃}.
Then, (E,D) is an ε-non-malleable code with respect to F , if there exists a distribu-
tion Df over {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥, same} such that ∀x ∈ B, the statistical distance between
Simfx := {x̃← Df ; output: x if x̃ = same & x̃, otherwise},
and Tamperfx is at most ε.
The above of definition has its origins in [66]. Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and
Wichs required the simulator to be efficient. Aggarwal et al. demonstrated that
the above relaxation is, in fact, equivalent for deterministic decoding. Allowing
decoding to be randomized does not affect their proof. For this reason, we will
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not concern ourselves with the efficiency of a simulator (or, equivalently, sampling
relevant distributions) for the remainder of this chapter.
Aggarwal et al. provide a simpler alternative to the above simulation-based
definition, which they prove equivalent. [3] Their definition is based on the notion
of non-malleable reduction, which we will use in this chapter.
Definition 4.2.2 (Non-Malleable Reduction). [3] Let F ⊂ AA and G ⊂ BB be
some classes of functions. We say F reduces to G, (F ⇒ G, ε), if there exists an
efficient (randomized) encoding function E : B → A, and an efficient (randomized)
decoding function D : A→ B, such that
(a) ∀x ∈ B,Pr[D(E(x)) = x] = 1 (over the randomness of E,D).
(b) ∀f ∈ F ,∃G : ∀x ∈ B, ∆(D(f(E(x)));G(x)) ≤ ε, where G is a distribution over
G and G(x) denotes the distribution g(x), where g ← G.
If the above holds, then (E,D) is an (F ,G, ε)-non-malleable reduction.
Definition 4.2.3 (Non-Malleable Code). [3] Let NMk denote the set of trivial
manipulation functions on k-bit strings, consisting of the identity function id(x) = x
and all constant functions fc(x) = c, where c ∈ {0, 1}k.
A coding scheme (E,D) defines an (F , k, ε)-non-malleable code, if it defines
an (F ,NMk, ε)-non-malleable reduction.
Aggarwal et al. also prove the following useful theorem for composing non-
malleable reductions.
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Theorem 4.2.1 (Composition). [3] If (F ⇒ G, ε1) and (G ⇒ H, ε2), then (F ⇒
H, ε1 + ε2).
We note that the proof given in [3] goes through unchanged with randomized
decoding.
4.2.2 Tampering Families
Definition 4.2.4 (Split-State Model). [66] The split-state model, SSk, denotes
the set of all functions:
{f = (f1, f2) : f(x) = (f1(x1:k) ∈ {0, 1}k, f2(xk+1:2k) ∈ {0, 1}k) for x ∈ {0, 1}2k}.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Efficient Split-State Non-malleable Codes). [97] For any k ∈ N,
there exists an efficient, explicit 2-state non-malleable code with block length 2k and
rate Ω(1/logk) with negligible error.
4.2.3 Reconstructable Probabilistic Encoding Scheme
Reconstructable Probabilistic Encoding (RPE) schemes were defined by Choi
et al. (in an in-submission journal version of [44], as well as in [45]), extending a
definition given by Decatur, Goldreich and Ron [57]. Informally, this is an error
correcting code, which has an additional secrecy property and reconstruction prop-
erty. The secrecy property allows a portion of the output to be revealed without
leaking any information about the encoded message. The reconstruction property
allows, given a message and a partial codeword for it, to reconstruct a complete
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consistent codeword. Thus, this is a combination of error correcting code and se-
cret sharing, similar to what has been used in the literature already starting with
Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [23].
Definition 4.2.5 (Binary Reconstructable Probabilistic Encoding). [44, 45] We
say a triple (E,D,Rec) is a binary reconstructable probabilistic encoding scheme with
parameters (k, n, cerr, csec), where k, n ∈ N, 0 < cerr, csec < 1, if it satisfies the
following properties:
1. Error correction. E : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n is an efficient probabilistic proce-
dure, which maps a message m ∈ {0, 1}k to a distribution over {0, 1}n. If we
let W denote the support of E, any two strings in W are 2cerr-far. Moreover,
D is an efficient procedure that given any w′ ∈ {0, 1}n that is (1− ε)-close to
some string w in W for any ε ≤ cerr, outputs w along with a consistent m.
2. Secrecy of partial views. For all m ∈ {0, 1}k and all sets S ⊂ [n] of size
≤ bcsec · nc, the projection of E(m) onto the coordinates in S, as denoted by
E(m)|S, is identically distributed to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}bc
secnc.
3. Reconstruction from partial views. Rec is an efficient procedure that
given any set S ⊂ [n] of size ≤ bcsec ·nc, any I ∈ {0, 1}n, and any m ∈ {0, 1}k,
samples from the distribution E(m) with the constraint ∀i ∈ S,E(m)i = Ii.
Choi et al. show that a construction of Decatur, Goldreich, and Ron [57] meets
the above requirements.
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Lemma 4.2.1. [44,45] For any k ∈ N, there exists constants 0 < crate, cerr, csec < 1
such that there is a binary RPE scheme with parameters (k, cratek, cerr, csec).
Remark 4.2.1. To achieve longer encoding lengths ck, with the same cerr and csec
parameters, one can simply pad the message to an appropriate length.
Specifically, Decatur, Goldreich and Ron [57] construct a probabilistic encod-
ing scheme that possesses the first two properties listed above. Moreover, since the
construction they present, instantiates E with a linear error-correcting code, we have
that property (3) holds. (Any linear error-correcting code has efficient reconstruc-
tion.)
These are the parameters we use here, but we believe it may be possible to
achieve a better rate if we use parameters based on the recent result of Coretti et
al. [48] (see also [43]).
4.3 Non-malleable Codes for Local
`i(n)
`o(n)
Theorem 4.3.1. (E,D) is a (Local
do(k)
di(k)
⇒ SSk, negl(k))-non-malleable reduction
given the following parameters for Local
do(k)
di(k)
(where crate, cerr, csec are taken from
lemma 4.2.1):




• di ≤ 12do/csec.
• n := crate k2
log2(k)







Putting together Theorem 4.3.1 with Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we obtain the
following.
Corollary 4.3.1. (E ◦ESS,DSS ◦D) is a (Local``, k, negl(k))-non-malleable code with
rate Θ(1/`), where ` = Õ(
√
n).
Remark 4.3.1. The reduction presented below is, in fact, a (XLocal`` ⇒ SSk, negl(k))-
non-malleable reduction, where ` = Õ(
√
n) and XLocal`` is the following class of
functions f : {0, 1}nL+nR → {0, 1}nL+nR:
• For i = 1, . . . , nL, there are at most ` indices j ∈ {nL + 1, . . . , nL + nR} such
that the i-th input bit affects fj. And, for i = nL + 1, . . . , nL + nR, there are
at most ` indices j ∈ {1, . . . , nL} such that the i-th input bit affects fj.
• For i = 1, . . . , nL, there are at most ` indices j ∈ {nL + 1, . . . , nL + nR} such
that the fi-th is affected by the j-th input bit. And, for i = nL+1, . . . , nL+nR,
there are at most ` indices j ∈ {1, . . . , nL} such that the fi-th is affected by
the j-th input bit.
In other words, the reduction holds for a generalized variant of split state tampering
where we only restrict locality with respect to the opposite side, and allow arbitrary
locality within each side. nL and nR are the lengths of the left and right side code-
words, respectively.
We construct an encoding scheme (E,D) summarized in Figure 4.1 and




non-malleable reduction. This immediately implies that given a non-malleable en-
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coding scheme (Ess,Dss) for class SSk (where SS is the class of split-state func-
tions), the encoding scheme scheme Π = (Ebd,Dbd), where Ebd(m) := E(Ess(m)) and




We parametrize our construction for Local
do(k)
di(k)
⇒ SSk with the following:
• (EL,DL) parametrized by (k, nL, cerrL , csecL ) := (k, cratek, cerr, csec) where cerr, csec,
crate are taken from lemma 4.2.1.


















Note that this setting of parameters is taken with our forthcoming reduction
in mind. (See Corollary 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.4.1.) One may take any parametriza-
tion for which (a) such RPEs exist, (b) (1 − cerr/4)ncheck is negligible in k, and (c)
Observation 1 (below) is satisfied. For certain applications, parametrization other
than ours may be advantageous.
Let f(~sL, ~sR) = (fL(~sL, ~sR), fR(~sL, ~sR)), where (~sL, ~sR) ∈ {0, 1}nL×{0, 1}nR and
fL(~sL, ~sR) ∈ {0, 1}nL and fR(~sL, ~sR) ∈ {0, 1}nR .
• Let SR→L denote the set of positions j such that input bit ~sRj affects the output
of fL.
• Let SL→R denote the set of positions i such that input bit ~sLi affects the output
of fR.
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Let (EL,DL,RecL) be a binary reconstructable probabilistic encoding scheme with




L ) and let (ER,DR,RecR) be a binary reconstructable prob-





Also let dsec, ncheck be parameters.
E(x := (L,R)):
1. Compute (sL1, . . . , s
L
nL
)← EL(L) and (sR1 , . . . , sRnR)← ER(R).
2. Output the encoding (~sL, ~sR) := ([sLi ]i∈[nL], [s
R
i ]i∈[nR]).
D(~σ := (~σL, ~σR)):
1. Let (~σL, ~σR) := ([σLi ]i∈[nL], [σ
R
i ]i∈[nR]).
2. Compute ((wL1 , . . . , w
L
nL
), L) ← DL(σL1 , . . . , σLnL). If the decoding fails, set
L :=⊥.
3. (decoding-check on right) Let t := dnR(1 − cerrR /4)e Define ~σ′
R
:=
σ′R1 , . . . , σ
′R
nR
as follows: Set σ′R` := σ
R
` for ` = 1, . . . , t. Set σ
′R
` := 0 for
` = t + 1, . . . , nR. Compute ((w
R
1 , . . . , w
R
nR
),R) ← DR(σ′R1 , . . . , σ′Rt ). If the
decoding fails or (wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
) is not cerrR /4-close to (σ
R
1 , . . . , σ
R
tR
), set R :=⊥.
4. (codeword-check on right) Pick a random subset Rcheck ⊂ [nR] of size
ncheck < c
sec
R · nR. For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If the check
fails, set R :=⊥.
5. (output) Output x := (L,R).
Figure 4.1: The (Local
do(k)
di(k)
,SS, negl(k))-non-malleable reduction (E,D)
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• For J ⊂ [nR], let SJL→R denote the set of positions i such that input bit ~sLi
affects the output of fRj for some j ∈ J .
• For a set Rcheck ⊆ nR of size ncheck, let Scheck denote the set of positions i such
that input bit ~sLi affects the output of f
R
` for some ` ∈ Rcheck.






























Figure 4.2: The adversary chooses tampering function f = (fL, fR) ∈ Localdo(k)di(k) which takes
inputs (~sL, ~sR) and produces outputs (~σL, ~σR). The highlighted bits of ~sL and ~sR
are the “bad” bits. E.g. note that bits sR2 and s
R





respectively after fL is applied to (~sL, ~sR). Thus we add 2 and i to the set SR→L.
Similarly, the bits sL1 and s
L
3 affect the bits {σR1 , σRi } and the bits {σR2 , σRi+1, σRnR,}
respectively after the tampering function fR is applied to (~sL, ~sR). We therefore add





also add both 1 and 3 to the set SL→R.
The sets defined above are illustrated in Figure 4.2. We observe the following
immediate facts about their sizes:
Observation 1. For f ∈ Localdodi , we have the following:
1. There is some set J∗ ⊂ [nR] such that |J∗| = t and |SJ
∗
L→R| = 0 (from now on,
J∗ denotes the lexicographically first such set).
(Since |SL→R| ≤ di · nL ≤ nR − t.)
2. By choice of parameters nL, ncheck, c
sec
L , we have that |Scheck| ≤ nL · csecL .
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(Since Scheck ≤ do · ncheck.)
3. By choice of parameters nL, nR, c
sec
R , we have that |SR→L| ≤ do · nL ≤ nR · csecR .
Now, for every f ∈ Localdodi , we define the distribution Gf over SSk. A draw from
Gf is defined as follows:
• Choose a random subset Rcheck ⊆ [nR] of size ncheck.
• Choose vectors IL ∈ {0, 1}nL × {∗}nL , IR ∈ {∗}nL × {0, 1}nR uniformly at
random.
• Let J∗ be the subset of [nR] as described in Observation 1.
• The split-state tampering function g := (gL, gR) ∈ SSk has IL, IR hardcoded
into it and is specified as follows:
gL(L):
1. (apply tampering and plain decode on left) Let
~sL := Rec(Scheck, IL, L). Let (σL1 , . . . , σLnL) := f
L|IR(~sL).
Compute ((wL1 , . . . , w
L
nL
), L̃)← DL(σL1 , . . . , σLnL). If the decoding fails, set
L̃ :=⊥.
2. (output) Output L̃.
gR(R):
1. (apply tampering and decoding-check on right) Let
~sR = (sR1 , . . . , s
R
nR
) := Rec(SR→L, IR,R). Let (σR1 , . . . , σRnR) := f
R|IL(~sR).
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Define ~σ′R := σ′R1 , . . . , σ
′R
nR
as follows: Set σ′R` := σ
R
` for ` ∈ [J∗]. Set
σ′R` := 0 for ` /∈ [J∗]. Compute ((wR1 , . . . , wRnR), R̃) ← DR(σ
′R
1 , . . . , σ
′R
t ).
If the decoding fails or (wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
) is not cerrR /4-close to (σ
R




then set R̃ :=⊥.
2. (codeword-check on right) For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If
the check fails, set R̃ :=⊥.
3. (output) Output R̃.
• Output g = (gL, gR).
Whenever Rec is run above, we assume that enough positions are set by S
such that there is only a single consistent codeword. If this is not the case, then
additional positions are added to S from IL, IR, respectively.
By the definition of a non-malleable reduction (Definition 4.2.2), in order to
complete the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, we must show that (E,D) have the following
properties:
1. For all x ∈ {0, 1}k, we have D(E(x)) = x with probability 1.
2. For all f ∈ Localdodi ,
∆(D(f(E(x)));Gf (x)) ≤ negl(k),
where Gf is the distribution defined above.
Item (1) above is trivial and can be immediately verified. In the following, we
prove Item (2) above by considering the following sequence of hybrid arguments for
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each function f ∈ Localdodi (for the intermediate hybrids, we highlight the step in
which they are different from the desired end distributions).
Hybrid H0. This is the original distribution D(f(E(x)))
Hybrid H1. H1 corresponds to the distribution D
′(f(E(x))), where D′ is defined as
follows:
D(~σ := (~σL, ~σR)):
1. (plain decode on left) Let (~σL, ~σR) := ([σLi ]i∈[nL], [σ
R
` ]`∈[nR]). Compute
((wL1 , . . . , w
L
nL
), L)← DL(σL1 , . . . , σLnL). If the decoding fails, set L :=⊥.
2. (decoding-check on right) Define ~σ′R := σ′R1 , . . . , σ
′R
nR
as follows: Set σ′R` :=
σR` for ` ∈ J∗ and σ′R` := 0 for ` /∈ J∗, where J∗ ⊆ [nR] is the lexicographically
first set such that |J∗| = t and |SJ∗L→R| = 0. Compute ((wR1 , . . . , wRnR),R) ←
DR(σ
′R
1 , . . . , σ
′R
tR
). If the decoding fails or (wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
) is not cerrR /4-close to
(σR1 , . . . , σ
R
tR
), set R :=⊥.
3. (codeword-check on right) For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If the
check fails, set R :=⊥.
4. (output) Output x := (L,R).
Note that the only difference between D and D′ is that in decoding-check on




































≤ (1− δ)ncheck ,
where the last inequality follows due to the fact that for i ∈ {0, . . . , ncheck − 1},
(1−δ)nR−i
nR−i
≤ (1− δ). Since (1− δ) < 1 is a constant, we can set ncheck = ω(log(k)).
Note that correctness still holds for D′ with probability 1.
We want to show that for every ~σ = (~σL, ~σR) ← f(E(x)), D(~σ) = D′(~σ) with
high probability, over the coins of D,D′.
Let D := (DL,DR) (respectively, D′ := (D′L,D′R)), where DR (respectively, D′R)
correspond to the right output of the decoding algorithm. Notice that only decoding
on the right changes. So, it suffices to show that for each (~σL, ~σR) in the support of
the distribution f(E(x)),
Pr[D|~σL(~σR) = D′|~σL(~σR)] ≥ 1− negl(n), (4.3.1)
where the probabilities are taken over the coins of D,D′.
LetW denote the set of all valid codewords for the given reconstructable prob-




R ,GF(2)). For x ∈ GF(2)nR ,
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define its distance from W to be d(x,W) := minw∈W d(x,w).
To analyze (4.3.1), we define the following set of instances (which intuitively
corresponds to the set of instances on which both D|~σL and D′|~σL are likely to output
⊥).
Π⊥ := {~σR ∈ {0, 1}nR d(~σ,W) ≥ δ}.
So, now consider the two cases:
• Suppose ~σR ∈ Π⊥. Then, both D(~σR) and D′(~σR) will fail the codeword-check
with probability ≥ 1− ρ(nR, δ, ncheck).
• Suppose ~σR /∈ Π⊥. Then, ∃w ∈ W such that d(~σR, w) ≤ δ. Moreover, in
both D and D′ it must be the case that ~σ′R is cerr/2-close to w. (Because
δ + (nR − t)/nR ≤ cerr/2). So both D and D′ must decode to the same w. Fix
a set of coins for D and D′. Therefore, when D and D′ are run with the same
coins, all comparisons made during the codeword-check are identical, and thus
the probability (over the coins of D,D′) that the codeword-check fails in D and
D′ is identical.
So for any ~σ = (~σL, ~σR), ∆({D(~σ)}, {D′(~σ)}) = ∆({DR|~σL(~σR)}, {D′R|~σL(~σR)}) ≤
ρ(nR, δ, ncheck). Therefore, ∆({D(f(E(x)))}, {D′(f(E(x)))} ≤ ρ(nR, δ, ncheck).
Hybrid H2. H2 corresponds to the distribution G
′(x), where G′f is a distribution
over functions g′ = (g′L, g
′
R) defined as follows:
• Choose a random subset Rcheck ⊆ [nR] of size ncheck.
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• Choose vectors IL ∈ {0, 1}nL , IR ∈ {0, 1}nR in the following way: IL ← EL(L),
IR ← ER(R).
• Let J∗ be the subset of [nR] as described in Observation 1.
• The split-state tampering function g := (gL, gR) ∈ SSk has IL, IR hardcoded
into it and is specified as follows:
gL(L):
1. (apply tampering and plain decode on left) Let ~sL := Rec(S :=
Scheck, IL, L). Let (σL1 , . . . , σLnL) := f
L|IR(~sL). Compute ((wL1 , . . . , wLnL), L̃)←
DL(σ
L
1 , . . . , σ
L
nL
). If the decoding fails, set L̃ :=⊥.
2. (output) Output L̃.
gR(R):
1. (apply tampering and decoding-check on right) Let
~sR = (sR1 , . . . , s
R
nR
) := Rec(SR→L, IR,R). Let (σR1 , . . . , σRnR) := f
R|IL(~sR).
Define ~σ′R := σ′R1 , . . . , σ
′R
nR
as follows: Set σ′R` := σ
R
` for ` ∈ [J∗]. Set
σ′R` := 0 for ` /∈ [J∗]. Compute ((wR1 , . . . , wRnR), R̃) ← DR(σ
′R
1 , . . . , σ
′R
t ).
If the decoding fails or (wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
) is not cerrR /4-close to (σ
R




then set R̃ :=⊥.
2. (codeword-check on right) For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If
the check fails, set R̃ :=⊥.
3. (output) Output R̃.
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• Output g = (gL, gR).
Note that the only difference between Gf and G
′
f is that I
L ← EL(L), IR ←
ER(R) are chosen honestly, instead of being chosen uniformly at random. Further-
more, note that g′ = (g′L, g
′
R) are not split-state, since g
′





The claim can be verified by inspection.
Hybrid H3. Hybrid H3 is simply the distribution Gf (x), defined previously.
Claim 4.3.3.
H2 ≡ H3.
Note that the result of fR only depends on the bits in J∗ and Rcheck. Moreover,
fRχJ∗∪Rcheck
only depends on on ~sR, [sLi ]i∈Scheck . Moreover, note that f
L depends only
on ~sL, [sRi ]i∈SR→L . Since by Observation 1, we have that |Scheck| ≤ nL · csecL and
|SR→L| ≤ nR · csecR , the claim follows from the secrecy property of the reconstructable
probabilistic encoding scheme.
4.3.1 Extending to Leaky Local
The construction from Section 4.3 is actually secure against a slightly larger
class of tampering functions beyond Localdodi functions, which we call LL, or “Leaky
Local.” Notice that the parameters given above (as in observation 1) in fact yield:
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It is not too hard to see that we can leak 1/3 of the security threshold, on both the
left and right, to a tampering adversary. Given this leakage, the adversary can then
select a tampering function from the subset of Localdo where all but a fraction of
the first nL bits have input locality di. Note that the input locality restrictions are
only needed on the left portions of codewords in the above proof. We formalize this
new class of tampering functions as follows.
Definition 4.3.1. Let LL ⊆ {{0, 1}qL × {0, 1}qR → {0, 1}qL × {0, 1}qR}, Leaky Lo-
cal, be the set of functions {ψf,h1,h2}, parametrized by functions (f, h1, h2), where
ψf,h1,h2(~s
L, ~sR) := Cuniv(f(h1(~s
L), h2(~s
R)), ~sL, ~sR), f outputs a circuit C and Cuniv
is a universal circuit that computes the output of the circuit C on input (~sL, ~sR).
Moreover, we require that f, h1, h2 have the following form:
• On input ~sL ∈ {0, 1}qL, h1 outputs a subset of cerrL /3 of its input bits.
• On input ~sR ∈ {0, 1}qR, h2 outputs a subset of cerrR /3 of its input bits.
• On input h1(~sL), h2(~sL) ∈ {0, 1}c
err
L /3 × {0, 1}cerrR /3, f outputs a circuit C :
{0, 1}qL × {0, 1}qR → {0, 1}qL × {0, 1}qR, where C has output-locality do. Of
the first qL input bits, all but at most c
err
L /3-fraction have input-locality at most
di.
The following corollary can be easily verified.
Corollary 4.3.2. (E◦ESS,DSS ◦D) is an (LL, SSk, negl(k))-non-malleable reduction.
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4.4 Extending to Localm(n)
We now state our theorem for Localm(n) tampering functions, or bounded fan-
in bounded-depth circuits.
Theorem 4.4.1. (E′,D′) is a (Localdo
′
⇒ LL, negl(n))-non-malleable reduction
given the following parameters for Localdo
′
:
• do′ := csec/12 · di, where di is the input locality of LL,
• E′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}N , where N = qin + 2n− nL, and r = log4(k), where n is
the output length of LL and nL is the length of the left output of LL.
We construct an encoding scheme (E′,D′) summarized in Figure 4.3 and
parametrized below. In brief, our encoding simply distributes the bits of the left
input pseudorandomly in a string comparable in length to the right input. We then
append a short description of where the encoding is hiding, a seed to pseudorandom
generator.
We then show that the pair (E′,D′) is an (Localdo
′
,LL, negl(n))-non-malleable
reduction. Combined with our previous construction, this immediately implies
that given a non-malleable encoding scheme (Ess,Dss) for SSk, the encoding scheme
scheme Π̂ = (Êbd, D̂bd), where Êbd(m) := E′(E(Ess(m))) and D̂bd(~s) := Dss(D(D′(~s)))
yields the following corollary, a non-malleable code against Localdo
′
.
Corollary 4.4.1. (E′,D′) yields, with previous results, a (LocalÕ(
√
n), k, negl(k))-





Remark 4.4.1. As before, the encoding scheme presented below is independent on
the left and right. Therefore, our reduction holds for not just for Localdo
′
but addi-
tionally any split-state function, independent on each side, trivially.
We parametrize our construction for Localdo
′
⇒ LL with the following:
• r := log4(k)
• τ := 2(n−nL), where n is the length of the output of LL and nL is the length
of the left output of LL.
Now, for every µ ∈ Localdo
′
where µ(ζ,XL, xR) := (µζ(ζ,XL, xR), µL(ζ,XL, xR),
µR(ζ,XL, xR)) we define the distribution Gµ over LL. A draw from Gµ is defined as
follows:
• Choose ζ ← {0, 1}r uniformly at random. Compute y := prg(ζ), where y =
y1, . . . , yτ . For i ∈ [τ ], compute Compute ρi := φ(yi).
• If ρ has less than nL number of ones, then set h1, h2, f all to the constant
function 0.
• Otherwise, choose vector IL ∈ {0, 1}τ+nR such that ∀ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ τ if
ρi = 1 then I
L
i = ∗ and otherwise, ILi is chosen uniformly at random.
• The function h1 is defined as follows: h1 outputs the bits in input xL that
affect the output bits of µζ (at most r · do′ ≤ csecL /3 · nL).
• The function h2 is defined as follows: h2 outputs the bits in xR that affect the
output bits of µζ (at most r · do′ ≤ csecR /3 · nR).
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Let prg be a pseudorandom generator for space bounded computations (see Defini-
tion 3.4.5), with inputs of length r and outputs of length log(τ) · τ .
Let G(ζ) be defined as follows:
1. Compute y := prg(ζ).
2. Divide pseudorandom tape y into blocks of bit strings y1, . . . , yτ . Let φ be
the randomized function that chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} with bias p := 3nL/2τ .
For i ∈ [τ ], let ρi = φ(yi), where yi is the explicit randomness of φ. Let
ρ = ρ1, . . . , ρτ . Let num denote the number of positions of ρ that are set to 1.




4. Otherwise, flip all but the first nL 1’s in ρ to 0.
5. Output ρ.
Let E′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}N and D′ : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}n.




1. Choose ζ ← {0, 1}r uniformly at random. Choose ζ ← {0, 1}r uniformly at
random. Compute ρ := G(ζ).
2. For j ∈ [num], let posj denote the j-th position i such that ρi = 1.
3. Let XL ∈ {0, 1}τ be defined in the following way: For j ∈ [nL], XLposj := x
L
j . In
all other locations, XLi is set uniformly at random.
4. Output the encoding (ζ,XL, xR).
D′(Z := (ζ̃, X̃L, x̃R)):
1. (Recover ρ̃) Let ρ̃ := G(ζ̃). Let ñum ≥ nL denote the number of ones in
ρ̃ := ρ̃1, . . . , ρ̃τ .
2. (Recover x) For j ∈ [ñum], let posj denote the j-th position i such that ρ̃i = 1.





4. (output) Output (x̃L, x̃R).
Figure 4.3: The (Localdo
′
,LL, negl(n))-non-malleable reduction (E′,D′)
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• The function f is defined as follows:
– f computes ζ̃, given ζ and the output of h1, h2.
– f computes ỹ := prg(ζ̃), where ỹ = ỹ1, . . . , ỹτ .
– For i ∈ [τ ], f computes ρ̃i := φ(ỹi).
– Let ρ̃∗ ∈ {0, 1}τ be defined as follows: For i ∈ [pos∗], ρ̃∗ = ρ̃; for pos∗ <
i ≤ τ, ρ̃∗ = 0, where pos∗ is the index of the nL-th one in ρ̃ (and is set to
τ if no such index exists).
– Let µL,ζ (resp. µR,ζ) correspond to the function µL(ζ,XL, xR) (resp.
µR(ζ,XL, xR))), which has ζ hardcoded in it.
– Let C be the circuit corresponding to the following restriction:
((µL,ζ |IL)ρ̃∗ , µR,ζ |IL).
– If C is in LL, then f outputs C. Otherwise, f outputs the constant
function 0.
By the definition of a non-malleable reduction (Definition 4.2.2), in order to
complete the proof of Theorem 4.4.1, we must show that (E′,D′) has the following
properties:
1. For all x ∈ {0, 1}n, we have D′(E′(x)) = x with probability 1.





where Gµ is the distribution defined above.
Item (1) above is trivial and can be immediately verified.
In the following, we prove Item (2), above, by noting that the statistical dis-
tance ∆(D′(µ(E′(x)));Gµ(x)) is upper bounded by the probability that either ρ does
not contain at least nL number of ones or C is not in LL.
We first argue that if ρ is chosen uniformly at random, then the probability
that either of these events occurs is negligible and then show that the same must be
true when ρ is chosen via a PRG with appropriate security guarantees.
Clearly, by multiplicative Chernoff bounds, if ρ is chosen uniformly at random,
then the probability that ρ contains less than nL ones is negligible. We now show
that the probability that C /∈ LL is negligible. If C /∈ LL, it means that more than
csecL /3 number of positions i in X
L are such that (1) XLi has “high input locality”
(i.e. input locality greater than 12/csecL · do
′ = di) (2) ρi = 1.
Since the adversary first specifies the tampering function µ, all positions in
XL with “high input locality” are determined. Note that, by choice of parameters
(since τ ≥ N/2), there can be at most csecL ·τ/6 number of positions in XL with “high
input locality”. Since p = 3nL/2τ , we expect c
sec
L · nL/4 number of positions i in XL
where (1) XLi has “high input locality” and (2) ρi = 1. Therefore, by multiplicative
Chernoff bounds, the probability that more than csecL ·nL/3 number of positions i in
XL are such that (1) XLi has “high input locality” and (2) ρi = 1 is negligible.
We now argue that these events must also occur with negligible probability
when ρ is pseudorandom. Assume the contrary, then the following is a distinguisher
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T that can distinguish truly random strings y from strings y := prg(ζ) with non-
negligible probability.
T is a circuit that has a string w ∈ {0, 1}τ hardwired into it (non-uniform
advice). w corresponds to the high input locality positions determined by the tam-
pering function µ that was chosen by the adversary A. Intuitively, w is the string
that causes A to succeed in breaking security of the non-malleable code with highest
probability.
On input y = y1, . . . , yτ (where either y := prg(ζ) or y is chosen uniformly at
random), T (y) does the following:
1. Set count1 = 0, count2 = 0.
2. For i = 1 to τ :
(a) Run φ(yi) to obtain ρi.
(b) If ρi = 1, set count2 := count2 + 1
(c) If ρi = 1 and wi = 1, set count1 := count1 + 1.
3. If count1 > c
sec
L · nL/3 or count2 < nL, output 0. Otherwise, output 1.
T can clearly be implemented by a read-once, Finite State Machine (FSM)
with 2O(log
2(τ)) number of states. However, note that by Theorem 3.4.1, prg is a
pseudorandom generator for space log3(k) with parameter 2− log
3(k). Thus, existence
of distinguisher T as above, leads to contradiction to the security of the Nisan PRG.
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4.5 Achieving Resilience against o(n/ log n) Output Locality
We now present the proof of our final main theorem. The encoding scheme we
use is simply the composition of the two schemes presented previously with slightly
different parameters The only substantial difference is in the analysis.
Theorem 4.5.1. (E′,D′) is a (Localdo ⇒ SS, negl(n))-non-malleable reduction given
the following parameters for Localdo:
• do = o(n/ log(n)).
• E′ : {0, 1}2k → {0, 1}n, where n = O(dok).
Putting together Theorem 4.5.1 with Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we obtain the
following.
Corollary 4.5.1. (E◦ESS,DSS ◦D) is a (Localdo , k, negl(k))-non-malleable code with
rate Θ(1/do), where do = o(n/ log n).
Remark 4.5.1. Note that n = Θ(dok). Thus, for resilience against do = n
1−ε our
codes is of polynomial length n = k1/ε.
We construct an encoding scheme (E,D) summarized in Figure 4.1 and
parametrized below. We then show that the pair (E,D) is a (Localdo , SSk, negl(k))-
non-malleable reduction.
We parameterize our construction for Localdo ⇒ SSk with the following:
• t := dnR(1− cerrR /4)e.
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• cdec := 1− t
nR
.
• δ := csec
9
.
• (EL,DL) parametrized by (k, nL, cerrL , csecL ) := (k, cratek, cerr, csec) where cerr, csec,
crate are taken from lemma 4.2.1.
• ncheck := k.




• (ER,DR) parametrized by (k, nR, cerrR , csecR ) := (k, nR, cerr, csec).
• r := k





• n := r + τ + nR = O(dok).
Proof Overview. To prove the theorem, we analyze the composed encoding schemes
as a single reduction. As mentioned in the introduction, the idea is to use the PRG
to “free up” the restrictions relating the size of the left RPE (previously denoted by
nL) and do that is an artifact of the piecewise analysis.
Recall that our encoding scheme is comprised of three blocks: (1) the PRG
seed, (2) the “hidden” left side encoding, and (3) the right side encoding. First, (as
in the previous section) we claim that a number of good things happen if the left
side is “hidden” in a large block in a truly random way. Namely, we have that, with
respect to the tampering function, only a small fraction of bits in the hidden left-side
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Let (EL,DL,RecL) be a binary reconstructable probabilistic encoding scheme with pa-




L ) and let (ER,DR,RecR) be a binary reconstructable probabilistic




R ). Also, let ncheck be a parameter. Let
prg be a pseudorandom generator for space bounded computations (see Definition 3.4.5),
with inputs of length r and outputs of length log(τ) · τ . Let G(ζ) be defined as follows:
1. Compute y := prg(ζ).
2. Divide pseudorandom tape y into blocks of bit strings y1, . . . , yτ . Let φ be the
randomized function that chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} with bias p := 3nL/2τ . For
i ∈ [τ ], let ρi = φ(yi), where yi is the explicit randomness of φ. Let ρ = ρ1, . . . , ρτ .
Let num denote the number of positions of ρ that are set to 1.
3. If num < nL, set ρ := 1
n
L0
τ−nL . Otherwise, flip all but the first nL 1’s in ρ to 0.
4. Output ρ.
E(x := (L,R)):
1. Compute ~sL = (sL1, . . . , s
L
nL
)← EL(L) and ~sR = (sR1 , . . . , sRnR)← ER(R).
2. Choose ζ ← {0, 1}r uniformly at random. Compute ρ := G(ζ).
3. Otherwise, for j ∈ [nL], let posj denote the j-th position i such that ρi = 1.
4. Let XL ∈ {0, 1}τ be defined in the following way: For j ∈ [nL], XLposj := s
L
j . In all
other locations, XLi is set uniformly at random.
5. Output the encoding (ζ,XL, ~sR).
D(~σ := (ζ̃, X̃L, ~σR)):
1. (Recover ρ̃) Let ỹ := prg(ζ̃), where ỹ = ỹ1, . . . , ỹτ . For i ∈ [τ ], compute ρ̃i := φ(ỹi).
Let ñum denote the number of ones in ρ̃ := ρ̃1, . . . , ρ̃τ .
2. (Recover x) For j ∈ [ñum], let posj denote the j-th position i such that ρ̃i = 1.
3. Let ~σL ∈ {0, 1}nL be defined as: For j ∈ [min(ñum, nL)], σLj := X̃Lposj .
4. (plain decoding on left) Compute ((wL1 , . . . , w
L
nL
), L)← DL(σL1 , . . . , σLnL). If the
decoding fails, set L :=⊥.
5. (decoding-check on right) Let t := dnR(1−cerrR /4)e Define ~σ′




follows: Set σ′R` := σ
R
` for ` = 1, . . . , t. Set σ
′R
` := 0 for ` = t+ 1, . . . , nR. Compute
((wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
),R)← DR(σ′R1 , . . . , σ′Rt ). If the decoding fails or (wR1 , . . . , wRnR) is not
cerrR /4-close to (σ
R
1 , . . . , σ
R
tR
), set R :=⊥.
6. (codeword-check on right) Pick a random subset Rcheck ⊂ [nR] of size ncheck <
csecR · nR. For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If the check fails, set R :=⊥.
7. (output) Output x := (L,R).
Figure 4.4: The (Localdo ,SS, negl(k))-non-malleable reduction (E,D)
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RPE is either (1) of high input locality, (2) effects bits in the right-side’s consistency
check or (3) effects the PRG seed used in decoding. (1) Implies that there exists a
“safe” subset to simulate decoding from (as before), and (2) and (3) allow us to relax
the bounds on locality. Next, we use a hybrid argument to essentially disconnect
influence between the 3 blocks of our encoding (that is dependent on the underlying
message, (L,R)).
Proof. We will consider the “Left” side of the encoding to be (ζ,XL) and the
“Right” side to be ~sR.
Let f(ζ,XL, ~sR) = (fL(ζ,XL, ~sR), fR(ζ,XL, ~sR)), where (ζ,XL, ~sR) ∈ {0, 1}r+τ×
{0, 1}nR and fL(ζ,XL, ~sR) ∈ {0, 1}r+τ and fR(ζ,XL, ~sR) ∈ {0, 1}nR . Furthermore,
let fL = (fζ , fX) where fζ : {0, 1}r+τ+nR → {0, 1}r and fX : {0, 1}r+τ+nR → {0, 1}τ
• Let U = {i ∈ [τ ] : ρi = 1} denote the (relative) locations of ~sL.
• Let SR→L denote the set of positions j such that input bit ~sRj affects the output
of fL.
• Let SL→R denote the set of positions i such that input bit ~sLi affects the output
of fR.
• For J ⊂ [nR], let SJL→R denote the set of positions i such that input bit ~sLi
affects the output of fRj for some j ∈ J .
• For a set Rcheck ⊆ nR of size ncheck, let Scheck denote the set of positions i such
that embedded input bit ~sLi affects the output of f
R
` for some ` ∈ Rcheck.
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• For a set Rcheck ⊆ nR of size ncheck, let S+check denote the set of positions i such
that input bit XLi affects the output of f
R
` for some ` ∈ Rcheck.
• For a set Rcheck ⊆ nR of size ncheck, let Scheck denote the set of positions i such
that embedded input bit ~sLi affects the output of f
R
` for some ` ∈ Rcheck.
• Let S+in(di) denote the set of i such that XLi has input locality greater than di.
• Let Sin(di) denote the set of i such that ~sLi has input locality greater than di.
• Let S+L→ζ denote the set of positions i such that input bit XLi affects the output
of fζ .
• Let SL→ζ denote the set of positions i such that input bit ~sLi affects the output
of fζ .
• Let SR→ζ denote the subset of SR→L that affects fζ .
We next define the following event Goodf .
Definition 4.5.1. The event Goodf occurs if for tampering function f ∈ Localdo
all of the following hold:
1. ρ contains at least nL ones.
2. |Scheck ∪ Sin(1/δ · do) ∪ SL→ζ | ≤ csec · nL.
3. There is some set J∗ ⊂ [nR] such that |J∗| = t and |SJ
∗
L→R \ Sin(1/δ · do)| = 0
(from now on, J∗ will denote the lexicographically first such set).
4. |SR→L| ≤ do · (r + nL) ≤ nR · csecR .
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Claim 4.5.1. Suppose ρ is chosen truly at random (ones occuring with bias p =
3nL/2τ). Then for every f ∈ Localdo, Pr[Goodf ] ≥ 1− negl(n).
Proof. We consider each part of the event Goodf separately.
1. Recall that |ρ| = τ , nL = cratek, n = O(dok) and p = 3nL2τ .
Let the number of ones in ρ = ρ1. Note that ρ1 is a Binomial random variable
with parameters (τ, p).





Using Chernoff’s bound we
can write,


















2. We know that, |S+check| ≤ doncheck, |S
+
in(1/δ · do)| ≤ δn ≤ 2δτ and |S+L→ζ | ≤
dor. Therefore, we can upper bound |S+check ∪ S
+
in(1/δ · do) ∪ S+L→ζ | ≤ 3δτ .
We would now like to show that with high probability, |Scheck ∪ Sin(1/δ · do)∪
SL→ζ | ≤ csecnL. We consider a mental experiment, in which the adversary
fixes the tampering function f and only after f is fixed, Rcheck and ρ are cho-
sen. In this case, each position in S+check ∪ S
+
in(1/δ · do) ∪ S+L→ζ corresponds
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to an ~sLi input variable (selected by ρ) with independent probability p. We
therefore observe that the size of |Scheck ∪ Sin(1/δ · do) ∪ SL→ζ | can be up-
per bounded by a Binomial random variable V with parameters (3δτ, p). Let




nL ·δ Using Chernoff’s bound we can write,
Pr[V ≥ 2µ] ≤ e−
3·nL·δ
2 . Therefore, since δ = c
sec
9
, we have that Pr[|Scheck ∪
Sin(1/δ · do) ∪ SL→ζ | ≥ 9nL · δ = csec · nL] ≤ e−
csec·nL
6 , which is negligible.
3. Clearly, |SL→R \ Sin(1/δ · do)| ≤ nL · 1/δ · do. Thus, in order to prove this
part of the claim, it is sufficient to show that nR − nL · 1/δ · do ≥ t, where
t = dnR(1− cerrR /4)e. Plugging in our choice of parameters, we get















≤ cerrR /4, the inequality holds.
4. We need to show that |SR→L| ≤ do · (r + nL) ≤ nR · csecR .
The first inequality |SR→L| ≤ do · (r+ nL), holds from the definition of output
locality. Recall that csecR ·nR = csecR ·d2doc
ratek
δcdeccsec
e ≥ 2docratek. Thus, by substituting
parameters we get do · (r + nL) = do · (k + cratek) ≤ 2docratek, since crate > 1
and so the second inequality holds as well.
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Now, for every f ∈ Localdo , we define the distribution Gf over SSk. A draw,
g = (gL, gR), from Gf is defined as follows:
• Choose ζ ← {0, 1}r uniformly at random. Compute ρ := G(ζ).
• If Goodf does not hold, then set g to the constant function 0.
• Otherwise, choose vectors IR ∈ {0, 1}nR , IL ∈ {0, 1}nL uniformly at random.
Imask ∈ {0, 1, ∗}τ such that if i ≤ pos (the location of the nL-th 1 in ρ ) and
ρi = 1, then I
mask
i = ∗ and is uniformly independently drawn from {0, 1}
otherwise.
Let IX be Imask where the i-th ∗ is replaced by the ith bit of IL. (id|Imask(IL).)
• Compute ζ̃ according to fζ , given inputs ζ and ILSL→ζ , I
R
SR→ζ .
• Compute ρ̃ := G(ζ̃), where ρ̃ = ρ̃1, . . . , ρ̃τ . Let Ũ = {i ∈ [τ ] : ρ̃i = 1}.
• Choose a random subset Rcheck ⊆ [nR] of size ncheck.
• Let J∗ be the the lexicographically first subset of [nR] such that |J∗| = t and
|SJ∗L→R \ Sin(do/δ)| = 0. Note that such J∗ must exist since Goodf occurs.
• The split-state tampering function g := (gL, gR) ∈ SSk has IL, IR, Imask, ζ
hardcoded into it (as well as Ũ , ζ̃, ρ̃) and is specified as follows:
gL(L):
1. (apply tampering and plain decode on left) Let ~sL := Rec(Scheck ∪
SL→ζ ∪ Sin(do/δ), IL, L).
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Let (σL1 , . . . , σ
L
nL
) := (fX |ζ,Imask,IR(~sL))Ũ . Recall that the above notation
denotes (1) applying the function fX to the input (ζ,X
L, IR), where
XL is Imask where the i-th ∗ is replaced by the ith bit of ~sL. (2) out-
putting the positions of fX indexed by Ũ . Compute ((w
L






1 , . . . , σ
L
nL
). If the decoding fails, set L̃ :=⊥.
2. (output) Output L̃.
gR(R):
1. (apply tampering and decoding-check on right) Let
~sR = (sR1 , . . . , s
R
nR
) := Rec(SR→L, IR,R).
Let (σR1 , . . . , σ
R
nR
) := fR|ζ,IX (~sR). Define ~σ′R := σ′R1 , . . . , σ′RnR as fol-
lows: Set σ′R` := σ
R
` for ` ∈ [J∗]. Set σ′R` := 0 for ` /∈ [J∗]. Com-
pute ((wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
), R̃) ← DR(σ′R1 , . . . , σ′Rt ). If the decoding fails or
(wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
) is not cerrR /4-close to (σ
R
1 , . . . , σ
R
nR
), then set R̃ :=⊥.
2. (codeword-check on right) For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If
the check fails, set R̃ :=⊥.
3. (output) Output R̃.
• Output g = (gL, gR).
Whenever Rec is run above, we assume that enough positions are set by S
such that there is only a single consistent codeword. If this is not the case, then
additional positions are added to S from IL, IR, respectively.
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Remark 4.5.2. Note that g = (gL, gR) drawn from the distribution Gf is a split-
state function with probability 1. This is true since if the event Goodf does not hold,
then g is set to the constant function 0 (which is in split-state). If the event Goodf
does hold, then as can be seen by inspection above, gL takes only L as input, gR takes
only R as input.
By the definition of a non-malleable reduction (Definition 4.2.2), in order to
complete the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, we must show that (E,D) have the following
properties:
1. For all x ∈ {0, 1}2k, we have D(E(x)) = x with probability 1.
2. For all f ∈ Localdo ,
∆(D(f(E(x)));Gf (x)) ≤ negl(k),
where Gf is the distribution defined above.
Item (1) above is trivial and can be immediately verified.
In the following, we prove Item (2) above by considering the following sequence
of hybrid arguments for each function f ∈ Localdo (for the intermediate hybrids, we
highlight the step in which they are different from the desired end distributions).
Our reduction will move in three phases to essentially disconnect influence
between the 3 blocks of our encoding (that is dependent on the underlying message,
x.
Firstly, we will argue that with high probability, the pseudorandomness of the
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PRG is sufficient to obtain that the event Goodf holds even when ρ is chosen via
the PRG (instead of being truly random). This will give us bounds on the “bad”
bits in the output of the encoding of the left input, L.
Next, we will use two hybrids to show that we can safely sample bits in SR→ζ ,
SR→L, SL→ζ , Scheck, and Sin uniformly at random. Given our first claim, the sizes of
all of these sets together will be below the secrecy threshold of the respective Recon-
structible Probablitistic Encodings. As such, the distribution over the randomness
of the encoding procedure will be identical, for any message. Notice that at this
stage we can simulate the entire left hand side, as well as codeword check on the
right. All that we need to handle is influence from ~sL on the rest of ~σR.
So for our final hybrid, we will use a technique from [44] to show that we can
decode from a “clean” portion of ~σR, J∗. This is possible because, by Claim 4.5.2
(and previous hybrids), the only non-uniformly-random bits in ~sL have bounded
input locality. Thus, these bits on the left can only effect a constant fraction of bits
on the right.
To begin, we prove the following claim to bound the set of “bad” bits on the
left side.
Claim 4.5.2. In any given tampering experiment, with tampering function f ∈∈
Localdo, the event Goodf holds with all but negligible probability, even when ρ gen-
erated according to Figure 4.4.
Proof. Suppose not, then there exists some f that violates the above constraints, or
any f will because the PRG will not select enough ones. Notice that f determines
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Sin(do/δ). (SL→ζ ,Scheck are determined by f and the randomness of E.)
Recall by choice of parameters when ρ is chosen at random, there can be at
most donR+δn+dor ≤ csecτ/3 number of positions in XL in Scheck∪Sin(do/δ)∪SL→ζ .
Since p = 3nL/2τ , we expect c
sec
L · nL/2 number of positions i in XL where (1)
XLi ∈ Scheck∪Sin(do/δ)∪SL→ζ (is “bad”) and (2) ρi = 1. Therefore, by multiplicative
Chernoff bounds, the probability that more than csecL · nL number of positions i in
XL are such that (1) XLi is “bad” and (2) ρi = 1 is negligible.
We now argue that these events must also occur with negligible probability
when ρ is pseudorandom. Assume the contrary, then the following is a distinguisher
T that can distinguish truly random strings y from strings ρ := G(ζ) with non-
negligible probability.
T is a circuit that has a string w ∈ {0, 1}τ hardwired into it. w corresponds
to the characteristic vector of Sin(do/δ) ∪ SL→ζ ∪ Scheck.
On input y = y1, . . . , yτ (where either y := prg(ζ) or y is chosen uniformly at
random), T (y) does the following:
1. Set count1 = 0, count2 = 0.
2. For i = 1 to τ :
(a) Run φ(yi) to obtain ρi.
(b) If ρi = 1, set count2 := count2 + 1
(c) If ρi = 1 and wi = 1, set count1 := count1 + 1.
3. If count1 > c
sec
L · nL/3 or count2 < nL, output 0. Otherwise, output 1.
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T can clearly be implemented by a read-once, Finite State Machine (FSM)
with 2O(log
2(τ)) number of states. However, note that by Theorem 3.4.1, prg is a
pseudorandom generator for space log3(k) with parameter 2−k. Thus, existence of
distinguisher T as above, leads to contradiction to the security of the Nisan PRG.
Hybrid H0. This is the original distribution D(f(E(x)))
Hybrid H1. H1 corresponds to the distribution D(f(E
′(x))), where E′ is defined as
follows:
E′(x := (L,R)):
1. Given f , find SR→ζ , SR→L, SL→ζ , Scheck, and Sin(do/δ).
2. Compute ~sL = (sL1, . . . , s
L
nL
)← Rec(Scheck ∪ SL→ζ ∪ Sin(do/δ),EL(L), L)




3. Choose ζ ← {0, 1}r uniformly at random. Compute ρ := G(ζ).
4. Otherwise, for j ∈ [nL], let posj denote the j-th position i such that ρi = 1.
5. Let XL ∈ {0, 1}τ be defined in the following way: For j ∈ [nL], XLposj := s
L
j .
In all other locations, XLi is set uniformly at random.
6. Output the encoding (ζ,XL, ~sR).
Note that the only difference between E and E′ is that we are reconstructing





The claim follows trivially from the definition of the reconstruction procedure.
Hybrid H2 H2 corresponds to the distribution D(f(E
(2)(x))), where E(2) is defined
as follows:
E(2)(x := (L,R)):
1. Given f , find SR→ζ , SR→L, SL→ζ , Scheck, and Sin(do/δ).
2. Choose IL ∈ {0, 1}nL , IR ∈ {0, 1}nR uniformly at random.
3. Compute ~sL = (sL1, . . . , s
L
nL
)← Rec(Scheck ∪ SL→ζ ∪ Sin(do/δ), IL, L)




4. Choose ζ ← {0, 1}r uniformly at random. Compute ρ := G(ζ).
5. For j ∈ [nL], let posj denote the j-th position i such that ρi = 1.
6. Let XL ∈ {0, 1}τ be defined in the following way: For j ∈ [nL], XLposj := s
L
j .
In all other locations, XLi is set uniformly at random.
7. Output the encoding (ζ,XL, ~sR).
Claim 4.5.4.
H1 ≡ H2.
By Claim 4.5.2, the sets reconstructed from are below the security thresholds
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of the respective RPE schemes. Thus by definition, the distribution of E(2)(x) is
identical to that of E(x).
Hybrid H3. H3 corresponds to the distribution D
′(f(E(2)(x))), where D′ is defined
as follows:
D(~σ := (ζ̃ , X̃L, ~σR)):
1. (Recover ρ̃) Let ỹ := prg(ζ̃), where ỹ = ỹ1, . . . , ỹτ . For i ∈ [τ ], compute
ρ̃i := φ(ỹi). Let ñum denote the number of ones in ρ̃ := ρ̃1, . . . , ρ̃τ .
2. (Recover x) For j ∈ [ñum], let posj denote the j-th position i such that ρ̃i = 1.





4. (plain decoding on left) Compute ((wL1 , . . . , w
L
nL
), L) ← DL(σL1 , . . . , σLnL).
If the decoding fails, set L :=⊥.
5. (decoding-check on right) Let t := dnR(1−cerrR /4)eDefine ~σ′
R := σ′R1 , . . . , σ
′R
nR
as follows: Set σ′R` := σ
R
` for ` = 1, . . . , t. Set σ
′R
` := 0 for ` = t +
1, . . . , nR. Compute ((w
R
1 , . . . , w
R
nR
),R) ← DR(σ′R1 , . . . , σ′Rt ). If the decoding
fails or (wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
) is not cerrR /4-close to (σ
R
1 , . . . , σ
R
tR
), set R :=⊥.
6. (codeword-check on right) Pick a random subset Rcheck ⊂ [nR] of size
ncheck < c
sec
R · nR. For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If the check
fails, set R :=⊥.
7. (output) Output x := (L,R).
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8. (decoding-check on right) Define ~σ′R := σ′R1 , . . . , σ
′R
nR
as follows: Set σ′R` :=
σR` for ` ∈ J∗ and σ′R` := 0 for ` /∈ J∗, where J∗ ⊆ [nR] is the lexicograph-
ically first set such that |J∗| = t and |SJ∗L→R ∩ ¯Sin(do/δ)| = 0. Compute
((wR1 , . . . , w
R
nR
),R) ← DR(σ′R1 , . . . , σ′RtR). If the decoding fails or (w
R




is not cerrR /4-close to (σ
R
1 , . . . , σ
R
tR
), set R :=⊥.
9. (codeword-check on right) For all ` ∈ Rcheck, check that σR` = wR` . If the
check fails, set R :=⊥.
10. (output) Output x := (L,R).
Note that the only difference between D and D′ is that in decoding-check on





We want to show that for every ~σ = (~σL, ~σR) ← f(E(x)), D(~σ) = D′(~σ) with
high probability, over the coins of D,D′. The proof is identical to the proof of Claim
4.3.1.
Hybrid H4. Hybrid H4 is simply the distribution Gf (x), defined previously.
Claim 4.5.6.
H3 ≡ H4.
This claim follows by inspection.
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Chapter 5: Non-Malleable Codes from Average-Case Hardness:
AC0, Decision Trees, and Streaming Space-Bounded Tam-
pering
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present general frameworks for constructing non-malleable
codes for encoding one and multi-bits against various tampering classes F for which
average case hardness results are known. Our frameworks (one for single-bit and
one for multi-bit) include both a generic construction, which requires that certain
underlying primitives are instantiated in a suitable way, as well as a proof “tem-
plate.” Our frameworks are inspired by the well-known double-encryption paradigm
for constructing CCA2-secure public key encryption schemes [99,102,111]. And al-
though we rely on techniques that are typically used in the cryptographic setting, we
instantiate our framework for particular tampering classes F in both the computa-
tional setting and in the information theoretic one. For the computational setting,
our results rely on computational assumptions, and require a common-reference
string (CRS), which the adversary can see before selecting the tampering function
(as typical in other NMC works using CRS or random oracles). For the information
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theoretic setting, our results do not require CRS nor any computational assumption
(as the primitives in our framework can be instantiated information theoretically).
Our general theorem statements provide sufficient conditions for achieving NMC
against a class F . Somewhat informally, the main such condition, especially for the
one-bit framework, is that there are sufficiently strong average-case hardness results
known for the class F . In particular, we obtain the following results, where
all the constructions are efficient and, for the multi-bit NMC, the achieved rate is
1/ poly(m) where m is the length of the message being encoded.
• Constructions for AC0 tampering: We obtain computational NMC in
the CRS model against AC0 tampering. Our constructions require public
key encryption schemes with decryption in AC0, which can be constructed
e.g. from exponential hardness of learning parity with noise [26], as well as
non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK), which can be constructed in the CRS
model from enhanced trapdoor permutations.
Previous results by Chattopadhyay and Li [36] achieve NMC for AC0 with
information theoretic security (with no CRS), but are inefficient, with super-
polynomial rate.
• Constructions for bounded-depth decision trees: We obtain computa-
tional NMC in the CRS model against tampering with bounded-depth decision
trees. Our construction requires the same computational assumptions as the
AC0 construction above. The depth of the decision tree we can handle is mε,
where m is the number of bits being encoded, and ε is any constant.
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No results for this class were previously known.
• Constructions for streaming, space-bounded tampering: We obtain
unconditional non-malleable codes against streaming, space-bounded tamper-
ing, where the tampering function is represented by a read-once, bounded-
width branching program. Our construction does not require CRS or compu-
tational assumptions.
No NMC results for this standard complexity theoretic class were previously
known. However, this tampering class can be viewed as a subset (or the
intersection) of the space bounded class considered by Faust et al. [70] (who
don’t limit the adversary to be streaming), and the block-wise tampering class
considered by Chandran et al. [31] (who don’t bound the adversary’s space,
but don’t give security in the event that decoding fails). In both cases there
cannot be NMC with the standard notion of security, and so those previous
works must relax the security requirement (and [70] also relies on a random
oracle). In contrast, we achieve standard (in fact, even stronger) notion of
NMC, without random oracle (nor CRS, nor any computational assumption)
for our class.
• Additional Constructions: We also briefly note two additional applications
of our paradigm as proof of concept. Both complexity classes can be repre-
sented circuits of size O(nc) for some fixed c, a class which [73] provide non-
malleable codes for in the CRS model, without computational assumptions.
We include these results here, merely to show the applicability of our frame-
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work to general correlation bounds; for example strong correlation bounds
against ACC0[p] or TC0 are likely immediately lead to non-malleable codes
against the same classes using our framework.
1. Under the same assumptions invoked in the constructions against AC0
and bounded-depth decision trees we obtain computational NMC in the
CRS model against tampering with small threshold circuits: threshold
circuits with depth d and n1+ε wires.
2. Assuming any public key encryption scheme and zk-SNARKs, we obtain
computational NMC in the CRS model against tampering by Turing
Machines running in time O(nk), where k is a constant. However, we
should note that these codes have weak tampering guarantees: tampering
experiments with respect to different messages are only polynomially close
to one another.
5.1.1 Technical Overview
We begin by describing our computational NMC construction (in the CRS
model) for one-bit messages secure against tampering in AC0, which will give the
starting point intuition for our results. We then show how the AC0 construction can
be modified to derive a general template for constructing NMC for one-bit messages
secure against a wider range of tampering classes F , and discuss various classes
F for which the template can be instantiated. We then discuss how the template
can be extended to achieve NMC for multi-bit messages secure against a wide range
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of tampering classes F . Finally, we discuss some particular instantiations of our
multi-bit template, including our constructions of computational NMC (in the CRS
model) against tampering in AC0 and against bounded-depth decision trees, as well
as our unconditional NMC (with no CRS) against streaming tampering adversaries
with bounded memory.
The starting point: Computational NMC against AC0 for one-bit messages. The
idea is to use a very similar paradigm to the Naor and Yung paradigm for CCA1
encryption [102] (later extended to achieve CCA2 [99, 111]), using double encryp-
tion with simulation-sound NIZK. The main observation is that using the tableaua
method, we can convert any NIZK proof system with polynomial verification into a
NIZK proof system with a verifier in AC0.
We also need a PKE scheme with perfect correctness and decryption in AC0(this
can be constructed using the transformation of Dwork et al. [63] on top of the scheme
of Bogdanov and Lee [26]).
We now sketch (a slightly simplified version of) the NM encoding scheme:
The CRS will contain a public key pk for an encryption scheme
E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) as above, and a CRS for a NIZK. For b ∈ {0, 1}, Let Db
denote the distribution over x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}n such that x1, . . . , xn are uniform
random, conditioned on the parity of the bits being equal to b.
To encode a bit b:
1. Randomly choose bits x1, . . . , xn from Db
2. Compute c1 ← Encryptpk(x1), . . . , cn ← Encryptpk(xn) and c← Encryptpk(b).
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3. Compute n NIZK proofs π1, . . . , πn that c1, . . . , cn are encryptions of bits
x1, . . . , xn.
4. Compute a NIZK proof π that there exists a bit b′ such that the plaintexts
underlying c1, . . . , cn are in the support of Db′ and b′ is the plaintext underlying
c.
5. Compute tableaus T1, . . . , Tn of the computation of the NIZK verifier on
π1, . . . , πn.
6. Compute a tableau T of the computation of the NIZK verifier on proof π.
7. Output (c1, . . . , cn, c, T, (x1, T1), . . . , (xn, Tn)).
To decode (c1, . . . , cn, c, T, (x1, T1), . . . , (xn, Tn)):
1. Check the tableaus T1, . . . , Tn, T .
2. If they all accept, output the parity of x1, . . . , xn.
In the proof we will switch from an honest encoding of b to a simulated encod-
ing and from an honest decoding algorithm to a simulated decoding algorithm. At
each point we will show that the decodings of tampered encodings stay the same.
Moreover, if, in the final hybrid, decodings of tampered encodings depend on b, we
will use this fact to build a circuit in AC0, whose output is correlated with the parity
of its input, reaching a contradiction. In more detail, in the first hybrid we switch
to simulated proofs. Then we switch c1, . . . , cn, c, in the ”challenge” encoding to
encryptions of garbage c′1, . . . , c
′
n, c
′, and next we switch to an alternative decoding
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algorithm in AC0 , which requires the trapdoor sk (corresponding to the public key
pk which is contained in the CRS).
Alternative Decoding Algorithm:
To decode (c1, . . . , cn, c, T, (x1, T1), . . . , (xn, Tn)):
1. check the tableaus T1, . . . , Tn, T
2. If it accepts, output the decryption of c using trapdoor sk.
In the final hybrid, the simulator will not know the parity of x1, . . . , xn in
the challenge encoding and will have received precomputed T 01 , T
1




n , T as
non-uniform advice, where T is a simulated proof of the statement “the plaintexts
underlying c′1, . . . , c
′
n and the plaintext underlying c
′ have the same parity” and for
i ∈ [n], β ∈ {0, 1}, T βi is a simulated proof of the statement “c′i is an encryption of
the bit β”.
We will argue by contradiction that if the decoding of the tampered encoding
is correlated with the parity of x1, . . . , xn then we can create a circuit whose out-
put is correlated with the parity of its input in AC0 . Specifically, the AC0 circuit
will have the crs, sk, precomputed c′1, . . . , c
′
n, c
′, T, T 01 , T
1





tampering function f hardwired in it. It will take x1, . . . , xn as input. It will com-
pute the simulated encoding in AC0 by selecting the correct tableaus: T x11 , . . . , T
xn
n
according to the corresponding input bit. It will then apply the adversarial tamper-
ing function (in AC0 ), perform the simulated decoding (in AC0 ) and output a guess
for the parity of x1, ..xn based on the result of the decoding. Clearly, if the decoding
in the final hybrid is correlated with parity, then we have constructed a distribution
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over AC0 circuits such that w.h.p. over choice of circuit from the distribution, the
output of the circuit is correlated with the parity of its input. This contradicts
known results on the hardness of computing parity in AC0 .
A general template for one-bit NMC. The above argument can be used to de-
rive a template for the construction/security proof of NMC against more general
classes F . The idea is to derive a high-level sequence of hybrid distributions and
corresponding minimal requirements for proving the indistinguishability of consec-
utive hybrids. We can now instantiate the tampering class F , “hard distributions”
(D0,D1), encryption scheme and NIZK proof in any way that satisfies these minimal
requirements. Note that each hybrid distribution is a distribution over the output
of the tampering experiment. Therefore, public key encryption and NIZK against
arbitrary PPT adversaries may be too strong of a requirement. Indeed, it is by
analyzing the exact security requirements needed to go from one hybrid to the other
that (looking ahead) we are able to remove the CRS and all computational assump-
tions from our construction of NMC against streaming adversaries with bounded
memory. In addition, we can also use our template to obtain constructions (in the
CRS model and under computational assumptions) against other tampering classes
F .
Extending the template to multi-bit NMC. The construction for AC0 given above
and the general template do not immediately extend to multi-bit messages. In
particular, encoding m bits by applying the parity-based construction bit-by-bit
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fails, even if we use the final proof T to “wrap together” the encodings of multiple
individual bits. The problem is that the proof strategy is to entirely decode the
tampered codeword and decide, based on the results, whether to output 0 or 1 as
the guess for the parity of some x1, . . . , xn. But if we encode many bits, b1, . . . , bm,
then the adversary could maul in such a way that the tampered codeword decodes
to b′1, . . . , b
′
m where each of b
′
i is individually independent of the parity of the cor-
responding xi1, . . . , x
i
n, but taken as a whole, the entire output may be correlated.
As a simple example, the attacker might maul the codeword so that it decodes to
b′1, . . . , b
′
m that are uniform subject to satisfying b
′
1⊕· · ·⊕b′m = b1⊕· · ·⊕bm. Clearly,
there is a correlation here between the input and output, but we cannot detect this
correlation in AC0, since detecting the correlation itself seems to require computing
parity!
In the case of parity (and the class AC0 ), the above issue can be solved by
setting m sufficiently small (but still polynomial) compared to n. We discuss more
details about the special case of parity below. However, we would first like to explain
how the general template must be modified for the multi-bit case, given the above
counterexample. Specifically, note that the difficulty above comes into play only
in the final hybrid. Thus, we only need to modify the final hybrid slightly and
require that for any Boolean function F over m variables, it must be the case that
the composition of F with the simulated decoding algorithm is in a computational
class that still cannot distinguish between draws x1, . . . , xn from D0 or D1. While the
above seems like a strong requirement, we show that by setting m much smaller than
n, we can still obtain meaningful results for classes such as AC0 and bounded-depth
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decision trees.
Multi-bit NMC against AC0. If we want to encode m bits, for each of the underlying
encodings i ∈ [m], we will use n :≈ m3 bits: ~xi = xi1, . . . , xin. To see why this works,
we set up a Hybrid argument, where in each step we will fix all the underlying
encodings except for a single one: ~x = x1, . . . , xn, which we will switch from having
parity 0 to having parity 1. Therefore, we can view C—the function computing the
output of the tampering experiment in this hybrid—to be a function of variables
~x = x1, . . . , xn only (everything else is constant and “hardwired”). For i ∈ [m], let
Ci denote the i-th output bit of C. We use PAR(~x) to denote the parity of ~x.
Now, for any Boolean function F overm variables, consider F (C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . ,
Cm(~x)), where we are simply taking an arbitrary Boolean function F of the decod-
ings of the individual bits. Our goal is to show that F (C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) is
not correlated with parity of ~x. Consider the Fourier representation of F (y1, . . . , ym).
This is a linear combination of parities of the input variables y1, . . . , ym, denoted
χS(y1, . . . , ym), for all subsets S ∈ {0, 1}m. (See here [56]).
On the other hand, F (C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) is a Boolean function over
n ≈ m3 variables (i.e. a linear combination over parities of the input variables
x1, . . . , xn, denoted χS′(x1, . . . , xn), for all subsets S
′ ∈ {0, 1}n). A representation of
F (C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) can be obtained by taking each term F̂ (S)χS(y1, . . . , ym)
in the Fourier representation of F and composing with C1, . . . , Cm to obtain the term
F̂ (S)χS(C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)). Since, by well-known properties of the Fourier
transform, |F̂ (S)| ≤ 1, we can get an upper bound on the correlation of
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F (C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) and PAR(~x), by summing the correlations of each func-
tion χS(C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . ,
Cm(~x)) and PAR(~x). Recall that the correlation of a Boolean function g with PAR(~x)
is by definition, exactly the Fourier coefficient of g corresponding to parity function
χ[n]. Thus, to prove that the correlation of χS(C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) and PAR(~x)
is low, we use the fact that χS(C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) can be computed by a (rel-
atively) low depth circuit. To see this, note that each Ci is in AC
0 and so has low
depth, moreover, since S has size at most m, we only need to compute parity over
m variables, which can be done in relatively low depth when m  n. We now
combine the above with Fourier concentration bounds for low-depth circuits [117].
Ultimately, we prove that for each S, the correlation of χS(C1(~x), C2(~x), . . . , Cm(~x))
and PAR(~x), is less than 1/2m(1+δ), where δ is a constant between 0 and 1. This
means that we can afford to sum over all 2m terms in the Fourier representation of
F and still obtain negligible correlation.
Multi-bit NMC against bounded-depth decision trees. Our result above extends to
bounded-depth decision trees by noting that (1) If we apply a random restriction
(with appropriate parameters) to input x1, . . . , xn then, w.h.p. the AC
0 circuit used
to compute the output of the tampering experiment collapses to a bounded-depth
decision tree of depth mε − 1; (2) on the other hand, again choosing parameters
of the random restriction appropriately, PAR(x1, . . . , xn) collapses to parity over at
least m1+ε variables; (3) any Boolean function over m variables can be computed by
a decision tree of depth m; (4) the composition of a depth-mε − 1 decision tree and
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depth-m decision tree yields a decision tree of depth at most (mε − 1)(m) < m1+ε.
Finally, we obtain our result by noting that decision trees of depth less than m1+ε
are uncorrelated with parity over m1+ε variables.
Unconditional NMC (with no CRS) against bounded, streaming tampering. Re-
cently, Raz [110] proved that learning parity is hard for bounded, streaming adver-
saries. In particular, this gives rise to hard distributions Db, b ∈ {0, 1} such that
no bounded, streaming adversary can distinguish between the two. Db corresponds
to choosing a random parity χS, outputting random examples (~x, χS(~x)) and then
outputting ~x∗ such that χS(~x
∗) is equal to b. The above also yields an uncondi-
tional, “parity-based” encryption scheme against bounded, streaming adversaries.
Note, however, that in order to decrypt (without knowledge of the secret key), we
require space beyond the allowed bound of the adversary. Given the above, we
use Db, b ∈ {0, 1} as the hard distributions in our construction and use the parity-
based encryption scheme as the “public key encryption scheme” in our construction.
Thus, we get rid of the public key in the CRS (and the computational assumptions
associated with the public key encryption scheme).
To see why this works, note that in the hybrid where we require semantic secu-
rity of the encryption scheme, the decryption algorithm is not needed for decoding
(at this point the honest decoding algorithm is still used). So essentially we can
set the parameters for the encryption scheme such that the output of the Tamper-
ing experiment in that hybrid (which outputs the decoded value based on whether
x1, .., xn is in the support of D0 or D1) can be computed in a complexity class that is
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too weak to run the decryption algorithm. On the other hand, we must also consider
the later hybrid where we show that the output of the Tampering experiment can be
computed in a complexity class that is too weak to distinguish D0 from D1. In this
hybrid, we do use the alternate decoding procedure. But now it seems that we need
decryption to be contained in a complexity class that is too weak to decide whether
x1, . . . , xn is in the support of D0 or D1, while previously we required exactly the
opposite! The key insight is that since we are in the streaming model and since (1)
the simulated ciphertexts (c′1, . . . , c
′
n, c
′) in this hybrid contain no information about
x1, . . . , xn and (2) the simulated ciphertexts precede x1, . . . , xn, the output of the
tampering function in blocks containing ciphertexts does not depend on x1, . . . , xn
at all. So the decryption of the tampered ciphertexts can be given as non-uniform
advice, instead of being computed on the fly, and we avoid contradiction.
In order to get rid of the CRS and computational assumption for the NIZK, we
carefully leverage some additional properties of the NMC setting and the streaming
model. First, we consider cut-and-choose based NIZK’s (based on MPC-in-the-
head), where the Verifier is randomized and randomly checks certain locations or
“slots” in the proof to ensure soundness. Specifically, given a Circuit-SAT circuit
C and witness w, the prover will secret share w := w1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w` and run an MPC
protocol among ` parties (for constant `), where Party i has input wi and the parties
are computing the output of C(w1⊕ · · · ⊕w`). The prover will then “encrypt” each
view of each party in the MPC protocol, using the parity-based encryption scheme
described above and output this as the proof. This is then repeated λ times (where
λ is security parameter). The Verifier will then randomly select two parties from
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each of the λ sets, decrypt the views and check that the views correspond to the
output of 1 and are consistent internally and with each other.
We next note that in our setting, the NIZK simulator can actually know the
randomness used by the Verifier. This is because the simulated codeword and the de-
coding are done by the same party in the NMC security experiment. Therefore, the
level of “zero-knowledge” needed from the simulation of the NIZK is in-between hon-
est verifier and malicious. This is because the adversary can still use the tampering
function to “leak” information from the unchecked slots of the proof to the checked
slots, while a completely honest verifier would learn absolutely nothing about the
unchecked slots. In order to switch from a real proof to a simulated proof, we fill in
unchecked slots one-by-one with parity-based encryptions of garbage. We must rely
on the fact that a bounded, streaming adversary cannot distinguish real encryp-
tions from garbage encryptions in order to argue security. Specifically, since we are
in the bounded streaming model, we can argue that the adversary can only “leak”
a small amount of information from the unchecked slots to the checked slots. This
means that the entire output of the experiment can be simulated by a bounded,
streaming adversary, which in turn means that the output of the experiment must
be indistinguishable when real, unchecked encodings are replaced with encodings
of garbage. Arguing simulation soundness, requires a similar argument, but more
slots are added to the proof and slots in an honest proof are only filled if the corre-
sponding position in the bit-string corresponding to the statement to be proven is
set to 1. We encode the statement in such a way that if the statement changes, the
adversary must switch an unfilled slot to a filled slot. Intuitively, since the bounded
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streaming attacker can only carry over a small amount of information from previous
slots, this will be as difficult as constructing a new proof from scratch.
5.2 Definitions
In this section we will provide some more definitions and background required
for our constructions and results presented in chapter 5.
5.2.1 Incompressible Functions
Definition 5.2.1. A function ψ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is ε-incompressible by function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` if for every function h : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}, for uniform random
x ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr [h(f(x)) = ψ(x)] ≤ 1
2
+ ε.
We say, ψ is (`, ε)-incompressible by class F , if for every f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}` ∈ F , ψ is ε-incompressible by f .
Following theorem was proved by [62]
Theorem 5.2.1 (Parity is incompressible [62]). Let 0 < δ < 1 be a constant. Parity
is (nδ, 2−Ω(n
1−δ
d )) - incompressible by circuits of depth d ≥ 2 of size 2O(n
1−δ
d ).
5.2.2 Proof Systems for Circuit SAT
We now consider proof of knowledge systems for Circuit SAT, where the prover
and/or verifier have limited computational resources.
Definition 5.2.2 (Proof of Knowledge Systems for Circuit SAT with
Computationally Bounded Prover/Verifier). For a circuit C, let L(C) denote the
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set of strings x such that there exists a witness w such that C(x,w) = 1. For a
class C, let L(C) denote the set {L(C) | C ∈ C}. Π = (P,V) is a Circuit SAT proof
system for the class L(C) with prover complexity D and verifier complexity E if the
following are true:
• For all C ∈ C and all valid inputs (x,w) such that C(x,w) = 1, P(C, ·, ·) can
be computed in complexity class D.
• For all C ∈ C, V(C, ·, ·) can be computed in complexity class E.
• Completeness: For all C ∈ C and all (x,w) such that C(x,w) = 1, we have
V(C, x,P(C, x, w)) = 1
• Extractability: For all (C, x, π), if Prr[V(C, x, π; r) = 1] is non-negligible, then
given (C, x, π) it is possible to efficiently extract w such that C(x,w) = 1.
We construct Circuit SAT proof systems for the class L(P/poly) with verifier
complexity AC0 in this section. We also construct Circuit SAT proof systems for
the class. L(P/poly) with streaming verifier
5.2.2.1 Circuit SAT proof system for the class L(C) with prover com-
plexity D and verifier complexity AC0 .
• P(C, x, w) the prover simply outputs a tableau T of the computation C(x,w) =
1.
• V(C, x, T ) the verifier computes an AND of all the local checks.
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Completeness clearly holds. To show extractability, note that the inputs to
the tableau T correspond to x,w. Thus if tableau T accepts then the extractor can
simply output those inputs corresponding to w.
Given the above, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2.2. Assuming the existence of same-string, weak one-time simulation
sound NIZK with deterministic verifier, there exists same-string, weak one-time
simulation sound NIZK with verifier in AC0 .
5.2.2.2 Circuit SAT proof system for the class L(C) with prover com-
plexity D and streaming verifier.
• P(C, x, w) the prover computes a tableau T of the computation C(x,w) = 1.
Let d denote the depth of the tableau T . For each level i ∈ [d], the i-th level,












i ) denote the j-th pair
of input wires at that level and outji denotes the j-th output wire at that level.
For simplicity of notation, we assume that the input wires to the first level,
T1 consist only of x, and that wires corresponding to the input w will occur
as outputs of level T1. The P outputs (T1, . . . , Td).
• V(C, x, T1, . . . , Td) the verifier chooses k at random and computes h0 = hk(x),
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where h is a universal hash function. For each level i ∈ [d], the verifier then
does the following:









– For j ∈ [`], (1) Check consistency of the gate’s computation, (2) Add
(inj,ai , in
j,b





(3) Add outji to the streaming computation of the hash hk([out
j
i ]j∈`).




i )]j∈`) = hi−1.
– Set hi := hk([out
j
i ]j∈`).
– If any of the above checks fail, abort and output 0.
If all checks succeed, the verifier outputs 1.
Completeness clearly holds. To show extractability, note that the only way
the inputs/outputs of level T1 do not correspond to x,w such that C(x,w) = 1 and
yet all checks pass is if the proof ouputted by the prover consists of consecutive lev-











[outji ]j∈2`. The probability over choice of k that this occurs for a single pair of con-
secutive levels is 1/22`, since h is universal. So the probability it occurs for any pair
of consecutive levels is at most d/22`, which is negligible.
Theorem 5.2.3 ( [110]). For any c < 1
20
, there exists α > 0, such that the the
following holds: Let x
u← {0, 1}n. Let m ≤ 2αn. Let A be an algorithm that is
given as input a stream of samples, (a1, b1), . . . , (am, bm), where each at is uniformly
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distributed over {0, 1}n and for every t, bt = at · x. Assume A uses at most cn2
memory bits and outputs a string x̃ ∈ {0, 1}n. Then, Pr[x̃ = x] ≤ O(2−αn).
Lemma 5.2.1 (Inner Product is a strong extractor [108]). Let X, Y be random
variables over {0, 1}n such that H∞(X) ≥ kX and H∞(Y ) ≥ kY . Let u ≤ kX
d(〈X, Y 〉|X : U) ≤ 2(2u−kX + 2(n+1−u−kY )/2),
where d(X|Y ) :
∑
y Pr[Y = y]∆(X|Y = y;U) for U the uniform distribution (inde-
pendent of X).
5.2.3 Computational Model for Streaming Adversaries
In this section we discuss the computational model used for analysis of the
streaming adversaries. This model is similar to the one used in [110].
We first discuss streaming adversaries in general, and then discuss the specific
case of streaming adversaries for learning parity and streaming tampering functions..
General Streaming Adversaries. The input is represented as a stream S1, . . . , S`,
where for i ∈ [`], each Si ∈ {0, 1}B, where B is the block length. We model the
adversary by a branching program. A branching program of length ` and width
w, is a directed acyclic graph with the vertices arranged in ` + 1 layers such that
no layer contains more than w vertices. Intuitively, each layer represents a time
step of computation whereas, each vertex in the graph corresponds to the potential
memory state learned by the adversary. The first layer (layer 0) contains a single
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vertex, called the start vertex, which represents the input. A vertex is called leaf
if it has out-degree 0, and represents the output (the learned value of x) of the
program. Every non-leaf vertex in the program has exactly 2n+1 outgoing edges,
labeled by elements S ∈ {0, 1}B, with exactly one edge labeled by each such S, and
all the edges from layer j − 1 going to vertices in layer j. Intuitively, these edges
represent the computation on reading Si as streaming input. The stream S1, . . . , S`,
therefore, define a computation-path in the branching program.
We discuss the streaming branching program adversaries, and streaming ad-
versaries for learning parity next.
Definition 5.2.3 (Streaming Branching Program Adversaries). A branching pro-
gram of length m and width w is a directed acyclic graph with vertices arranged in
m + 1 layers containing at most w vertices each. In the first layer, that we call
layer 0, there is only one vertex, called the start vertex. A vertex of out-degree 0
is called a leaf. All the vertices in the layer m are leaves. Every non-leaf vertex in
the program has exactly 2n+1 outgoing edges, labeled by elements S ∈ {0, 1}B, with
exactly one edge labeled by each such S, and all the edges from layer j − 1 going to
vertices in layer j.
Computation Path: The stream S1, . . . , S` ∈ {0, 1}B that are given as input,
define a computation-path in the branching program, by starting form the start vertex
and following at step i the edge labeled by Si, until reaching a leaf.
Streaming Adversaries for Learning Parity. Recall, that in the Parity Learning set-
ting, the adversary aims to learn a uniform random string x ∈ {0, 1}n, from a stream
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of samples, (a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (am, bm), where each ai is uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}n and for every i, bi = ai · x.
Definition 5.2.4 (Streaming Branching Program for Parity Learning). [110] A
branching program of length m and width w, for parity learning is a directed acyclic
graph with vertices arranged in m+ 1 layers containing at most w vertices each. In
the first layer, that we call layer 0, there is only one vertex, called the start vertex.
A vertex of out-degree 0 is called a leaf. All the vertices in the layer m are leaves.
Every non-leaf vertex in the program has exactly 2n+1 outgoing edges, labeled by
elements (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}, with exactly one edge labeled by each such (a, b),
and all the edges from layer j − 1 going to vertices in layer j.
Computation Path: The samples (a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (am, bm) ∈ {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1} that are given as input, define a computation-path in the branching program,
by starting form the start vertex and following at step i the edge labeled by (ai, bi),
until reaching a leaf.
Streaming Tampering Functions. The input is represented as a stream S1, . . . , S`,
where for i ∈ [`], each Si ∈ {0, 1}B, where B is the block length. We model the
adversary by a branching program, which reads in a block of length B and writes
out a block of length B in each step. A branching program of length ` and width
w, is a directed acyclic graph with the vertices arranged in ` + 1 layers such that
no layer contains more than w vertices. Intuitively, each layer represents a time
step of computation whereas, each vertex in the graph corresponds to the potential
memory state learned by the adversary. The first layer (layer 0) contains a single
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vertex, called the start vertex, which represents the input. A vertex is called leaf if it
has out-degree 0, and represents the output (the learned value of x) of the program.
Every non-leaf vertex in the program has exactly 2n+1 outgoing edges, labeled by
pairs of elements Sin, Sout ∈ {0, 1}B, with exactly one edge labeled by each such Sin,
and all the edges from layer j−1 going to vertices in layer j. Intuitively, these edges
represent the computation on reading Si as streaming input, as well as the output
in that time step. The stream S1, . . . , S`, therefore, define a computation-path in
the branching program.
Definition 5.2.5 (Streaming Tampering Functions). A branching program of length
m and width w is a directed acyclic graph with vertices arranged in m + 1 layers
containing at most w vertices each. In the first layer, that we call layer 0, there
is only one vertex, called the start vertex. A vertex of out-degree 0 is called a leaf.
All the vertices in the layer m are leaves. Every non-leaf vertex in the program has
exactly 2n+1 outgoing edges, labeled by pairs of elements Sin, Sout ∈ {0, 1}B, with
exactly one edge labeled by each such Sin, and all the edges from layer j− 1 going to
vertices in layer j.
Computation Path: The stream S1, . . . , S` ∈ {0, 1}B that are given as input,
define a computation-path in the branching program, by starting form the start vertex
and following at step i the edge labeled by Si, until reaching a leaf.
In this work we consider the Polynomial-time uniform family of branching
programs which can be informally defined as follows:
A family of branching programs of size s (number of nodes in the branching
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program), denoted by BP = {BPs : s ∈ N} is Polynomial-time uniform if there
exists a deterministic Turing machine M , such that
• M runs in polynomial time (i.e. poly(s)), and
• For all s ∈ N, M outputs the description (nodes and corresponding labels) of
BPs on input 1
s
5.3 Generic Construction for One-Bit Messages
In this section we present the generic construction for encoding a single bit
messages.
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Let E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public key encryption scheme with perfect correctness
(see Definition 3.4.3). Let ΠNI = (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) be a non-interactive simulat-
able proof system with soundness against adversaries A ∈ G (see Definition 3.5.4). Note
that in the CRS model, we implicitly assume that all algorithms take the CRS as input,
and for simplicity of notation, sometimes do not list the CRS as an explicit input.
CRSGen(1n):
1. Choose (pk, sk)← Gen(1n).
2. Choose [(crsNIi , τ
i
sim)]i∈{0,...n} ← CRSGen
NI(1n). Let −→crsNI := [crsNIi ]i∈{0,...n} and let−→τ sim := [τ isim]i∈{0,...n} and output crs := (pk,
−→crsNI).
Languages. We define the following languages:
• Lβi : For i ∈ [n], β ∈ {0, 1}, s := (~̂k,~c, c) ∈ L
β
i iff the i-th ciphertext ci := ki ⊕ β
(where ~c = c1, . . . , cn) and the i-th encryption k̂i (where ~̂k = k̂1, . . . , k̂n+1) is an
encryption of ki under pk (where pk is hardwired into the language).
• L: s := (~̂k,~c, c) ∈ L iff (x1, . . . , xn) is in the support of Db where:
1. For i ∈ [n], xi := ci ⊕ ki, and b := c⊕ kn+1
2. ~̂k is an encryption of k1, . . . , kn+1 under pk (where pk is hardwired into the
language).
E(crs, b):
1. Sample ~x← Db, where ~x = x1, . . . , xn.
2. Choose an n+1-bit key ~k = k1, . . . , kn, k uniformly at random. For i ∈ [n], compute
k̂i ← Encrypt(pk, ki) and compute k̂n+1 ← Encrypt(pk, k). Let ~̂k := k̂1, . . . , k̂n+1.
3. Compute c1 := k1 ⊕ x1, . . . , cn := kn ⊕ xn. Let ~c := c1, . . . , cn. Also, compute
c := b⊕ k.
4. For i ∈ [n], compute a non-interactive, simulatable proof Ti proving s := (~̂k,~c, c) ∈
Lxii relative to crsNIi .
5. Compute a non-interactive, simulatable proof T proving s := (~̂k,~c, c) ∈ L relative
to crsNI0 .
6. Output CW := (~̂k, c1, . . . , cn, c, T, x1, T1, .., xn, Tn).
D(crs,CW):
1. Parse CW := (~̂k, c1, . . . , cn, c, T, x1, T1, .., xn, Tn)
2. Check that VNI outputs 1 on all proofs T1, .., Tn, T , relative to the corresponding
CRS. If yes, output b such that x1...xn is in the support of Db. If not, output 0.
Figure 5.1: Non-malleable code (CRSGen,E,D), secure against F tampering.
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E1(crs,
−→τ sim, r, b):
1. Sample ~x← Db, where ~x = x1, . . . , xn.
2. Choose an n + 1-bit key ~k = k1, . . . , kn, k uniformly at random. For i ∈ [n],
compute k̂i ← Encrypt(pk, ki) and compute k̂n+1 ← Encrypt(pk, k). Let ~̂k :=
k̂1, . . . , k̂n+1.
3. Compute c1 := k1 ⊕ x1, . . . , cn := kn ⊕ xn. Let ~c := c1, . . . , cn.
4. Compute c := b⊕ k.
5. For i ∈ [n], use τ isim and r to simulate a non-interactive proof T ′i proving
(~̂k,~c, c) ∈ Lxii , relative to crsNIi .
6. Use τ0sim and r to simulate a non-interactive proof T
′ proving (~̂k,~c, c) ∈ L,
relative to crsNI0 .
7. Output CW := (~̂k, c1, . . . , cn, c, T
′, x1, T
′
1, .., xn, T
′
n).
Figure 5.2: Encoding algorithm with simulated proofs.
E2(crs,
−→τ sim, r, b):
1. Sample ~x← Db, where ~x = x1, . . . , xn.
2. Choose c′1, . . . , c
′
n uniformly at random. Let
~c′ := c′1, . . . , c
′
n.
3. Choose c′ uniformly at random.
4. Set ~k′ = c′1, . . . , c
′
n, c
′. For i ∈ [n], compute k̂′i ← Encrypt(pk, k′i) and compute
k̂′n+1 ← Encrypt(pk, k′).
Let ~̂k′ := k̂′1, . . . , k̂
′
n+1.
5. For i ∈ [n], use τ isim and r to simulate a non-interactive proof T ′i proving
( ~̂k′, ~c′, c) ∈ Lxii , relative to crsNIi .
6. Use τ0sim and r to simulate a non-interactive proof T
′ proving ( ~̂k′, ~c′, c) ∈ L,
relative to crsNI0 .
7. Output CW := (~̂k′, c′1, . . . , c
′
n, c
′, T ′, x1, T
′
1, .., xn, T
′
n).
Figure 5.3: Encoding algorithm with simulated proofs and encryptions.
131
Ext(crs, sk,CW):
1. Parse CW := (~̂k, c1, . . . , cn, c, T, x1, T1, .., xn, Tn),
2. Output Decrypt(sk, k̂n+1).
Figure 5.4: Extracting procedure Ext.
D′(crs, k,CW):
1. Parse CW := (~̂k, c1, . . . , cn, c, T, x1, T1, .., xn, Tn),
2. Check that VNI outputs 1 on all proofs T1, .., Tn, T , relative to the corresponding
CRS,
3. If not, output 0. Otherwise, output b := k ⊕ c.
Figure 5.5: Alternate decoding procedure D′, given additional extracted key
k as input.
g(crs,CW,CW∗, r):
1. Parse CW = (~̂k,~c, c, T, x1, T1, .., xn, Tn), CW
∗ = (~̂k∗,~c∗, c∗, T ∗, x∗1, T
∗





2. If (1) VNI outputs 1 on all proofs T ∗, T ∗1 , .., T
∗
n , relative to the corresponding
CRS; and (2) (~̂k,~c, c) = (~̂k∗,~c∗, c∗), then output 1. Otherwise output 0.
Figure 5.6: The predicate g(crs,CW,CW∗, r).
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Let Ψ(p, c, x, y, r, z) be defined as a function that takes as input a predicate p,
and variables c, x, y, r, z. If p(c, x, y, r) = 1, then Ψ outputs 0. Otherwise, Ψ outputs
z.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let (E,D), E1, E2, Ext, D
′ and g be as defined in Figures 5.1, 5.2,
5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. Let F be a computational class. If, for every adversary A ∈ G
outputting tampering functions f ∈ F , all of the following hold:
Simulation of proofs.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW0, f(CW0), r0) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1) = 1],
2. Ψ(g, crs,CW0, f(CW0), r0,D(crs, f(CW0); r0)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r0, r1 are sampled uniformly
at random,
CW0 ← E(crs, 0) and CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1, 0).
Simulation of Encryptions.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1],
2. Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2,D(crs, f(CW2); r2)),
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where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r1, r2 are sampled uniformly
at random,
CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1, 0) and CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2, 0).
Simulation Soundness.
Pr
D(crs, f(CW2); r2) 6= D
′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2)
∧g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 0
 ≤ negl(n),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim) ← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2 is sampled uniformly at
random and
CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r, 0).
Hardness of Db relative to Alternate Decoding.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW3, f(CW3), r3) = 1],
2. D′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ≈ D′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2, r3 are sampled uniformly
at random,
CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2, 0) and CW3 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r3, 1).
Then the construction presented in Figure 5.1 is a non-malleable code for class
F against adversaries A ∈ G.
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5.3.1 Proof of Theorem 5.3.1
In this subsection we prove Theorem 5.3.1.
We take g to be the predicate that is used in the MediumTamperΠ,FA,m,g(n) tam-
pering experiment. We must argue that for every m ∈ {0, 1} and every attacker
A ∈ G the output of the experiment ExptΠ,FA,m,g(n) is 1 with at most negligible prob-
ability.
Assume towards contradiction that for some A ∈ G the output of the experi-
ment is 1 with non-negligible probability. Then this means that the probability in the
last line of experiment ExptΠ,FA,m,g(n) that g(crs,CW,CW
∗, r) = 1∧D(crs,CW∗; r) 6= m
is non-negligible. Parse CW = (~̂k,~c, c, T, x1, T1, .., xn, Tn), and
CW∗ = (~̂k∗,~c∗, c∗, T ∗, x∗1, T
∗





Recall that D(crs,CW; r) = m. Thus, if the above event occurs, it means that
D(crs,CW; r) 6= D(crs,CW∗; r). But since g(crs,CW,CW∗, r) = 1, it means that VNI
outputs 1 on all proofs T ∗, [T ∗i ]i∈[n] and (
~̂k,~c, c) = (~̂k∗,~c∗, c∗).
This, in turn, means that there must be some bit xi, x
∗
i that CW and CW
∗ differ
on. But note that by assumption ci = c
∗
i . Due to the fact that CW is well-formed
and perfect correctness of the encryption scheme, it must mean that c∗i /∈ L
x∗i
i . But
recall that by assumption, proof T ∗i verifies correctly. This means that soundness is
broken by A ∈ G. This contradicts the security of the proof system ΠNI.






To do so we consider the following hybrid argument:
Hybrid 0: The real game, MediumTamperΠ,FA,0,g, relative to g, where the real
encoding CW0 ← E(crs, 0) and the real decoding oracle D are used.
Hybrid 1: Replace the encoding from the previous game with
CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1, 0) where r1 is chosen uniformly at random and g, D
use random coins r1.
Hybrid 2: Replace the encoding from the previous game with CW2 ←
E2(crs,
−→τ sim, r2, 0), where r2 is chosen uniformly at random and g, D use ran-
dom coins r2.
Hybrid 3: Replace the decoding from the previous game, with
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2). where r2 is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom and g, E2 use random coins r2.
Hybrid 4: Same as Hybrid 3, but replace the encoding with
CW3 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r3, 1), where r3 is chosen uniformly at random and g, D′
use random coins r3.
Now, we prove our hybrids are indistinguishable.
Claim 5.3.1. Hybrid 0 is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 1.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the Simulation of proofs property in
Theorem 5.3.1.
Claim 5.3.2. Hybrid 1 is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 2.
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Proof. The claim follows immediately from the Simulation of Encryptions prop-
erty in Theorem 5.3.1.
Claim 5.3.3. Hybrid 2 is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 3.
Proof. This claim follows from the fact that (1) if g(crs,CW,CW∗, r) = 1, then the
experiment outputs same∗ in both Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3; and (2) the probability
that g(crs,CW,CW∗, r) = 0 and the output of the experiment is different in Hybrid
2 and Hybrid 3 is at most negligible, due to the Simulation Soundness property
in Theorem 5.3.1.
Claim 5.3.4. Hybrid 3 is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 4.
Proof. This follows from the fact that (1) for γ ∈ {2, 3} if g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) =
1 then
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWγ)), f(CWγ); rγ) always outputs 0 and so
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWγ)), f(CWγ); rγ)
≡ Ψ(g, crs,CWγ, f(CWγ), rγ,D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWγ)), f(CWγ); rγ));
and (2) the Hardness of Db relative to Alternate Decoding property in The-
orem 5.3.1.
5.3.2 One-Bit NMC for AC0 and beyond
In this section, we show that our generic construction yields efficient NMC
for AC0 in the CRS model, when each of the underlying primitives is appropriately
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instantiated.
Theorem 5.3.2. Π = (CRSGen,E,D) (presented in Figure 5.1) is a one-bit, com-
putational, non-malleable code in the CRS model, secure against tampering by AC0
circuits, if the underlying components are instantiated in the following way:
• E := (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is a public key encryption scheme with perfect
correctness and decryption in AC0 .
• ΠNI := (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) is a same-string, weak one-time simulation-
sound NIZK with verifier in AC0 .
• For b ∈ {0, 1}, Db is the distribution that samples bits x1 . . . xn uniformly at
random, conditioned on x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn = b.
Note that given Theorem 5.2.2, proof systems ΠNI as above exist, under the
assumption that same-string, weak one-time simulation-sound NIZK with (arbitrary
polynomial-time) deterministic verifier exists. Such NIZK can be constructed in the
CRS model from enhanced trapdoor permutations [111]. Public key encryption
with perfect correctness and decryption in AC0 can be constructed by applying the
low-decryption-error transformation of Dwork et al. [63] to the (reduced decryption
error) encryption scheme of Bogdanov and Lee [26]. We now provide an instantiation
of the public key encryption scheme.
Public key encryption in AC0 . We now present the result presented by Bogdanov
and Lee in [26] which showed that the encryption scheme given by Applebaum et
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al. in [13] can be implemented by circuit with constant depth and size polynomial
in the security parameter.
PKE Scheme based on Bipartite Graphs [13]
• Gen(1n): The key generation algorithm takes security parameter n as input
and outputs a random bipartite graph G = ((U1, U2), E) as the public key pk,
where |U1| = n and |U2| = r = n0.9 generated in the following way. First choose
the random subsets S1 ⊆ U1 and S2 ⊆ U2 of sizes s and s/3 respectively for
s = O(log n). Each vertex in S1 is connected to d (possibly repeated) random
vertices in S2 and each vertex outside S1 is connected to d random vertices in
U2. The secret key sk is an odd size subset of S1 such that each vertex in S2
has an even number of neighbors in sk.
• Encrypt(pk, b): To encrypt bit b ∈ {0, 1}, choose a random subset S ′2 ⊂ U2
and output ~c = ~y+~e+b·~1, where each coordinate of ~y ∈ {0, 1}n is the degree of
corresponding vertex in S1 restricted to S
′
2 mod 2, ~e ∈ {0, 1}n is a vector with
each coordinate (ei : i ∈ [n]) sampled from distribution η̂ with Pr [ei = 0] = η
independently, and ~1 ∈ {0, 1}n is the vector of all 1s.
• Decrypt(sk,~c): Output b =
∑
i∈sk ci mod 2.
Refer [13] for the security of the scheme presented above. We next present the
AC0 implementation of the PKE presented above as shown in [26].
AC0 Implementation of [13] PKE Scheme based on Bipartite Graphs [26]
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• Gen:
1. Sample y1, y2, . . . , ys from [n] and w1, w2, . . . , ws/3 from [r] to represent
the subsets S1 ⊆ U1 and S2 ⊆ U2 respectively.
2. Sample vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,d from [r] for all i ∈ [n]. These represent the
random neighbors of each vertex in U1 \ S1.
3. Sample v̂i,1, v̂i,2, . . . v̂i,d from [s/3] for all i ∈ [s]. These become the random
neighbors of the vertices in S1 after being mapped to the wi’s by the index




[(i = j) ∧ wj]
.
The key generation circuit outputs vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,d if the vertex i is not in
S1 and outputs ι(v̂i,1), ι(v̂i,2), . . . ι(v̂i,d) otherwise. Now we can output the j
th





[(i = k) ∧ ι(v̂k,j)]
]
∨ (δ̄i ∧ vi,j),
where δi :=
∨s
k=1(i = yk) indicates whether i belongs to S1.
To come up with secret key sk, we enumerate all the possible subsets of S1
(this is still efficient since s = O(log n)) and output the first one that satisfies
the linear dependency. Given an odd size subset of S1 indicated by the support
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outputs 0 only if every vertex in S2 has an even number of neighbors in support
of ~a and outputs 1 otherwise. (Since the XOR involves only O(d log n) inputs
it can be calculated with a circuit of depth 2 and size nO(d).) We can therefore,
enumerate all the possible ~a ∈ {0, 1}s with odd hamming weight and output
the first ~a such that f~a = 0. The secret key is represented by a vector ~z
containing s entries in [n], where each non-zero entry corresponds to a vertex








 ∧ (ai ∧ i)
 .
• Encrypt: Given a public key represented by the neighbors vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,d of
each vertex i ∈ U1. To encrypt bit b ∈ {0, 1}, choose a random vector ~x ∈
{0, 1}r whose support forms the subset S ′2 of U2, a noise vector ~e ∈ {0, 1}n
by choosing each of its entries independently from η̂. The ith bit of ciphertext









(vi,j = kj) ∧ (xk1 = a1) ∧ · · · ∧ (xkd = ad)
]
⊕ ei ⊕ b
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• Decrypt: Given the ciphertext ~c and secret key sk represented by the vector





[(zi = k) ∧ ck].
Reducing the decryption error The [13] encryption scheme suffers from significant
encryption error (and thus decryption error) however, this can be minimized ar-
bitrarily by encrypting the message multiple times independently. The decryption
algorithm can then take approximate majority to compute the encrypted bit. Ap-
proximate majority can be computed with constant depth circuits [11] (depth 3)
and thus the overall decryption algorithm is still in AC0 .
We now use the following transformation given by [63] to obtain almost-all
keys perfect decryption for the above encryption scheme.
Let E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be any public-key encryption scheme. Also
let `(n) > n be the number of bits used by Encrypt to encrypt n-bit messages.
Let prg be a pseudorandom generator that expands n bits to `(n) bits. Then the
modified encryption scheme E ′ = (Gen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) is obtained as follows: On
input 1n, Gen′ outputs ((pk, r̄), sk) where (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n) and r̄ ∈ {0, 1}`(n) is
chosen uniform randomly. To encrypt message m, Encrypt′ samples a random n-bit
string r and outputs Encrypt(pk,m) using prg(r) ⊕ r̄ as randomness for Encrypt.
Decrypt′ is same as Decrypt, note that this preserves the computational complexity
of decryption.
Theorem 5.3.3. [63] Let E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be any (1 − 2−4n) cor-
rect public key encryption scheme with Decrypt being deterministic. Then E ′ =
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(Gen′,Encrypt′,Decrypt) is an almost-all-key perfectly correct public encryption scheme.
Furthermore, if E is IND-CPA secure then so is E ′.
Note that the above transformation takes a public key encryption scheme E
with sufficiently low decryption error and transforms it into a public key encryption
scheme that enjoys perfect correctness, and furthermore, note that the decryption
algorithm Decrypt remains unchanged. Therefore, if we start with the (reduced de-
cryption error) version of the AC0 Bogdanov and Lee public key encryption scheme,
we obtain a perfectly correct public key encryption scheme with decryption in AC0
, as desired.
Proof of theorem 5.3.2. To prove the theorem, we need to show that for every PPT
adversary A outputting tampering functions f ∈ F , the necessary properties from
Theorem 5.3.1 hold. We next go through these one by one.
• Simulation of proofs.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW0, f(CW0), r0) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1) = 1],
2. Ψ(g, crs,CW0, f(CW0), r0,D(crs, f(CW0); r0)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r0, r1 are sampled uniformly
at random,
CW0 ← E(crs, 0) and CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1, 0).
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This follows immediately from the zero-knowledge property of
ΠNI = (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI).
• Simulation of Encryptions.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1],
2. Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2,D(crs, f(CW2); r2)),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r1, r2 are sampled uniformly
at random,
CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1, 0) and CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2, 0).
This follows immediately from the fact that ~c, c and ~c′, c′ are identically dis-
tributed when generated by E1 versus E2 and from the semantic security of
the public key encryption scheme E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt).
• Simulation Soundness.
Pr
D(crs, f(CW2); r2) 6= D
′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2)
∧g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 0
 ≤ negl(n),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim) ← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2 is sampled uniformly at
random and
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CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r, 0).
Note that g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 0 only if either of the following is true:
(1) VNI did not output 1 on all tampered proofs T ∗, T ∗1 , . . . , T
∗
n in f(CW2); or
(2) the first 3 elements of CW2 and f(CW2) are not identical (i.e., (~̂k,~c, c) 6=
( ~̂k∗, ~c∗, c∗)). Now in case (1), both D(crs, f(CW2); r2), and
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) output 0. This is contradiction to the
claim that D(crs, f(CW2); r2) 6= D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2). In
case (2), the extractor Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)) outputs k
∗
n+1 := Decrypt(sk, k̂
∗
n+1)
and D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) outputs b
∗ = c∗ ⊕ k∗n+1. Now, if
D(crs, f(CW2); r2) 6= D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) but VNI outputs
1 on all tampered proofs T ∗, T ∗1 , . . . , T
∗
n in f(CW2) then one-time simulation
soundness of ΠNI = (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) does not hold.
• Hardness of Db relative to Alternate Decoding.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW3, f(CW3), r3) = 1],
2. D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ≈
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2, r3 are sampled uniformly
at random,
CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2, 0) and CW3 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r3, 1).
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Let ~X denote a random variable where ~X is sampled from D0 with probability
1/2 and ~X is sampled from D1 with probability 1/2 and let random variable
CW denote the output of E2 when ~X replaces ~x.
To show (1), assume Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] and
Pr[g(crs,CW3, f(CW3), r3) = 1] differ by a non-negligible amount. This im-
plies that takes as input ~X, hardwires all other random variables, and outputs
1 in the case that g(crs,CW, f(CW), r) = 1 and 0 otherwise, implying that
it has non-negligible correlation to the parity of its input ~X. We will show
that the above can be computed by an AC0 circuit with input ~X, thus contra-
dicting Theorem 3.3.1, which says that an AC0 circuit has at most negligible
correlation with parity of its input ~X, denoted P( ~X). Details follow.
We construct the distribution of circuits C1F . A draw C ∼ C1F is done as follows:
1. Sample (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n).
2. Sample tampering function A(crs)→ f .
3. Sample ~c′, c′ uniformly at random.
4. Set ~k′ = c′1, . . . , c
′
n, c. For i ∈ [n], compute k̂′i ← Encrypt(pk, k′i) and
compute k̂′n+1 ← Encrypt(pk, k′).
5. Sample r uniformly at random.
6. Sample simulated proofs [T
′β
i ]β∈{0,1},i∈[n] and T
′ (as described in Fig-
ure 5.3).
7. Output the following circuit C that has the following structure:
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– computes and outputs:
g(crs,CW, f(CW), r).
Note that given all the hardwired variables, computing CW is in AC0 since
all it does is, for i ∈ [n], select the correct simulated proof T ′xii based on
the corresponding input bit xi. Additionally, f in AC
0 and g in AC0 ,
since bit-wise comparison is in AC0 and V SAT is in AC0 . Thus, the entire
circuit is in AC0 .
To show (2), assume D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) and
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3) have non-negligible statistical distance.
This implies that a circuit that takes as input ~X, hardwires all other ran-
dom variables, and outputs D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW)), f(CW); r2) has non-
negligible correlation to the parity of ~X. We will show that
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW)), f(CW); r2) can be computed by an AC
0 circuit with
input ~X, thus contradicting Theorem 3.3.1, which says that an AC0 circuit has
at most negligible correlation with the parity of its input ~X, denoted P( ~X).
Details follow.
We construct the distribution of circuits C2F . A draw C ∼ C2F is done as follows:
1. Sample (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n).
147
2. Sample tampering function A(crs)→ f .
3. Sample ~c′, c′ uniformly at random.
4. Set ~k′ = c′1, . . . , c
′
n, c. For i ∈ [n], compute k̂′i ← Encrypt(pk, k′i) and
compute k̂′n+1 ← Encrypt(pk, k′).
5. Sample r uniformly at random.
6. Sample simulated proofs [T
′β
i ]β∈{0,1},i∈[n] and T
′ (as described in Fig-
ure 5.3).
7. Output the following circuit C that has the following structure:




– computes and outputs:
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW)), f(CW); r2).
Note that Ext ∈ AC0 since decryption for E := (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) in
AC0 . Moreover, as above, given all the hardwired variables, computing
CW is in AC0 since all it does is, for i ∈ [n], select the correct simulated
proof T
′xi
i based on the corresponding input bit xi. Additionally, f in
AC0 and D′ is in AC0 , since xor of two bits is in AC0 and V SAT is in AC0
. Thus, the entire circuit is in AC0 .
We present the analysis for more tampering classes next.
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5.3.3 Tampering classes beyond AC0 .
Let F ( P be a tampering class. Relative to this class F , define the circuit
classes C1F and C2F as in the proof above.
Theorem 5.3.4. Let {D0,D1} be (probabilistic polynomial time) samplable distri-
butions with disjoint support. If the following hold:
• There exists a ppt distinguishing algorithm D such that for b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr
~x∼Db
[D(~x) = b] = 1.
• For all C ∈ C1F ∪ C2F
∣∣∣∣ Pr~x∼D0[C(~x) = 1]− Pr~x∼D1[C(~x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
Then, under the same assumptions as Theorem 5.3.2, Π = (CRSGen,E,D) is a
computational non-malleable code against tampering by F that encodes a single bit.
We informally argue that Theorem 8 yields non-malleable codes against new
classes: small threshold circuits and time-bounded probabilistic RAM machines. As
noted earlier, non-malleable codes (in the CRS model without computational as-
sumptions) from [73] are resilient against these classes. We provide theorems simply
to demonstrate the applicability of our framework to a broad class of correlation
bounds.
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Theorem 5.3.5 ( [41]). For all d there exists εd > 0 such that the following holds.
There exists a probabilistic polynomial time computable f (the Generalized Andreev
Function) such that for any depth-d threshold circuit with n1+εd wires, C, f has
correlation at most 2−n
Ω(1)
with C.
Corollary 5.3.1. Let f be as in Theorem 5.3.5. Fix x0, x1 such that f(xb) = b.
Let Db define a variable, X, which is defined by rejection sampling the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}n conditioned on f(X) = b; if after O(n) tries the rejection
sampling has not succeeded, output xb.
Then, assuming PKE in AC0 and same-string weak one-time simulation-
simulation sound NIZK, there exists a constant d0 such that for d > d0, Π =
(CRSGen,E,D) is a computational non-malleable code against depth-d threshold cir-
cuits with n1+ε
′
d wires, where ε′d is any positive constant less than εd from Theo-
rem 5.3.5.
The corollary follows from the fact that given the appropriate choice of se-
curity parameters for the encryption scheme and NIZK, any C ∈ C1F ∪ C2F has a
representation as depth-d threshold circuit with 1 + εd wires, so long as d is large
enough, and the fact that rejection sampling fails with very low probability as f is
balanced.
Using a generalization of a Theorem from [20] (combined with a result on
prime finding from [104]):
Theorem 5.3.6 ( [20]). Let k be an integer (constant). Assuming one of the fol-
lowing:
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1. a randomized variant of the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (BPSETH):
∀ε > 0,∃q such that no randomized algorithm running in time O(21−ε)n) is
correct with probability > 2/3 on every instance of qSAT.
2. the randomized k-Orthogonal Vector Conjecture (BPkOVC): the k-Orthogonal
Vector problem requires time Ω(nk−o(1)) for randomized algorithms that are
correct with probability > 2/3 on every instance.
k-Othogonal Vector is a generalization of the well-studied Orthogonal Vector
problem that asks given k sets of vectors U1, . . . , Uk ⊂ {0, 1}log
2 n each of size
n, does there exist




i · · ·u
(k)
i = 0?
Then, there exists a function FOVk such that any randomized time t = Ω(2log
ε n) (for
ε > 0) algorithm whose output (on a random instance x) is correct (the algorithm




Combining the above with simulation sound zk-SNARKS, for example from [80],
to reduce the proof size and verification time we get the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3.2. Let k ∈ N. Let t(n) = Ω(2logε(n)) and δ(n) > 0 such that T/δ2 =
Ω(nk−o(1)). Let Lk be as in Theorem 5.3.5. Fix x0, x1 such that Lk(xb) = b. Let Db
define a variable, X, which is defined by rejection sampling the uniform distribution
over {0, 1}n conditioned on Lk(X) = b; if after O(n) tries the rejection sampling
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has not succeeded, output xb.
Then, assuming BPSETH or BPkOVC, PKE, and simulation sound zk-SNARK,
Π = (CRSGen,E,D) is a computational (BPTIME(t(n)), δ(n)+negl(n))-non-malleable
code.






Note, however, that the tampering experiments are only inverse-polynomially
indistinguishable (not negligible). Stronger bounds on the probability of correctness
(δ) in Theorem 5.3.6 will yield stronger bounds on the tampering experiments.
5.4 Construction for Multi-Bit Messages
The construction for encoding multi-bit messages is similar to that for encoding
a single bit, presented in section 5.3. The construction repeats the procedure for
encoding single bit m times, for encoding m-bit messages and binds it with a proof
T .
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Let E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public key encryption scheme with perfect correctness
(see Definition 3.4.3). Let ΠNI = (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) be a non-interactive simulat-
able proof system with soundness against adversaries A ∈ G (see Definition 3.5.4). Note
that in the CRS model, we implicitly assume that all algorithms take the CRS as input,
and for simplicity of notation, sometimes do not list the CRS as an explicit input.
CRSGen(1n): Choose (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n). Choose [crsNIi,j , τ
i,j
sim](i,j)=(0,0),i∈[m],j∈[n] ←
CRSGenNI(1n). Let −→crsNI := [crsNIi,j ](i,j)=(0,0),i∈[m],j∈[n] and let
−→τ sim :=
[τ i,jsim](i,j)=(0,0),i∈[m],j∈[n], and output crs := (pk,
−→crsNI).
Languages. We define the following languages:
• Lβi,j : For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], β ∈ {0, 1}, s := ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L
β
i,j iff the (i, j)-th
ciphertext cij := k
i
j ⊕ β (where ~c = [cij ]i∈[m],j∈[n]) and the (i, j)-th encryption k̂ij
(where ~̂ki = k̂i1, . . . , k̂
i
n+1) is an encryption of k
i
j under pk (where pk is hardwired
into the language).
• L: s := ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L iff For each i ∈ [m], (xi1, . . . , xin) is in the support of Dbi
where:
1. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], xij := cij ⊕ kij , and bi := ci ⊕ kin+1 (where c := c1, . . . , cm)
2. ~̂ki is an encryption of ki1, . . . , k
i
n+1 under pk (which is hardwired into the
language).
E(crs,~b := b1, . . . , bm):
1. Sample ~x := ~x1, . . . , ~xm ← D~b, where for i ∈ [m], ~x
i = xi1, . . . , x
i
n.
2. Choose an m · (n + 1)-bit key ~k := [~ki]i∈[m] = [ki1, . . . , kin, ki]i∈[m] uniformly at
random. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n + 1], compute k̂ij ← Encrypt(pk, kij). For i ∈ [m], let
~̂ki := k̂i1, . . . , k̂
i
n+1. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], compute cij := kij⊕xij . Let~c := [cij ]i∈[m],j∈[n].
3. For i ∈ [m], compute ci := ki ⊕ bi. Let c := [ci]i∈[m]. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], compute a
NI, simulatable proof T ij proving ([
~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L
xij
i,j relative to crs
NI
i,j .
4. Compute a NI, simulatable proof T proving ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L relative to crsNI0,0.











2. Check that VNI outputs 1 on all proofs [T ij ]i∈[m],j∈[n], T , relative to corresponding




n is in the support of Dbi . Else, output
~0.
Figure 5.7: Non-malleable code (CRSGen,E,D), secure against F tampering.
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E1(crs,
−→τ sim, r,~b := b1, . . . , bm):
1. Sample ~x := ~x1, . . . , ~xm ← Db, where for i ∈ [m], ~xi = xi1, . . . , xin.
2. Choose an m · (n + 1)-bit key ~k := [~ki]i∈[m] = [ki1, . . . , kin, ki]i∈[m] uniformly at
random. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n + 1], compute k̂ij ← Encrypt(pk, kij). For i ∈ [m],
let ~̂ki := k̂i1, . . . , k̂
i
n+1.
3. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], compute cij := kij ⊕ xij . Let ~c := [cij ]i∈[m],j∈[n].
4. For i ∈ [m], compute ci := ki ⊕ bi. Let c := [ci]i∈[m].
5. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], simulate, using τ i,jsim and r, a non-interactive proof T
′i
j
proving s := ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L
xij
i,j , relative to crs
NI
i,j .
6. Simulate, using τ0,0sim and r, a non-interactive proof T
′ proving
s := ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L,relative to crsNI0,0.
7. Output CW := ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c, T
′, [(xij , T
′i
j )]i∈[m],j∈[n]).
Figure 5.8: Encoding algorithm with simulated proofs.
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E2(crs,
−→τ sim, r,~b := b1, . . . , bm):
1. Sample ~x := ~x1, . . . , ~xm ← Db, where for i ∈ [m], ~xi = xi1, . . . , xin.
2. Choose [c
′i





′i]i∈[m] uniformly at random. Let c
′ := [c
′i]i∈[m].








For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n+ 1],
compute k̂
′i
j ← Encrypt(pk, k
′i
j ). For i ∈ [m], let ~̂k
′i := k̂
′i
1 , . . . , k̂
′i
n+1.
5. For i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], simulate, using τ i,jsim and r, a non-interactive proof T
′i
j
proving s := ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L
xij
i,j , relative to crs
NI
i,j .
6. Simulate, using τ0,0sim and r, a non-interactive proof T
′ proving s :=
([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) ∈ L, relative to crsNI0,0.
7. Output CW := ([~̂k
′i
]i∈[m],~c
′, c′, T ′, [(xij , T
′i
j )]i∈[m],j∈[n]).
Figure 5.9: Encoding algorithm with simulated proofs and encryptions.
Ext(crs, sk,CW):





2. Output [Decrypt(sk, k̂in+1)]i∈[m].
Figure 5.10: Extracting procedure Ext.
D′(crs, [ki]i∈[m],CW):





2. Check that VNI outputs 1 on all proofs [T ij ]i∈[m],j∈[n], T , relative to the corre-
sponding CRS,
3. For i ∈ [m], output bi := ki ⊕ ci.
Figure 5.11: Alternate decoding procedure D′, given additional extracted
key [ki]i∈[m] as input.
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g(crs,CW,CW∗, r):









∗, c∗, T ∗, [(x∗ij , T
∗i
j )]i∈[m],j∈[n]).
2. If (1) VNI outputs 1 on all proofs T ∗, [T ∗ij )]i∈[m],j∈[n], relative to the correspond-
ing CRS; and (2) ([~̂ki]i∈[m],~c, c) = ([~̂k
∗i
]i∈[m],~c
∗, c∗), then output 1. Otherwise
output 0.
Figure 5.12: The predicate g(crs,CW,CW∗, r).
Let Ψ(p, c, x, y, r, z) be defined as a function that takes as input a predicate
p, and variables c, x, y, r, z. If p(c, x, y, r) = 1, then Ψ outputs the m-bit string ~0.
Otherwise, Ψ outputs z.
Theorem 5.4.1. Let (E,D), E1, E2, Ext, D
′ and g be as defined in Figures 5.7, 5.8,
5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12. Let F be a computational class. If, for every pair of m-bit
messages ~b0,~b1 and if, for every adversary A ∈ G outputting tampering functions
f ∈ F , all of the following hold:
• Simulation of proofs.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW0, f(CW0), r0) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1) = 1],
2. Ψ(g, crs,CW0, f(CW0), r0,D(crs, f(CW0); r0)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r0, r1 are sampled uniformly
at random, CW0 ← E(crs,~b0) and CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1,~b0).
• Simulation of Encryptions.
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1. Pr[g(crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1],
2. Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2,D(crs, f(CW2); r2)),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r1, r2 are sampled uniformly
at random, CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1,~b0) and CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2,~b0).
• Simulation Soundness.
Prr[D(crs, f(CW2); r2) 6= D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ∧
g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 0] ≤ negl(n),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim) ← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2 is sampled uniformly at
random and CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r,~b0).
• Hardness of D~b relative to Alternate Decoding.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW3, f(CW3), r3) = 1],
2. For every Boolean function, represented by a circuit F over m variables,
F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ≈
F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2, r3 are sampled uniformly
at random, CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2,~b0) and CW3 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r3,~b1).
Then the construction presented in Figure 5.7 is a non-malleable code for class
F against adversaries A ∈ G.
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We present the proof of theorem 5.4.1 next.
5.4.1 Generic Analysis
Similarly to the one-bit case, we take g to be the predicate that is used in the
MediumTamperΠ,FA,m,g(n) tampering experiment. We must argue that for every m ∈ Σ
and every attacker A ∈ G the output of the experiment ExptΠ,FA,m,g(n) is 1 with at
most negligible probability
Assume towards contradiction that for some A ∈ G the output of the experi-
ment is 1 with non-negligible probability. Then this means that the probability in the
last line of experiment ExptΠ,FA,m,g(n) that g(crs,CW,CW
∗, r) = 1∧D(crs,CW∗; r) 6= m








∗, c∗, T ∗, [(xij, T
∗i
j ]i∈[m],j∈[n]).
Recall that D(crs,CW; r) = m. Thus, if the above event occurs, it means that
D(crs,CW; r) 6= D(crs,CW∗; r). But since g(crs,CW,CW∗, r) = 1, it means that
VNI outputs 1 on all proofs T ∗, [T ∗ij )]i∈[m],j∈[n] and ([




This, in turn, means that there must be some bit xij, x
∗i
j that CW and CW
∗ differ
on. But note that by assumption cij = c
∗i
j . Due to the fact that CW is well-formed
and perfect correctness of the encryption scheme, it must mean that c∗ij /∈ L
x∗ij
i,j . But
recall that by assumption, proof T ∗ij verifies correctly. This means that soundness
is broken by A ∈ G. This contradicts the security of the proof system ΠNI.
Next, recall that we wish to show that for any ~b0,~b1 and any adversary A ∈ G





To do so we consider the following hybrid argument, which proceeds almost
identically to the hybrid argument for the one-bit case:
Hybrid 0: The real game, MediumTamperΠ,F
A,~b0,g
, relative to g, where the real
encoding CW0 ← E(crs,~b0) and the real decoding oracle D are used.
Hybrid 1: Replace the encoding from the previous game with CW1 ←
E1(crs,
−→τ sim, r1,~b0) where r1 is chosen uniformly at random and g, D use ran-
dom coins r1.
Hybrid 2: Replace the encoding from the previous game with CW2 ←
E2(crs,
−→τ sim, r2,~b0), where r2 is chosen uniformly at random and g, D use
random coins r2.
Hybrid 3: Replace the decoding from the previous game, with
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2). where r2 is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom and g, E2 use random coins r2.
Hybrid 4: Same as Hybrid 3, but replace the encoding with CW3 ←
E2(crs,
−→τ sim, r3,~b1), where r3 is chosen uniformly at random and g, D′ use
random coins r3.
The proofs of indistinguishability of consecutive hybrid distributions follow
identically to the one bit case, except for the final hybrid.
Claim 5.4.1. Hybrid 3 is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 4.
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Proof. First note that for γ ∈ {2, 3} if g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1 then
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWγ)), f(CWγ); rγ) always outputs ~0 and so
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWγ)), f(CWγ); rγ)
≡ Ψ(g, crs,CWγ, f(CWγ), rγ,D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWγ)), f(CWγ); rγ)).
Now, assume towards contradiction that the two distributions
Ψ(g, crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2,D
′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2)) and
Ψ(g, crs,CW3, f(CW3), r3,D
′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3)) are distinguishable.
By the above, this implies that D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) and
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3) are distinguishable. Note that since D
′ out-
puts m bits, this implies that there exists a distinguishing circuit F over m-bit
inputs such that
∣∣Pr[F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) = 1]
− Pr[F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3)] = 1
∣∣ ≥ negl(n).
But this yields a contradiction to the Hardness of D~b relative to Alternate
Decoding property in Theorem 5.4.1.
5.4.2 Efficient, Multi-Bit NMC for AC0
Theorem 5.4.2. Π = (CRSGen,E,D) (presented in Figure 5.7) is an m-bit, compu-
tational, non-malleable code in the CRS model against tampering by depth-(mlog
δm/2−
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c) circuits with unbounded fan-in and size δ · logm
log logm
− p(n) (where c is constant and
p(·) is a fixed polynomial), and m is such that n = m3+5δ, if the underlying compo-
nents are instantiated in the following way:
• E := (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is a public key encryption scheme with perfect
correctness and decryption in AC0 .
• ΠNI := (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) is a same-string, weak one-time simulation-
sound NIZK with verifier in AC0 .
• For b ∈ {0, 1}, Db is the distribution that samples bits x1 . . . xn uniformly at
random, conditioned on x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn = b.
For as in the one-bit case, given Theorem 5.2.2, proof systems ΠNI as above
exist, under the assumption that same-string, weak one-time simulation-sound NIZK
with (arbitrary polynomial-time) deterministic verifier exists. See the beginning of
Section 5.3.2 for a discussion of how such NIZK and public key encryption can be
instantiated.
Before proving the theorem, we state some claims on Fourier concentration
of AC0 circuits and then prove Claim 5.4.3, which will be used in the proof of
Theorem 5.4.2.
Claim 5.4.2 ( [117]). AC0 circuits of depth d and size k have at most 2−Ω(n/(log k)
d−1
of their Fourier mass at level n or above.
Setting d = (2 + δ) · logm
log logm
, k = mlog





















We have the following corollary:
Corollary 5.4.1. An AC0 circuit of depth d = (2 + δ) · logm
log logm
and size k = mlog
δm
has at most ε ∈ 2−Ω(m1+δ) of its Fourier mass at level n := m3+5δ or above.
We now prove the main technical claim of this section:
Claim 5.4.3. Let n be security parameter. Let C ∈ AC0 be a circuit of depth
d ≤ (2 + δ) · logm
log logm
and size k ≤ mlogδm that takes inputs ~x of length n bits. Let
m be such that n = m3+5δ, where 0 < δ ≤ 1. For γ ∈ {0, 1} let ~Xγ be a random
variable distributed as Dγ. Then for every Boolean function F over m variables,
|Pr[F (C( ~X0)) = 1]− Pr[F (C( ~X1)) = 1]| ∈ 2−Ω(mδ).
Note, the above claim implies that
F (C( ~X0))
s
≈ F (C( ~X1)).
of Claim 5.4.3. The conclusion of the claim is implied by showing that |Pr[F (C(~x)) =
1 | PAR(~x) = 1]−Pr[F (C(~x)) = 1 | PAR(~x) = −1]| ∈ 2−Ω(mδ), where the probability
is taken over choice of ~x from the distribution which sets ~x ← D0 with probability
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1/2 and ~x ← D1 with probability 1/2. Thus, in order to prove the claim, it is
sufficient to show that for every (inefficient) distinguisher F ,
|E[F ◦ C(~x) · PAR(~x)]| ∈ 2−Ω(mδ).
Recall that the correlation of F ◦ C with PAR(~x) is defined as |E[F ◦ C(~x) ·
PAR(~x)]|. Thus, to complete the proof, we must show that for every (inefficient) F ,
the correlation of F ◦ C with PAR(~x) is negligible.
Analyzing the correlation of χS ◦C with PAR(~x). First, note that since each output
bit of C, computed by Ci, i ∈ [m] is in AC0 it has depth at most δ · lognlog logn .
We next claim that for S ⊆ [m], there is a circuit computing χS ◦ C(~x) =
χS(C1(~x), . . . , Cn(~x)) of depth at most d = (2 + δ) · logmlog logm and size at most k =
mlog
δm.
This follows since the circuit for χS(C1(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) can be constructed by
computing C(~x) := C1(~x), . . . , Cm(~x) in size m
logδm/2 and depth δ · logm
log logm
and then
feeding this into a circuit that computes parity over (at most) m bits, which (by
recursively computing parity over logm bits in depth 2 and polynomial size), has
size mlog
δm/2 and depth 2 logm
log logm
.




= ε. Since |E[χS ◦
C(~x) · PAR(~x)]| = χ̂S ◦ C([n]), we have that for S ⊆ [m], the correlation of
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χS(C1(~x), . . . , Cn(~x)) with PAR(~x) is at most
√
ε ∈ 2−Ω(m1+δ):
|E[χS ◦ C(~x) · PAR(~x)]| ≤
√
ε. (5.4.1)
Analyzing the correlation of F ◦ C with PAR(~x). Since F ◦ C(~x) =
∑
S⊆[m] F̂ (S) ·
χS(C1(~x), . . . , Cn(~x)), we have that
|E[F ◦ C(~x) · PAR(~x)]| = |
∑
S⊆[m]




|F̂ (S)||E[χS(C1(~x), . . . , Cm(~x)) · PAR(~x)]| (5.4.2)
≤ 2m ·
√
ε ∈ 2−Ω(mδ), (5.4.3)
where (5.1) follows by the triangle inequality and (5.2) follows from (5.4.1)
and the fact that for all S ⊆ [n], |F̂ (S)| ≤ 1.
So we have shown that |E[F ◦C(~x) ·PAR(~x)]| is negligible (in m and therefore
also in n, since m and n are polynomially related), thus completing the proof.
We are now ready to complete the proof of the theorem.
of Theorem 5.4.2. The proof proceeds identically to the one-bit proof, until we reach
the final property:
Hardness of Db relative to Alternate Decoding.
1. Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(crs,CW3, f(CW3), r3) = 1],
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2. For every Boolean function, represented by a circuit F over m variables,
F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ≈
F ◦ D′(Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim) ← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2, r3 are sampled uniformly at
random, CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2,~b0) and CW3 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r3,~b1).
We consider a sequence of distributions where we switch the internal random
variables of E2 from from ~x
i ← Dbi0 , for all i ∈ [m] to ~x
i ← Dbi1 , for all i ∈ [m].
Namely, for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} we consider a distribution where for j ≤ i, ~xj ← Dbi1
and for j > i, ~xj ← Dbi0 .
We must show that (1) and (2) hold for each consecutive pair of distributions.
When considering the i-th consecutive pair, fix all random variables except the i-
th variable ~X i to values ~x1, . . . , ~xi−1, ~xi+1, . . . , ~xm. Let ~X i be a random variable
such that with probability 1/2, ~X i ← Dbi0 and with probability 1/2, ~X
i ← Dbi1 .
~X i = ~X i,γ where γ ← {0, 1}, and let random variable CWi denote the output of E2
when using random variables ~x1, . . . , ~xi−1, ~X i, ~xi+1, . . . , ~xm.
To show (1), assume Pr[g(crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] and
Pr[g(crs,CW3, f(CW3), r3) = 1] differ by a non-negligible amount. This implies that,
for some i ∈ [m], there is a circuit that takes as input ~X i, hardwires all other random
variables, and outputs 1 in the case that g(crs,CWi, f(CWi), r) = 1 and 0 otherwise,
implying that it has non-negligible correlation to the parity of its input ~X i. We
will show that the above can be computed by an AC0 circuit with input ~X i, thus
contradicting Theorem 3.3.1, which says that an AC0 circuit has at most negligible
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correlation with parity of its input ~X i, denoted P( ~X i). Details follow.
We construct the distribution of circuits C1F . A draw C ∼ C1F is done as follows:
1. Sample (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n).
2. Sample tampering function A(crs)→ f .
3. Sample ~c′, c′ uniformly at random,




1 , . . . , c
′i
n, c
′i]i∈[m]. For i ∈ [m], j ∈
[n+ 1], compute k̂
′i
j ← Encrypt(pk, k
′i
j ). For i ∈ [m], let ~̂k
′i := k̂
′i
1 , . . . , k̂
′i
n+1.
5. Sample r uniformly at random.
6. Sample simulated proofs [T
′β,i
j ]β∈{0,1},i∈[m],j∈[n] and T
′ (as described in Fig-
ure 5.8).
7. Sample ~x1, . . . , ~xi−1 from Dbi0 , and ~x
i+1, . . . , ~xm from Dbi1 .
8. Output the following AC0 circuit C that has the following structure:
• hardcoded variables: crs, sk, f , [~̂k′i]i∈[m],~c′, c′, r, [T
′β,i
j ]β∈{0,1},i∈[m],j∈[n],
~x1, . . . , ~xi−1, ~xi+1, . . . , ~xm.
• input: ~X i.
• computes and outputs:
g(crs,CW, f(CW), r).
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Note that given all the hardwired variables, computing CW is in AC0 since
all it does is, for j ∈ [n], select the correct simulated proof T
′Xij ,i
j based on
the corresponding input bit X ij. Additionally, f in AC
0 and g in AC0 , since
bit-wise comparison is in AC0 and V SAT is in AC0 . Thus, the entire circuit is
in AC0 .
To show (2), assume D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) and
D′(Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3) have non-negligible statistical distance. This
implies that there exists a distinguisher F (represented by an m-bit Boolean func-
tion) such that F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) is far from
F ◦ D′(Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3). This implies that, for some i ∈ [m], the
output of F ◦D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWi)), f(CWi); ri) is correlated with the parity of
its input ~X i. We will show that
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWi)), f(CWi); ri) can be computed by an AC
0 circuit C (drawn
from some distribution C) with input ~X i. We then use Claim 5.4.3, which says that
if C is an AC0 circuit taking inputs of length n bits and F is any m-bit function
then the output F (C( ~X i)), conditioned on the parity of ~X i being 0 is statistically
close to the output F (C( ~X i)), conditioned on the parity of ~X i being 1. This yields a
contradiction, since it means that F ◦D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWi)), f(CWi); ri) cannot
be correlated with the parity of its input ~X i. Details follow.
We construct the distribution of circuits C2F . A draw C ∼ C2F is done as follows:
1. Sample (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n).
2. Sample tampering function A(crs)→ f .
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3. Sample ~c′, c′ uniformly at random,




1 , . . . , c
′i
n, c
′i]i∈[m]. For i ∈ [m], j ∈
[n+ 1], compute k̂
′i
j ← Encrypt(pk, k
′i
j ). For i ∈ [m], let ~̂k
′i := k̂
′i
1 , . . . , k̂
′i
n+1.
5. Sample r uniformly at random.
6. Sample simulated proofs [T
′β,i
j ]β∈{0,1},i∈[m],j∈[n] and T
′ (as described in Fig-
ure 5.8).
7. Sample ~x1, . . . , ~xi−1 from Dbi0 , and ~x
i+1, . . . , ~xm from Dbi1 .
8. Output the following AC0 circuit C that has the following structure:
• hardcoded variables: crs, sk, f , [~̂k′i]i∈[m],~c′, c′, r, [T
′β,i
j ]β∈{0,1},i∈[m],j∈[n],
~x1, . . . , ~xi−1, ~xi+1, . . . , ~xm.
• input: ~X i.
• computes and outputs:
D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CWi)), f(CWi); ri)
.
Note that Ext ∈ AC0 since decryption for E := (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) in AC0
. Moreover, as above, given all the hardwired variables, computing CWi is in
AC0 since all it does is, for j ∈ [n], select the correct simulated proof T
′Xij ,i
j
based on the corresponding input bit X ij. Additionally, f in AC
0 and D′ is in
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AC0 , since xor of two streams of bits is in AC0 and V SAT is in AC0 . Thus, the
entire circuit is in AC0 .
Remark 5.4.1. We wish to highlight that for AC0 tampering, the condition on the
encryption scheme used in Sections 5.3.2, and 5.4.2, that Decrypt algorithm must
be in AC0 can be relaxed. Note that in the proof we need to show that for PPT
distinguisher Dist, the entire tampering experiment can be simulated in AC0 after
we switch the decoding algorithm to alternate decoding D′. On a high level the main
difference between the decoding algorithm D and the alternate decoding algorithm D′
is that if the NIZK proofs are accepted then, D′ uses the “trapdoor” (secret key) to
decrypt the ciphertext and recover the underlying message. In the proof, we need to
argue that Dist cannot distinguish between the output of alternate decoding D′ in the
two tampering experiments when the input distribution is switched from D0 to D1.
Recall that this is argued by invoking incompressibility of parity function (over n bits)
PARn and noting that the length of the output of D
′ is m << n. We can split the
alternate decoding algorithm D′, as follows: D′ = D′1 ◦D′2 where, (1) D′2 first checks
if the NIZK proofs are accepted and if so, simply output the ciphertext corresponding
to the underlying message (which is part of the codeword), and then (2) D′1 finds
the underlying message by brute-force, instead of decrypting the ciphertext. Now,
instead of proving Dist cannot distinguish between the tampering experiments when
the input distribution is switched from D0 to D1, we need to show that Dist ◦ D′1
cannot distinguish between the tampering experiments when the input distribution is
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switched from D0 to D1. However, since the output of D
′
2 is the size of m ciphertexts
(so m · λ), by setting n polynomial sufficiently large even an unbounded Dist ◦D′1 is
not correlated with the parity due to the incompressibility theorem (Theorem 5.2.1).
Thus, by appropriate choice of parameters such that n is sufficiently large compared
to m number of ciphertexts encrypting a single bit, we no longer need that Decrypt ∈
AC0 .1
5.4.3 Tampering with decision trees
Theorem 5.4.3. Π = (CRSGen,E,D) (presented in Figure 5.7) is an m-bit, compu-
tational, non-malleable code in the CRS model against tampering by depth-d circuits
with unbounded fan-in and size ≤ 2mε (where d, ε are constants), and m is such that
n = m1+ε, if the underlying components are instantiated in the following way:
• E := (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is a public key encryption scheme with perfect
correctness and decryption in AC0 .
• ΠNI := (CRSGenNI,PNI,VNI, SimNI) is a same-string, weak one-time simulation-
sound NIZK with verifier in AC0 .
• For b ∈ {0, 1}, Db is the distribution that samples bits x1 . . . xn uniformly at
random, conditioned on x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn = b.
The proof of this theorem follows exactly as the proof of Theorem 5.4.2, ex-
cept we replace Claim 5.4.3 with Claim 5.4.4 below. But first, we present a simple
corollary of the theorem.
1We thank Vinod Vaikuntanathan and the other attendees at CIS seminar, MIT on February
23rrd, 2018, for insightful discussion which brought this improvement to our notice.
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Corollary 5.4.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5.4.3, (CRSGen,E,D) is an
m-bit, computational, non-malleable code against tampering by decision trees of com-
plexity ≤ mε, where 0 < ε ≤ 1 is a constant, and n = m1+ε.
This follows from the above theorem when put together with the fact that deci-
sion trees of depth t can be represented as a disjunction of 2t terms (each term is a
path to some 1).
Claim 5.4.4. Let n be security parameter. Fix some d ∈ Z. Let ε ≥ 1/d. Let m be
such that n = m1+ε Let C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be composed of depth-d circuit with
unbounded fan-in and size s = 2m
ε
. For γ ∈ {0, 1} let ~Xγ be a random variable
distributed as Dγ. Then for every Boolean function F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} over m
variables,






Proof. Let n = m1+ε/q for 1 > ε ≥ 1/d. Let ρ be a random restriction over {0, 1}`




. Let t = mε. Then, by lemma 3.3.1 and a
union bound the probability that some output bit of Cρ cannot be represented by a
decision tree of depth t− 2 is at most ms(9q1/dt)t.






= m exp(−mε). (5.4.5)
If Cρ can be represented by a decision tree of depth t− 1 call Cρ “simple.”
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Any F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} has decision tree complexity at most than m. If
we compose this with a simple Cρ, the resulting decision tree has complexity <
m1+ε − 1 [116].
Additionally, by standard Chernoff bounds, the probability that ρ contains
more than 4`q ?’s is at most exp(−mε). Call such a ρ “bad.” Note that if this is
the case, then Cρ is a function over at least m
1+ε variables.
If neither event happens, ρ is not bad and Cρ is simple, then F◦Cρ is completely
uncorrelated with parity. Otherwise, the correlation is bounded by 1. Therefore, we
can simply bound correlation with the probability that either ρ is bad or Cρ is not
simple: (m+ 1) exp(−mε).
5.5 One-Bit NMC Against Streaming Adversaries
We begin by describing constructions of the underlying components required to
instantiate the generic constructions in the streaming adversaries setting.
In the following, we assume that the tampering class F corresponds to stream-
ing adversaries with memory o(n′′). We then choose parameter n ∈ ω(n′′) and
parameter n′ ∈ ω(n). n is the parameter for the hard distribution described in Sec-
tion 5.5.1, n′ is the parameter for the encryption scheme described in Section 5.5.2,
n′′ is the parameter for the weak encryption scheme (Hide,Rec) described in Sec-
tion 5.5.3.
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5.5.1 The Hard Distribution Db (parameter n)
Let n = (µ+ 1)2 − 1
For b ∈ {0, 1}, a draw from the distribution Db is defined as follows: Choose
a parity χS uniformly at random from the set of all (non-zero) parities over µ vari-
ables (∅ 6= S ⊆ [µ]). Choose y1, . . . , yµ ∼ {0, 1}µ uniformly at random. Choose y
uniformly at random, conditioned on χS(y) = b. Output the following n-bit string:
[(yi, χS(yi)]i∈[µ]||y.
The hardness of the distribution follows from Theorems 5.2.3 and lemma 5.2.1.
Claim 5.5.1. Let A be a streaming algorithm with o(n) space, and α > 0. Then,
‖ Pr
x∼D0
[A(x) = 0]− Pr
x∼D1
[A(x) = 0]‖ ≤ 2αn/3.
5.5.2 Encryption scheme E = (Encrypt,Decrypt) (parameter n′ ∈
ω(n))
The Learning Parity problem yields an encryption scheme with semantic se-
curity against streaming adversaries with o(n′) storage. We can use this encryption
scheme to encrypt the key k, bit-by-bit, thus yielding an encryption scheme with the
necessary properties.
To encrypt a bit b, Encrypt(b) outputs z, where z ∼ Db and Db is the same as
above, except with parameter n′.
To decrypt a ciphertext z, with Θ(n′) storage, Decrypt(z) runs the parity learn-
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ing algorithm to recover b.
Renaming variables and plugging in Claim 5.5.1 from above, we have
Claim 5.5.2. Let A be a streaming algorithm with o(n) space, and α > 0. Then,
‖ Pr
z∼Encrypt(0)
[A(z) = 0]− Pr
z∼Encrypt(1)
[A(z) = 0]‖ ≤ 2αn/3.
5.5.3 Weak Encryption Scheme (parameter n′′ ∈ o(n))
Let n′′ = (µ′′+ 1)2− 1 Given a bit string k = k1, . . . , kµ′′ of length µ′′ bits, and
a vector y := y1, . . . , yµ′′ of length µ
′′ bits, let Sk ⊆ [µ′′] denote the set of positions
in k that are set to 1. Let m = m1, . . . ,m` be a bit string of length ` bits (where `
is polynomial in µ′′). let χSk(y) :=
⊕
i∈Sk yi.
On input m ∈ {0, 1}` and k as above, Hide(k,m) chooses random strings
y01, . . . , y
0
µ′′, y1, . . . , y` ← Uµ′′ and outputs ([y0i , χSk(y0i )]i∈[µ′′], [(yi, χSk(yi)⊕mi)]i∈[`]).
On input ([y0i , χSk(y
0
i )]i∈[µ′′], [(yi, χSk(yi) ⊕ mi)]i∈[`]), Rec uses the first µ′′ ex-
amples to learn χSk and then returns [m
i]i∈[`] := χSk(yi)⊕m′i.
5.5.4 Non-Interactive Simulatable Proof System (parameter n′′ ∈
o(n))
In the following construction, inputs and proofs have λ parallel components,
corresponding to λ parallel invocations of the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. To sim-
plify the exposition, we assume that the bounded, streaming computations read in λ
symbols in parallel from each of the λ parallel components and output λ symbols in
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parallel for each of the λ parallel components. Note that this increases the required
storage by a factor of λ, but since we set λ n′′, the overall storage bound remains
below n′′.
We begin by introducing a simplified proof system and proving its soundness.
We then present the actual proof system used in our construction. Looking ahead,
proving that the Simulation Soundness property required by Theorem 5.3.1 holds,
will reduce to the soundness of the simplified proof system.
Simplified Proof System Π′ Let λ′ be security parameter and ` is a constant (e.g.
` = 5).
P: On input statement s, encoding [s1u, . . . , s
λ′
u ]u∈[`] and witness w:
1. Check that for q ∈ [λ′], sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
` = s: Compute streaming hash h
∗ :=
Hh(s) and λ′ streaming hashes in parallel, hq := [H
h(sq1⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
`)]q∈λ′, where
H is Merkle Damgard and h ← H, where H is a universal family of hash
function. Check that for all q ∈ [λ′], hq = h∗. If not, output ⊥.
2. Run MPC-in-the-head: For q ∈ [λ], secret share w into ` additive shares
(wq1, . . . , w
q









` ), producing views [View
q
u]q∈[λ′],u∈[`] (here, each view
is a tableau of the parties’ computation, as described in the construction of cir-
cuit SAT proof system for streaming verifiers in Section 5.2.2).
Note that of the input wires to the views, some will be public (corresponding to
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the shares of s) and some will be private (corresponding to the shares of w).
3. Encrypt the Views. For q ∈ [λ′], u ∈ [`], choose kqu uniformly at random
from {0, 1}µ′′. Compute Squ ← Hide(kqu,Viewqu), where Hide is run with param-
eter n′′. Output proof T = ([k̂qu, S
q
u]q∈[λ′],u∈[`]).
V: On input statement s, encoding [s1u, . . . , s
λ′





1. Generate randomness. Choose randomness r1, . . . , rλ′ and hash function
h← H. For each q ∈ [λ], choose a subset Sq ⊆ [`] using random coins rq.
2. Check that for q ∈ [λ], sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
` = s: Repeat the same steps as P to
check that for q ∈ [λ], sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
` = s if not, output ⊥.
3. Prepare hashes of input for later equality checks. This is done in
parallel to the previous item. For q ∈ [λ′], u ∈ Sq, compute hq,u = Hh(squ).





u) (where Rec is run with parameter n
′′) and
corresponding inputs s̃qu, w̃
q
u.
5. Check consistency of views. This is done in parallel to the previous item.
(1) Check that the opened views are internally consistent (using the verifier
described in the construction of circuit SAT proof system for streaming verifiers
in Section 5.2.2.2). (2) Check that the opened views are consistent with each
other (i.e. same transcript) using similar hashing techniques as above. (3)
Check that hq,u = H
h(s̃qu).
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6. Output. If all checks succeed, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Claim 5.5.3. Soundness of proof system follows from perfect correctness of the
MPC and security of the universal hash function family H.
The Actual Proof System Π As above, in the following construction, inputs and
proofs have λ parallel components, corresponding to λ parallel invocations of the
MPC-in-the-head paradigm. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the bounded,
streaming computations read in λ symbols in parallel from each of the λ parallel
components and output λ symbols in parallel for each of the λ parallel components.
Note that this increases the required storage by a factor of λ, but since we set λ n′′,
the overall storage bound remains below n′′.
Let λ be security parameter and ` is a constant.
P: On input statement s := s1, . . . , st, encoding [s
q
1, . . . , s
q
` ]q∈[λ] and witness w:
1. Check that for q ∈ [λ], sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
` = s: Compute streaming hash h
∗ :=
Hh(s) (with block length λ) and λ streaming hashes (all with block length λ) in
parallel, hq := [H
h(sq1⊕· · ·⊕s
q
`)]q∈λ, where H is Merkle Damgard and h← H,
where H is a universal family of hash function. Check that for all q ∈ [λ],
hq = h
∗. If not, output ⊥.
2. Run MPC-in-the-head: For q ∈ [λ], secret share w into ` additive shares
(wq1, . . . , w
q













Note that of the input wires to the views, some will be public (corresponding to
the shares of s) and some will be private (corresponding to the shares of w).
3. Select the Slots. For each position q, u there are ` · 2t slots [Sz,pq,u]z∈[`],p∈[2t],
where t = |s|. Let sq[z, p] denote the p-th bit position of the string sqz. Let S ′q,z
be the set of positions in the string [sq[z, p]||sq[z, p]]p∈[t] that are set to 1. Note
that |S ′q,z| = t.
4. Encrypt the Views. For q ∈ [λ], u ∈ [`], z ∈ [`], p ∈ [2t], choose kz,pq,u
uniformly at random from {0, 1}µ′′. For q ∈ [λ], u ∈ [`], z ∈ [`] and p ∈ S ′q,z,
compute Sz,pq,u ← Hide(kz,pq,u,Viewqu), where Hide is run with parameter n′′. For
q ∈ [λ], u ∈ [`], z ∈ [`] and p /∈ S ′q,z, set Sz,pq,u ← Hide(kz,pq,u,~0). Output proof
T = ([k̂z,pq,u, S
z,p
q,u]q∈[λ],u∈[`],z∈[`],p∈[2t]).
V: On input statement s := s1, . . . , st, encoding [s
q
1, . . . , s
q
` ]q∈[λ], and proof T , parse
T = ([k̂pq,u, S
p
q,u]q∈[λ],u∈[`],p∈[2t]).
1. Generate Randomness. Choose randomness (r11, r
2





function h ← H. Choose subsets S1q ,S2q ⊆ [`], each of size 2, using random
coins (r1q , r
2
q).
2. Check that for q ∈ [λ], sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
` = s: Repeat the same steps as P to
check that for q ∈ [λ], sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
` = s if not, output ⊥.
3. Prepare hashes of input for later equality checks. This is done in
parallel to the previous item. Do the following in parallel: (1) For q ∈ [λ],
u ∈ S1q , compute h1q,u = Hh(squ) in a streaming fashion, using block size λ and
178
space O(λ2). (2) For q ∈ [`], u ∈ S2q , compute h2q,u = Hh(squ) in a streaming
fashion, using block size λ and space O(λ2).
4. Open selected views and check consistency across slots. For q ∈ [λ],
u ∈ S1q , do the following: (1) For each z ∈ [S2q ], p ∈ [2t], recover kz,pq,u =
Decap(k̂pq,u). (2) For each z ∈ [S2q ], recover Viewz,pq,u, where Viewz,pq,u := Rec(Sz,pq,u),
and Rec is run with parameter n′′. Let [Viewz,pq,u]p∈S′zq,u be the views (out of
[2t]) that do not decrypt to ~0 (i.e. S ′zq,u is the set of slots that are filled).
Let s′zq,u denote the vector corresponding to S ′
z
q,u. (3) Use hashing as above
to check that for each q, r all the recovered views Viewz,pq,u are identical. (4)






5. Check consistency of views. This is done in parallel to the previous item.
(1) For q ∈ [λ], u ∈ S1q check that the view Viewqu is internally consistent
(using the verifier described in the construction of circuit SAT proof system
for streaming verifiers in Section 5.2.2.2). (2) For q ∈ [λ], Check that the views
[Viewqu]u∈S′q are consistent with each other (i.e. same transcript) using similar
hashing techniques as above. (3) For each u ∈ S1q , check that h1q,u = Hh(s̃qu).
(4) For each u ∈ S2q , check that h2q,u = Hh(s̃qu).
6. Output. If all checks succeed, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Sim: On input statement s := s1, . . . , st, encoding [s
q
1, . . . , s
q
` ]q∈[λ], . . . , [s
q
1, . . . , s
q
` ]q∈[λ]:
1. Check that for q ∈ [λ], sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
` = s: Compute streaming hash h
∗ :=
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Hh(s) and λ streaming hashes in parallel, hq := [H
h(sq1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ s
q
`)]q∈λ, where
H is Merkle Damgard and h ← H, where H is a universal family of hash
function. Check that for all q ∈ [λ], hq = h∗. If not, output ⊥.
2. Run MPC-in-the-head Simulation: For q ∈ [λ], choose subset S1q ⊆
[`] using random coins r1q . run Sim
MPC to produce the views of parties Pu,
u ∈ S1q (note that each of these parties has public input squ) producing views
[Viewqu]q∈[λ],u∈Sq .
3. Select the Slots. For each position q, u there are `·2t slots [q, u, z, p]z∈[`],p∈[2t],
where t = |s|. Let sq[z, p] denote the p-th bit position of the string sqz. Let S ′q,z
be the set of positions in the string [sq[z, i]||sq[z, i]]i∈[t] that are set to 1. Note
that |S ′q,z| = t.
4. Encrypt the Views. Choose subset S2q ⊆ [`] using random coins r2q . For
q ∈ [λ], u ∈ [`], z ∈ [`], p ∈ [2t], choose kz,pq,u uniformly at random from {0, 1}µ
′′
.
For q ∈ [λ], u ∈ [S1q ], z ∈ [S2q ] and p ∈ S ′q,z, compute Sz,pq,u ← Hide(kz,pq,u,Viewqu),
where Hide is run with parameter n′′. For q ∈ [λ] and u, z, p such that u /∈




Remark 5.5.1. Note that if the simulated proof and encoding [sq1, . . . , s
q
` ]q∈[λ] are
generated at the same time, then we can first produce the simulated proof π in-
dependently of s. This can be done because the simulated proof depends only on
[squ]q∈[λ],u∈[S1q∪S2q ], which can be chosen uniformly at random (since our parameter
settings ensure that |S1q |+ |S2q | = `− 1). Given the simulated proof π and the choice
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of [sqy]q∈[λ],y∈[S1q∪S2q ], we can then output the entire encoding
[sq1[1], . . . , s
q
` [1]]q∈[λ], . . . , [s
q
1[t
′], . . . , sq` [t
′]]q∈[λ] and proof π in a streaming fashion,
given input s in a streaming fashion, requiring only O(λ2) memory. This is done by
hardwiring [sqy]q∈[λ],y∈[S1q∪S2q ], and, in a block-by-block streaming fashion (with block
length λ), outputting, in parallel, the i-th block of each share for each q ∈ [λ], along






Remark 5.5.2. Note that for two statements s1 6= s2 and their proofs πs1, πs2,
for each q, there exists a pair (z∗q , p
∗
q) such that for each u ∈ [`], slot [q, u, z∗q , p∗q]
contains encryptions of ~0 in πs1 and encryptions of View
q
u in πs2. Moreover, for
any two statements s1 6= s2 and every q ∈ [λ], the probability over choice of r2 that
z∗q ∈ [S2q ], (which means that slots [q, u, z∗, p∗]u∈S1q will be checked by V) is at least
1/`.
Claim 5.5.4. Let A be an unbounded adversary that takes as input random variable
S1tamp||S2tamp. Let S1, S2 denote the random variables corresponding to the initial
contents of A’s input (before tampering).
Let f be a streaming tampering function with memory o(n′′) that reads in
random variable S1||I||S2 (chunk-by-chunk), where I = Hide(k,m) is an encoding
of m with random key k and parameter n′′, and (in a streaming fashion) outputs the
random variable S1tamp||Itamp||S2tamp (chunk-by-chunk). For i ∈ [3], let f(S1||I||S2)[i]
denote the i-th chunk outputted by f .
Then for any m0,m1, when I encodes m0 vs. I encodes m1 the resulting output
distributions of A(f(S1||I||S2)[1], f(S1||I||S2)[3]) are statistically close.
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Proof. If the claim is false, then there exists a distinguisherD. UsingD, A, f , we can
now construct a streaming branching program with space o(n′′) that distinguishes
whether I encodes 0 or 1. We do so in the following way:
1. Fix the random variables S1 = s1 and S2 = s2
2. Construct a branching program BPs1,s2,D,A,f that hardcodes s
1, s2 and emu-
lates f(s1||I||s2). Note the following about the emulation:
• S1tamp = s1tamp = f(s1||I||s2)[1] and the entire inner state of f up to
the moment right before it starts reading I can be hardcoded into the
transition function for BP .
• from this point on, we can emulate f(s1||I||s2) using space o(n′′) until
the moment that f finishes reading I.
• from this point on, we can determine the output of
A(s1tamp, f(S1||I||S2)[3]) without requiring any more memory. To do this,
we use the fact that s1, s1tamp, s
2 are hardcoded and simply precompute
the output of A(s1tamp, f(s1||I||s2)[3]) for each of the possible 2o(n
′′) in-
ternal states of f (by using the internal state of f at the moment that
f finishes reading I to compute S2tamp = s
2
tamp and then running A on
(s1tamp, s
2
tamp)) and then output whatever D outputs. This implies that
given the internal state of f at the moment f finishes reading I, we
can immediately transition to the output level of the branching program,
without requiring additional state.
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3. Note that BP succeeds with the same probability as D.
Theorem 5.5.1. Π = (E,D) (presented in Figure 5.1) is a one-bit, unconditional
non-malleable code against streaming adversaries with space o(n′′), if the underlying
components are instantiated in the following way:
• E := (Encrypt,Decrypt) is the encryption scheme described in Section 5.5.2
(with parameter n′ := n′(n)).
• ΠNI := (PNI,VNI, SimNI) the simulatable proof system with streaming verifier
described in Section 5.5.4 with parameter n′′ := n′′(n).
• For b ∈ {0, 1}, Db is the distribution described in Section 5.5.1 (with paramter
n).
Note that no CRS or computational assumptions are needed for this result.
Indeed we can assume that the adversary A outputting tampering function f is
computationally unbounded. To maintain consistency, we continue to use the
variables crs, sk, −→τ sim but we simply assume that all of them are set to ⊥.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we need to show that the necessary properties from
Theorem 5.3.1 hold. We next go through these one by one.
• Simulation of proofs.
1. Pr[g(CW0, f(CW0), r0) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(CW1, f(CW1), r1),= 1],
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2. Ψ(g, crs,CW0, f(CW0), r0,D(crs, f(CW0); r0)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r1, r2 are sampled uniformly
at random, CW0 ← E(crs,~b0) and CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1,~b0).
To prove this, we must switch from all real proofs (as outputted by E) to
all simulated proofs (as outputted by E). Looking closer at the construction
from Section 5.5.4, to switch from a real to a simulated proof, we must go
through a sequence of hybrids starting from honestly generated proofs from
E and ending with simulated proofs from E1. In hybrid H[q,u,p] we switch to
using encoding algorithm E[q,u,p], which works the same way as the encoding
in the previous hybrid, except when generating the proofs, if r /∈ Sq, it sets
random variable Spq,u to S
p
q,u ← Hide(kpq,u,~0). Note that for u ∈ Sq, H[q,u,p]
is identical to the previous hybrid. Let CW[q,u,p] denote the random variable
representing the codeword in each hybrid distribution. We use Claim 5.5.4
to show that for every fixed random string r and u /∈ Sq, the output of g in
consecutive hybrids is indistinguishable and the output of Ψ in consecuitve
hybrids is indistinguishable. To see this, note that we set A from Claim 5.5.4
to be equal to D, f = f , S1 denotes the codeword up to the [q, u, p] position,
S2 denotes the codeword after the [q, u, p] position, and I := Spq,u. The key
is that VNI (which checks the proofs during computation of g and Ψ) with
random coins r := r1, . . . rq will not check slot [q, u, p] when determining its
output and so the conditions of Claim 5.5.4 are satisfied.
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• Simulation of Encryption.
1. Pr[g(CW1, f(CW1), r1) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(CW2, f(CW2), r2),= 1],
2. Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)) ≈
Ψ(g, crs,CW2, f(CW2), r2,D(crs, f(CW2); r2)),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r1, r2 are sampled uniformly
at random,
CW1 ← E1(crs,−→τ sim, r1,~b0) and CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2,~b0).
To see this, we will show that g(CW1, f(CW1), r1),
Ψ(g, crs,CW1, f(CW1), r1,D(crs, f(CW1); r1)) can be computed in a streaming
fashion with memory o(n′), while distinguishing encryptions of ki from encryp-
tions of k′i in a streaming fashion requires memory Ω(n
′) (see Claim 5.5.2). We
will show that each of E1/E2, f,D, g can be computed in a streaming fashion
with memory o(n′). This implies that their (parallel) composition can also be
computed in a streaming fashion with memory o(n′).
To see that this is true for E1/E2, we use the observation from Remark 5.5.1.
It is true for f by definition of the tampering class F . D consists of (1)
determining b such that ~x is in the support of Db and (2) running the verifier
for Π. Note that (1) can be done in a streaming fashion using Θ(n) bits
of memory. Since we choose n′ = ω(n), the required memory is o(n′). (2)
can be done in a streaming fashion with space o(n′), since the only memory
intensive part of the verification is running Rec. Similar to the above, we set
parameters of Hide/Rec such that this can be done using Θ(n′′) bits of memory,
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where n′′ = o(n). Finally, g consists of a bit-wise comparison of two strings
obtained in a streaming fashion and running the verifier for Π, both of which
can be done in a streaming fashion with memory o(n′). Thus, we have shown
that each of each of E1/E2, f,D, g can be computed in a streaming fashion with
memory o(n′).
• Simulation Soundness.
Prr[D(f(CW2); r2) 6= D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ∧
g(CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 0] ≤ negl(n),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim) ← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2 is sampled uniformly at
random and CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r, 0).
We give a reduction from the above property with Π instantiated with security
parameter λ to the soundness of Π′ with security parameter λ′ = λ/2`.
First, if g(CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 0 then it must be the case that either the
verification of the proofs rejects (in both D and D′, since they are the same) or
s1 6= s2, where s1 is the statement for the proofs in CW and s2 is the statement
for the proofs in f(CW), and s2 /∈ L. Therefore, by Remark 5.5.2, for each q,
there exists a pair (z∗q , p
∗
q) such that for each u ∈ [`], slot [q, u, z∗q , p∗q] contains




We now consider the distribution over slots ([q, u, z∗q , p
∗
q]q∈[λ],u∈[`]). Note that
by Claim 5.5.4 the distribution over these slots only is statistically close in the
case that f gets as input a codeword with a simulated proof, versus a proof
186
where all Sz,pq,u encrypt ~0.
Therefore, our reduction R will construct a simulated proof
π′ = ([k̂z,pq,u, S
z,p
q,u]q∈[λ],u∈[`],z∈[`],p∈[2t]), for s1 where all S
z,p
q,u encrypt ~0. Note that
this simulated proof π′ has no dependence on (r11, r
2





slots encrypt ~0 so there is no information at all in the proof. R will then
extract a proof π′′ = ([k̂z,pq,u, S
z,p
q,u]q∈[λ],r∈[`],z∈[`],p∈[2t]) for some statement s2 6= s1
from the tampered codeword. It will now choose random coins r2q and sets
S2q ⊆ [`], for q ∈ [λ] (using random coins r2q). Using Remark 5.5.2, we know
that the probability over choice of random coins r2q that z
∗
q ∈ S2q is at least 1/`.
Therefore, with all but negligible probability, there is a set Q ⊆ [λ] of size at
least 1/2` · λ such that z∗q ∈ S2q for all q ∈ Q. Moreover, note that if w.h.p.
over choice of r11, . . . , r
2




q,u]q∈Q,u∈[`],z∈[`],p∈[2t] pass then it








q,u ]q∈[Q],u∈[`] is a proof for statement s2 for
proof system Π′ for which VΠ
′
accepts w.h.p. But this breaks the soundness
of proof system Π′ with security parameter λ′ = |Q| ≥ λ/2`.
• Hardness of Db relative to Alternate Decoding.
1. Pr[g(CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] ≈ Pr[g(CW3, f(CW3), r3) = 1],
2. D′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ≈ D′(Ext(sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3),
where (crs, sk,−→τ sim)← CRSGen(1n), f ← A(crs), r2, r3 are sampled uniformly
at random, CW2 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r2, 0) and CW3 ← E2(crs,−→τ sim, r3, 1).
Let ~X denote a random variable where ~X ← D0 with probability 1/2 and
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~X ← D1 with probability 1/2 and let random variable CW denote the output
of E2 when ~X replaces ~x.
To show (1), assume Pr[g(CW2, f(CW2), r2) = 1] and Pr[g(CW3, f(CW3), r3) =
1] differ by a non-negligible amount. This implies that a circuit that takes as
input ~X, hardwires all other random variables, and outputs 1 in the case
that g(CW, f(CW), r) = 1 and 0 otherwise, implying that it has non-negligible
correlation to the function that outputs b such that ~X is in the support of
Db. We will show that the above can be computed by a streaming adversary
with storage o(n) and input ~X, thus contradicting Claim 5.5.1. Indeed, this
follows since the output of E2 can be computed in a streaming fashion using a
similar trick to the AC0 case, f can be computed by streaming adversaries with
storage o(n) by definition of tampering class F , and verification for Π can also
be computed in a streaming fashion with memory Θ(n′′), where n′′ = o(n). So
the composition of the three can also be computed by streaming adversaries
with storage o(n).
To show (2), assume D′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) and
D′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3) have non-negligible statistical distance.
This implies that a circuit that takes as input ~X, hardwires all other random
variables, and outputs D′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW)), f(CW); r2) has non-negligible
correlation to the function that outputs b such that ~X is in the support of
Db. We will show that D
′(crs,Ext(sk, f(CW)), f(CW); r2) can be computed
by a streaming adversary with storage o(n) and input ~X, thus contradicting
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Claim 5.5.1. To show this, note first that the output kn+1 of Ext(sk, f(CW))
can be given as non-uniform advice since it does not depend on ~X. This is
the case because the key is extracted by looking at the first part of the tam-
pered codeword, which is independent of ~X. Since the tampering function is
streaming as well, it means that the output of the tampering function was
determined independently of ~X.
Now, we must show that E2, f , and D
′(crs, kn+1, ·; r2) can all be computed in
a streaming fashion. We have already argued that E2, f can be computed in
a streaming fashion. Note that D′(crs, kn+1, ·; r2) simply decrypts (by xor’ing
kn+1 with c) and checks all proofs using the verifier of Π, which can be done
in a streaming fashion, with space Θ(n′′) = o(n).
5.5.5 Multi-Bit NMC Against Streaming Adversaries
The result from the previous section extends trivially for any number m of bits.
Moreover, when we increase the number of bits m, all other parameters (n, n′, n′′)
can remain the same and do not need to be increased as in our previous multi-bit
constructions. To see this, note that the only additional property that needs to be
proved in the multi-bit case is that for every Boolean function, represented by a cir-
cuit F over m variables,
F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW2)), f(CW2); r2) ≈
F ◦ D′(crs,Ext(crs, sk, f(CW3)), f(CW3); r3).
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But in the bounded, streaming model, F as above can be computed without requiring
any additional memory beyond what is required in the one-bit case. To see this,
recall that the streaming adversary can receive the decryptions of the m ciphertexts
in the tampered codeword as non-uniform advice, since tampering on this part of
the codeword does not depend on the values of [~xi]i∈[m]. Thus, the streaming ad-
versary needs only to check the m · n + 1 proofs, in a streaming fashion, in order
to determine the output of D′: If all proofs verify correctly, the output of D′ will
consist of the hardcoded, “candidate” bits; otherwise, D′ will output ~0. Thus, the
streaming adversary can compute the output of D′ using the same amount of space
as in the one-bit case. Now, F needs to be applied to the output of D′. But note that
computing F does not require any additional space. Indeed, given the state of the
streaming adversary at the moment the output of D′ is determined, we can simply
hardcode the output of F in the transition function. Thus, no additional memory is
required.
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Figure 5.13: A pictorial representation of the Prover’s output in the NI Simu-
latable Proof System Π. Let ` = 5 be the number of parties, and λ be the
security parameter. In the q-th iteration, each party Pi for i ∈ [`] has inputs
(wqi , s
q






i , where s
q
i is the bit-wise complement
of sqi . For example 001 is encoded as 001100. For each bit of the encoding
of sqi , if the bit is 1 then each party Pi places a weak encryption of its view,
viewi, in the corresponding slot (represented by filled-in rectangles of various
shades of gray in the figure). Otherwise, if the bit is 0 then each party places
a weak encryption of all 0’s in the corresponding slot, (represented by blank
rectangles in the figure). During verification, the verifier checks in the first
step that input s = sq1⊕ s
q
2⊕ . . .⊕ s
q
` . To check the consistency of the views,





and does the following: (1) checks that sqi and s
q
` are consistent with the
values read in the first step (2) runs Rec on the weakly encrypted views and
checks that the resulting views are consistent with each other and internally.
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Chapter 6: Tight Upper and Lower Bounds for Leakage-Resilient,
Locally Decodable and Updatable Non-Malleable Codes
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 1 standard non-malleable codes are useful for protecting
small amounts of secret data stored on a device (such as a cryptographic secret key)
but unfortunately are not suitable in settings where, say, an entire database must
be protected. In a recent result, [54] proposed a new notion called locally decodable
and updatable non-malleable codes, which informally speaking, provides the security
guarantees of a non-malleable code while also allowing for efficient random access.
In more detail, we consider a message m = m1, . . . ,mn consisting of n blocks, and
an encoding algorithm E(m) that outputs a codeword Ĉ = ĉ1, . . . , ĉn̂ consisting of n̂
blocks.
As observed by [54], achieving these locality properties requires a modification
of the previous definition of non-malleability: Suppose a tampering function f only
modifies one block of the codeword, then it is likely that the output of the decoding
algorithm, D, remains unchanged in most locations. (Recall D gets as input an index
i ∈ [n] and will only access a few blocks of the codeword to recover the i-th block
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of the message, so it may not detect the modification.) In this case, the (overall)
decoding of the tampered codeword f(Ĉ) (i.e. (Df(Ĉ)(1), . . . ,Df(Ĉ)(n))) can be highly
related to the original message, which intuitively means it is highly malleable.
To handle this issue, [54] consider a more fine-grained experiment. Informally,
they require that for any tampering function f (within some class), there exists a
simulator that, after every update instruction, computes a vector of decoded messages
~m∗, and a set of indices I ⊆ [n]. Here I denotes the coordinates of the underlying
messages that have been tampered with. If I = [n], then the simulator thinks that
the decoded messages are ~m∗, which should be unrelated to the original message as
well as the messages placed in each position by the updater. On the other hand,
if I ( [n], the simulator thinks that all the messages not in I remain unchanged
(equivalent to the most recent values placed there by the simulator or the original
message, if no update has occurred in that position), while those in I become ⊥. This
intuitively means the tampering function can do only one of the following cases:
1. It destroys a block (or blocks) of the underlying messages while keeping the
other blocks unchanged, OR
2. If it modifies a block of the underlying message to a valid encoding, then it must
have modified all blocks to encodings of unrelated messages, thus destroying the
original message.
It turns out, as shown by [54], that the above is sufficient for achieving tamper-
resilience for RAM computations. Specifically, the above (together with an ORAM
scheme) yields a compiler for any RAM program with the guarantee that any ad-
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versary who gets input/output access to the compiled RAM program Π running on
compiled database D who can additionally apply tampering functions f ∈ F to the
database D adaptively throughout the computation, learns no more than what can be
learned given only input/output access to Π running on database D.
Rewind attacks As discussed earlier in chapter 1, when considering both leakage
and tampering attacks (even just a single leakage query followed in a later round
by a single tampering query) so-called rewind attacks become possible. In a rewind
attack, the attacker does the following (1) leak information on only a “few” blocks
of memory in rounds 1, . . . , i; (2) wait during rounds i+1, . . . , j until these memory
locations are (with high probability) modified by the “updater” (the entity that models
the honest computation on the data); (3) re-write the old information into these
memory locations in round j + 1, with the goal of causing the state of the computa-
tion to be rewound. Rewind attacks can be thwarted by ensuring that when the old
information is written back, it becomes inconsistent with other positions of the code-
word and an error is detected. On the other hand, a bad outcome of a rewind attack
occurs if when decoding certain blocks of memory, with non-negligible probability,
the old values from round i are recovered and no error is detected. This is a problem
since such an outcome cannot be simulated by a simulator as required in the security
definition: The decoding of these blocks depends on the original message and yet is
no longer equal to “same” (since the values decoded are not the most recent values
placed in those positions by the updater).
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6.1.1 Our Results
Our results show that any construction of locally decodable and updatable non-
malleable codes in a threat model that allows for a rewind attack as above will require
“high locality.” Specifically, we show tight upper and lower bounds: (1) Every such
construction will require super-constant locality, moreover; (2) Super-constant local-
ity is sufficient for achieving constructions in the same threat model as [54] (which,
as discussed, allows for rewind attacks). Throughout the paper, we assume that the
decode and update procedures are non-adaptive in the sense that the next block of
the codeword accessed during decode/update does not depend on the contents of the
previous blocks accessed. For non-adaptive decode and update we consider two set-
tings: In the first, simpler setting, which we call non-adaptive decode and update
with deterministic accesses we assume that once the encoding scheme Π = (E,D,UP)
is specified, for each n ∈ N, the sets of codeword blocks Si := SDi ∪ SUPi accessed in
order to decode/update the i-th message block, i ∈ [n], are fixed. This is a natural re-
quirement, which holds true for the encoding scheme of [54]. This is the setting that
was considered in the conference version of this paper [53]. In this work, we also
consider a second, more complex setting, which we call non-adaptive decode and
update with randomized accesses. Here we assume that the locations accessed by
decode/update can depend on random coins r ∈ {0, 1}ρ, in addition to the message
index i. Specifically, once the encoding scheme Π = (E,D,UP) is specified, for each
n ∈ N, the sets of codeword blocks Si,r := SDi,r ∪ SUPi,r corresponding to the locations
accessed in order to decode/update the i-th message block, i ∈ [n], with random coins
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r, are fixed. Note that since the access pattern depends on the random coins r, the
blocks of the codeword accessed each time location i is decoded/updated may differ.
Nevertheless, the access pattern is still non-adaptive since the next accessed location
depends only on the message index i to be decoded/updated and on random coins r,
but does not depend on the contents of previously read blocks.
We show the following:
Theorem 6.1.1 (Informal). Let λ be security parameter and let Π = (E,D,UP) be
a locally decodable and updatable non-malleable code that has non-adaptive decode
and update with deterministic accesses in a threat model which allows for a rewind
attack, which takes messages over alphabet Σ and outputs codewords over alphabet Σ̂,
where |Σ|, |Σ̂| ∈ poly(λ). Then, for n = poly(λ), Π must have locality δ(n) ∈ ω(1).
Moreover, for every δ(n) ∈ ω(1), there exists a computationally secure, locally
decodable and updatable non-malleable code Π = (E,D,UP) that has non-adaptive
decode and update with deterministic accesses, in a threat model which allows for
a rewind attack, which takes messages over alphabet Σ and outputs codewords over
alphabet Σ̂, where |Σ|, |Σ̂| ∈ poly(λ) and such that for n = poly(λ), Π has locality
δ(n).
Specifically, for the positive result, the construction of leakage resilient locally
decodable updatable codes is secure against the same classes of tampering and leakage
functions, F , G, as the construction of [54], but improves the locality from O(log n)
to δ(n), for any δ(n) ∈ ω(1).
In this work, we extend our lower bound beyond the setting considered in the
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conference version [53], to the setting where the locations accessed by decode and
update may be randomized:
Theorem 6.1.2 (Informal). Let λ be security parameter and let Π = (E,D,UP) be a
locally decodable and updatable non-malleable code that has non-adaptive decode and
update with randomized accesses which takes messages over alphabet Σ and outputs
codewords over alphabet Σ̂, where |Σ|, |Σ̂| ∈ poly(λ), in a threat model which allows
for a rewind attack. Then, for n = poly(λ), Π has locality δ(n) ∈ ω(1).
We emphasize that, for both lower bounds, our attacks work even in a threat
model which allows only a single bit of leakage in each round.
We also note that since our attacks are efficient, the lower bounds are appli-
cable in the computational setting and therefore also rule out constructions based on
computational assumptions.
We leave as an open question extending our lower bound to the setting where
the access pattern of decode and update, in addition to being randomized, may also
be adaptive (i.e. the next position accessed by decode and/or update depends on the
values read in the previous positions). In Section 6.1.2.3, we discuss the difficulties
of extending our technique to the setting in which decode and update are adaptive.
6.1.2 Our Techniques
6.1.2.1 Lower Bound for Deterministic Access Patterns
We assume that there exists a locally decodable and updatable non-malleable
code with non-adaptive decode and update and constant locality, c, for all message
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lengths n = poly(λ) (where n is the number of blocks in the message). We then
arrive at contradiction by showing that for every constant c, there exists a constant
c′ > c, such that the security guarantee cannot hold when encoding messages of
length X c′ number of blocks, where X ∈ poly(λ) is the bit length of the codeword
blocks. Specifically, for messages of length n := X c′ ∈ poly(λ) number of blocks,
we will present an explicit (efficient) attacker and an explicit updater for which
there cannot exist a simulator as required by the definition of locally decodable and
updatable non-malleable codes.
The attack we present is a rewind attack, as discussed before. Intuitively,
the main difficulty of designing the attack is to determine which positions of the
codeword are to be leaked and subsequently re-wound to their original values so that
with high probability in the real game, the corresponding message block will decode
(with no error detected) to the original value in that position, as opposed to the
most recently updated value. For purposes of our attack, we assume that the original
message is either equal to 0 in all n blocks or equal to 1 in all n blocks.
Sunflower Lemma Informally speaking, a sunflower of size k is a collection of k
sets {S1, . . . , Sk} such that the intersection of any pair is equal to the core core,
i.e. for sets Si and Sj, Si ∩ Sj = core. There exists k petals, Si \ core, and it is
required that none of them are empty. Figure 6.1 shows a sunflower and the gray
area represents a sample set Si.
We now describe how sunflowers are employed in our setting. We begin by
considering the following collection of sets ({S1, . . . , Sn̂}) (which is not necessarily
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petal core
Figure 6.1: Illustration of a Sunflower
a sunflower): For i ∈ [n], let the sets Si ⊆ [n̂] correspond to the blocks (where each
block has size X ∈ poly(λ) bits) of the codeword accessed in order to decode/update
the i-th block of the message. Note that by the locality assumption, the size of each
set Si is |Si| = c. The celebrated Sunflower Lemma of Erdős and Rado [68] tells
us that any sufficiently large collection of sets (such as {S1, . . . , Sn̂}), must contain
a sunflower, whose size depends on the number of sets and the size of each set.
Specifically, since the size of each set in {S1, . . . , Sn̂} is constant in our setting, the
Sunflower Lemma of Erdős and Rado [68] implies that we can choose constant c′
large enough such that when the message is of length n := X c′ number of blocks, we
are guaranteed to have a sunflower SF := {Si0 , Si1 , . . . , Sik}, where i0, . . . , ik ∈ [n],
of size k+ 1, where k  X · c. The collection of sets forming a sunflower are of the
form Sij for j ∈ [k] and the intersection of any pair is equal to the core core, i.e.
Sij ∩Si` = core for all j 6= `. There also exist k petals Sij \ core, and, as mentioned,
none of them are empty. See Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 for more details.
The Compression Function In the following, we explicitly define a compression
function that is implicitly computed during a run of the security experiment. We
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define this function since its stability properties (discussed below) will be crucial for
the analysis of our attack. Given a fixed initial codeword Ĉ and sunflower SF (as
defined above) we define a (randomized) compression function FĈ : {0, 1, same}k →
{0, 1}X·c which takes as input values x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1, same} indicating how to
update (or not) the corresponding message block ij, j ∈ [k], where Sij is in the
sunflower. Specifically, for j = 1 to k: If xj = same, message block ij does
not get updated. Otherwise the update algorithm, UPĈ(ij, xj) is executed. The
output of the function FĈ is the contents of the sunflower core, core, after all
the updates have been completed. Note that core can consist of at most c code-
word blocks since core ⊆ Sij for all j ∈ [k]. Therefore, the output length of
FĈ is at most X · c bits. Note that this means that FĈ is a compression func-
tion, since we chose k  X · c. Now this, in turn, means that the output of
FĈ cannot contain all of the information in its input and satsifies certain stabil-
ity properties. Indeed, it can be shown (cf. [61]) that with high probability over the
choice of j∗ ∈ [k], the two distributions FĈ(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk) and
FĈ(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, Xj∗ , Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk) are statistically close when each Xj, j ∈ [k]
is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, same}. See Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4
for more details.
The Attacker and the Updater The attacker first finds the sunflower SF := {Si0 ,
Si1 , . . . , Sik} in polynomial time and then chooses j∗ ∈ [k] at random. In the first
round (or multiple rounds if the attacker is allowed only a single bit of leakage) the
attacker leaks the contents of the positions in Ĉ corresponding to the decoding of ij∗
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(Sij∗ ), minus the contents of the blocks in the core of the sunflower. We denote the
entire leaked information by yj∗. The attacker then writes those same values, yj∗,
back in the k+1-st round. The updater chooses values x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1, same} and
in each round from 1 to k, requests the corresponding update (i.e. update message
block ij to 0, if xj = 0, update to 1 if xj = 1 and do not update this block at all, if
xj = same). See Section 6.2.5 for more details.
Putting it All Together Note that the input to the decoding algorithm when decoding
position ij∗ is exactly: (yj∗ , FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, Xj∗ , Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk)) (the contents
of the positions in Ĉ corresponding to decoding of ij∗, minus the contents of the
blocks in the core of the sunflower, and the core itself). Additionally, note that
since {Si0 , Si1 , . . . , Sik} form a sunflower, if xj∗ = same, then the rewind attack
has no effect (since the blocks in Sij∗ \ core were not accessed during any update
request) and so decode on input (yj∗ , FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk)) must
correctly output 1 if the original encoding was 1 and 0 if the original encoding was 0
(without outputting ⊥). Since FĈ is a compression function, it means that with high
probability decode on input (yj∗, FĈ(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, Xj∗ , Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk)) will output
1 if the original encoding was 1 and 0 if the original encoding was 0, regardless of
the value of Xj∗. Intuitively, since the output of decode now depends on the original
message block in the ij∗-th position, as opposed to the most recently updated value,
the simulator must fail in at least one of the two cases (either when the original
message was 0 or 1) and so the encoding scheme cannot satisfy the non-malleability
definition. See Section 6.2.6 for more details.
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6.1.2.2 Lower Bound for Randomized Access Patterns
We next present a technical overview of the results that are new to this work
and did not appear in the conference version [53]. In the following, we highlight the
main technical challenges that arise in this setting and the approaches for addressing
them.
• We need to define a sunflower for the randomized access pattern setting. The
natural way to do this is to consider the collection of sets Si,r ⊆ [n̂], for i ∈ [n],
r ∈ {0, 1}ρ, corresponding to the blocks of the codeword accessed in order to
decode/update the i-th block of the message with randomness r. Note that by
the locality assumption, the size of each set Si,r is still |Si,r| = c. Thus, we can
still find a sufficiently large sunflower contained in the collection of sets above.
However, when launching a rewind attack, while we can still randomly select
(i, r1), leak information about blocks corresponding to some set Si,r1, and write
back to Si,r1 at a later point, it is now possible that the decode algorithm will
actually access a different set of blocks Si,r2 during decoding in the final round,
corresponding to some other randomness r2. The key observation is that since
the number of blocks n̂ in the codeword is polynomial in security parameter λ,
and since the total number of blocks accessed by each decode/update is a con-
stant, c, then for each i ∈ [n], there must be some set of c blocks Ri such that
the same set Ri is accessed by the decode algorithm for position i with proba-
bility at least 1/n̂c, which is inverse polynomial in the security parameter. We




randomness corresponding to the set Ri described above. We may now apply
the Sunflower Lemma to obtain a sunflower SF := {Si0,r∗i0 , Si1,r∗i1 , . . . , Sik,r∗ik},
where i0, . . . , ik ∈ [n], of size k+1, where k  X ·c2, contained in the collection
of sets. For technical reasons, we also choose a slightly smaller sunflower, SF−,
which is a subset of SF. We omit this part of the analysis from the overview
and refer the reader to Section 6.3.1 for more details.
• Analogously to our previous rewind attack, we would like the attacker to select
an index j∗ ∈ [k], leak the contents of the positions in Ĉ corresponding to




), minus the contents of the
blocks in the core of the sunflower, and then write those same values back in
some later round (call this the k′ + 1-st round). Crucial to our analysis of
the attack, is that if no update occurs on position ij∗, then the rewind attack
makes no change at all to the state of the codeword in the k′ + 1-st round.
However, this is now not straightforward to argue. The reason is that the
other k′ updates that occur are now randomized and may overwrite locations
contained in the set Sij∗ ,r∗ij∗
\ core. In more detail, note that the adversary
does not control the randomness of the updater and so cannot ensure that the
updater accesses only the sets of the sunflower (corresponding to random coins
r∗ij) during the updates. Indeed, since the updater samples its own randomness,
it is extremely unlikely that this will happen. To address this issue, note that
we now choose a larger sunflower SF := {Si0,r∗i0 , Si1,r∗i1 , . . . , Sik,r∗ik} of size
k + 1, where k  X · c2, whereas in the deterministic access pattern case we
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chose a sunflower of size k + 1 where k  X · c. The fact that k is larger
allows us to now choose a random subset of the sunflower SF, which is also a
sunflower and still has sufficiently large size. Specifically, we choose a random
subset T ⊆ [k] of size k′, such that T := {z1, . . . , zk′} and consider updates
to the sets Sizj , j ∈ [k
′]. Now, due to the structure of the sunflower (which
guarantees that all the sets (Sij ,r∗ij
\ core) are pairwise disjoint) we will argue
that (when k′ is sufficiently small relative to k), with high probability over the
random choice of T , j∗ ∈ [k′], and randomness of the updater, if no update
occurs on position izj∗ then there is no intersection between the updated sets
and the chosen set Sizj∗ ,r∗zj∗
\ core. See Sections 6.3.3, 6.3.5 for more details.
• Recall that the analysis of the previous case proceeds by showing that after
the rewind attack occurs, the probability that the decode algorithm on position
iz∗j outputs the original value, is “close” whether or not an update occurred
on position izj∗ . Unfortunately, the argument we used in the previous section
only allows us to bound the difference in probabilities by a constant. This is
no longer sufficient to complete the proof in the randomized case, since recall
that in the randomized case, we can only argue that, when no update occurs,
the decode algorithm on position izj∗ outputs the original value with probability
1/n̂c–when the attacker gets lucky and correctly guesses the random coins used
by the decoder. This means that our previous techniques cannot rule out the
case that when an update occurs, the decode algorithm outputs the original
value with probability 0. Therefore, we must define a different event and show
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that this event is both observable given the output of the experiment, and occurs
with 1/ poly(λ) probability. We then show that conditioned on this observable
event occurring, the probability that the decode algorithm outputs the original
value at another randomly chosen location i`∗ is high. See Section 6.3.5 for
more details.
6.1.2.3 Difficulty of Extending Techniques to the Adaptive Setting
In both the deterministic and randomized case, our techniques crucially rely on
using the access patterns to define a sunflower. Specifically, we consider a collection
of sets {Si}, where each set Si contains the indeces of the blocks of the codeword ac-
cessed in order to decode/update the i-th block of the message. If access patterns are
adaptive, then as updates occur, the sets Si may change, depending on the contents
of the updates. This means that the structure of the sunflower may keep changing in
each round of the experiment. Moreover, since the sets Si are now defined in a way
that depends on the messages input to the encode and update procedures, they are
now unknown to the attacker. Therefore, it is not clear how to define an attack for
such a case (since the attacker doesn’t know the sets Si and so doesn’t know which
positions to leak and write back), or which mathematical tools would be useful for
analyzing an attack (since our main technical tool–the Sunflower Lemma–assumes
a static collection of sets).
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6.1.2.4 Upper Bound
Overview of Locally Decodable and Updatable NMC [54] In [54], the authors con-
struct locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes from a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt), a standard (non-local) non-malleable code
NMC = (E′,D′), and a collision resistant hash function family H.
Encoding E(m): In order to encode message m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn), they first gen-
erate the secret key sk of by running Gen and choose hash function h ← H. Then
the algorithm encrypts each message block mi using sk to get the encrypted blocks
(e1, e2, . . . en) corresponding to each message block. They then compute the Merkle
tree Th of these encrypted blocks using the collision-resistant hash function h, along
with the root of the merkle tree (Th) as (Rh). They finally encode the secret key
sk, the description of the hash function h, and the root Rh using the standard
non-malleable code to generate c ← E′(sk, h, Rh) and output the encoded message
C = (c, e1, e2, . . . , en, Th).
Decoding DC(i): In order to decode the i-th block of C, they first recover (sk, h, Rh) =
D′(c). Then the algorithm checks the consistency of the path path to leaf ei in tree
Th and outputs mi = Decrypt(sk, ei). If any of the consistency checks, decoding of
c, or decryption fails then the algorithm outputs ⊥.
Update UPC(i,m′i): In order to update a message block mi with m
′
i the algorithm
first recovers (sk, h, Rh) = D
′(c) along with the path path to leaf ei in tree Th. If D
′
outputs ⊥ then the algorithm updates the first block of C with ⊥ denoting failure.
Otherwise, computes the fresh encryption e′i and updates the path path
′ and root
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R′h in the merkle tree Th by replacing the leaf ei with e
′
i and computing the path
to the root. Finally, update c′ as c′ ← E′(sk, h, R′h). The construction of [54] pro-
vides computational security against polynomial size tampering functions f = (f1, f2)
such that f1 ∈ F tampers with c, and the underlying non-local NMC (E′,D′) is se-
cure against F , whereas f2 tampers with rest of the codeword arbitrarily. For more
details please refer to Section 6.4.
Here we take advantage of the fact that codeword blocks are large–X ∈ Ω(λ1/µ)
number of bits, for constant 0 < µ < 1–number of bits—to replace the Merkle Tree
used in the original construction of [54] with an alternative data structure we call a
t-slice Merkle Tree. Note that the Ω(log λ) locality of the construction of [54] came
from the fact that an entire path (and siblings) of the binary Merkle tree from root to
leaf of length log(n) had to be traversed for each decode and update instruction. Our
new data structure is a t := X 1−µ-ary tree and uses as a building block a collision
resistant hash function h : {0, 1}X → {0, 1}Xµ (note h has output length X µ ∈ Ω(λ))
and so, for messages of length n = poly(λ) blocks, an entire path of the tree from
root to leaf will always have length at most δ(n), for any δ(n) ∈ ω(1). Moreover, the
root of the tree can be updated and verified without reading any of the siblings along
the path from root to leaf, due to the use of a hash function with a specific structure.
This allows us to achieve a locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes with
locality δ(n), for any δ(n) ∈ ω(1). See Section 6.4 for more details.
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6.2 Lower Bound
In this section we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.2.1. Let λ be security parameter and let Π = (E,D, UP) be a locally
decodable and updatable non-malleable code that has non-adaptive decode and up-
date with deterministic accesses which takes messages over alphabet Σ and out-
puts codewords over alphabet Σ̂, where log |Σ|, log |Σ̂| ∈ poly(λ), in a threat model
which allows for a rewind attack. Then, for n := n(λ) ∈ poly(λ), Π has locality
δ(n) ∈ ω(1).
We denote by X := log |Σ̂| ∈ poly(λ) the number of bits in each block of the
codeword. For purposes of the lower bound, we can take X to be any polynomial in
λ (or smaller).
In the following, we assume that Π = (E,D, UP) is a locally decodable and up-
datable non-malleable code with non-adaptive decode and update with deterministic
accesses and with constant locality. We then present an efficient rewind attacker
along with an updater that break the security of Π, thus proving the theorem.
6.2.1 Attack Preliminaries
Definition 6.2.1 (Sunflower). A sunflower (or ∆-system) is a collection of sets Si
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that the intersection of any two set is core Y , i.e. Si ∩ Sj = core
for all i 6= j. There exists k petals S−i := Si \ core and it’s required that none of
them are empty. A family of pairwise disjoint sets form a sunflower with an empty
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core.
The following famous lemma is due to Erdős and Rado.
Lemma 6.2.1 (Sunflower Lemma [68]). Let F be family of sets each of cardinality
s. If |F| > s!(k − 1)s then F contains a sunflower with k petals.
Definition 6.2.2 (Statistical Distance). Let D1 and D2 be two distribution over a
shared universe of outcomes. let supp(D) be the set of values assumed by D with
nonzero probability, and let D(u) := Pr[D = u]. The statistical distance of D1 and







Definition 6.2.3 (Distributional Stability [61]). Let U be a finite universe and
t, n ≥ 1 be integers. Let Di for 1 ≤ i ≤ t be a collection of t mutually independent
distributions over {0, 1}n and F be a possibly-randomized mapping F (x1, . . . , xt) :
{0, 1}n×t → U , for j ∈ [t] let
γj := E
y∼Dj
[||F (D1, . . . ,Dj−1, y,Dj+1, . . . ,Dt)− F (D1, . . . ,Dt)||stat].







Lemma 6.2.2 (Compression Functions are Distributionally Stable [61]). Let
R(x1, . . . , xt) : {0, 1}n×t → {0, 1}≤t′ be any possibly-randomized mapping, for any
n, t, t′ ∈ N+. R is δ-distributionally stable with respect to any independent input












6.2.2 Applying the Sunflower Lemma
For i ∈ [n], the sets Si ⊆ [n̂] correspond to the blocks (each of size X ) of
the codeword accessed in order to update/decode mi (i.e. the set Si := S
D
i ∪ SUPi ,
where SDi , S
UP
i are the sets of blocks accessed by the decode and update procedures,
respectively). By hypothesis, we have that for i ∈ [n], |Si| = c, for constant c.
Choose n = X c′ ∈ poly(λ), where c′ is a constant such that
X c′ > c! · (22, 500 · c · X )c
Then by the Sunflower Lemma, {S1, . . . , Sn} contains a sunflower with k + 1 :=
22, 500 ·c ·X +1 petals and core core. Let SF := {Si0 , Si1 , . . . , Sik}, where i0, . . . , ik ∈
[n]. For codeword Ĉ, let core(Ĉ) denote the content of the set of blocks that make up
the core of the sunflower. For set S`, ` ∈ [n], let set`(Ĉ) denote the content of the
blocks in set S`, and let set
−
` (Ĉ) denote the content of the blocks in set S
−
` , where
S−` := S` \ core.
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6.2.3 The Compression Functions
Given a fixed initial codeword Ĉ, sunflower SF := {Si0 , . . . , Sik}, where
i0, . . . , ik ∈ [n] (as defined above) with k + 1 := 22, 500 · c · X + 1 petals, define the
following (randomized) function FĈ : {0, 1, same}k → {0, 1}X·c as follows:
• On input x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1, same}
• For j = 1 to k:
– If xj = same, run UP
Ĉ(j)(i0, 0).
– Otherwise run UPĈ
(j)
(ij, xj).
where Ĉ(j) denotes the codeword immediately before the j-th update.
• Run UPĈ(k+1)(i0, 0).
• Output the contents of core(Ĉ(k+1)+), where Ĉ(k+1)+ denotes the codeword im-
mediately after the k + 1-st update.
6.2.4 Closeness of Distributions
For ` ∈ [k], let X` be a random variable distributed as X, where X is distributed
as U{0,1,same}, i.e. its value is chosen uniformly from the set {0, 1, same}. Let Ĉ0 ←
E(0 . . . 0) and Ĉ1 ← E(1 . . . 1). We prove the following claim, which will be useful in
the subsequent analysis.
Claim 6.2.1. For every Ĉ0 ← E(0 . . . 0) and Ĉ1 ← E(1 . . . 1), we have that:
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• The statistical distance between FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk) and
FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xk) is at most 0.1, with probability at least 0.8 over j ∼ [k].
• The statistical distance between FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk) and
FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xk) is at most 0.1, with probability at least 0.8 over j ∼ [k].
Proof. First, by Lemma 6.2.2 and the fact that FĈ is a compression function, we





































Applying Markov’s inequality again, we have that with probability at least 0.8 over
choice of j ∼ [k],





where the final equality holds since we take k + 1 := 22, 500 · c · X + 1. Finally,
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since the above holds for every Ĉ, the claim is immediate. we have that for every
Ĉ0 ← E(0 . . . 0), and Ĉ1 ← E(1 . . . 1):
• The statistical distance between FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk) and
FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xk) is at most 0.1, with probability at least 0.8 over j ∼ [k].
• The statistical distance between FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk) and
FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xk) is at most 0.1, with probability at least 0.8 over j ∼ [k].
This concludes the proof of the claim.
6.2.5 The Attack
In this section we describe the polynomial-time attacker and updater:
Description of attacker:
• Find the Sunflower SF := {Si0 , . . . , Sik}, where i0, . . . , ik ∈ [n] and k + 1 :=
22, 500 · c · X + 1, contained in {S1, . . . , Sn} in polynomial time.1
• Choose j∗ ∼ [k]
• In the first round, submit leakage function `(Ĉ) defined as `(Ĉ) := set−ij∗ (Ĉ)
which returns Leaked, i.e. the contents of the positions in Ĉ corresponding to
decoding of ij∗, minus the contents of the blocks in the core of the sunflower.
2
1It is not hard to see that the original inductive proof of the Sunflower lemma by Erdős and
Rado yields an efficient (polynomial in (n, c, k)) algorithm for finding the sunflower. For further
information, see for example [?].
2If the attacker may leak only a single bit per round, we instead add here r < X · c number of
rounds where in each round the attacker leaks a single bit from set−ij∗ (Ĉ). During each of these




• Wait until the (k + 2)-nd round. In the (k + 2)-nd round, choose tamper-
ing function f which replaces the contents of set−ij∗(Ĉ
(k+1)+)—where Ĉ(k+1)+
denotes the contents of the codeword immediately after the (k + 1)-st update–
corresponding to decoding of ij∗, minus the contents of the blocks in the core
of the sunflower, with the values, Leaked, that were leaked via `.
Description of Updater:
• Choose x1, . . . , xk ∼ {0, 1, same}k.
• For j = 1 to k:
– If xj = same, request UP
Ĉ(j)(i0, 0)
– Otherwise request UPĈ
(j)
(ij, xj)
where Ĉ(j) denotes the codeword immediately before the j-th update.
• In round k + 1, request UPĈ(k+1)(i0, 0).
6.2.6 Attack Analysis
We begin with some notation and basic facts. Let J∗ be the random variable
corresponding to choice of j∗ in the attack described above. For j ∈ [k], let UPij
be the event that location ij gets updated and let UPij be the event that location ij
does not get updated. Recall that ~m ∈ {0n, 1n} denotes the original message. For
j ∈ [n], mj denotes the original message in block j. m(t)j denotes the decoding of




j denotes the decoding of Ĉ
(t)+ in the j-th position, where Ĉ(t)+ denotes
the codeword immediately after the t-th update. We have the following properties,
which can be verified by inspection:
Fact 6.2.1. (a) For j ∈ [k], Pr[UPij | mij = 0] = Pr[UPij | mij = 1] = 0.67;
Pr[UPij | mij = 0] = Pr[UPij | mij = 1] = 0.33.
(b) For j ∈ [k], if the ij-th block of original message was a mij = 0, then condi-
tioned on an update occurring on block ij, m
(k+1)
ij








= 0 with probability 1.
(c) For j ∈ [k], if the ij-th block of original message was a mij = 1, then condi-
tioned on an update occurring on block ij, m
(k+1)
ij




= 0 with probability 0.5. Conditioned on no update occurring on block
ij, m
(k+1)
i = 1 with probability 1.
(d) For j ∈ [k], m(k+1)ij = m
(k+1)+
ij
, since in the k + 1-st round only the position i0
gets updated.
We next present the main technical lemma of this section:
Lemma 6.2.3. For the attack and updater specified in Section 6.2.5:











We first show how to use Lemma 6.2.3 to complete the proof of Theorem 6.2.1
and then present the proof of Lemma 6.2.3.
Proof (of Theorem 6.2.1.). We show that the above claim implies that the candidate
scheme is not secure under Definition 3.2.3 and Definition 3.2.4. Definition 3.2.4
requires the existence of a simulator Sim which (for the above attack and updater)
outputs one of {same,⊥} ∪ {0, 1}κ for the decoding of each position i ∈ [n] in each
round j ∈ [k + 2]. We denote by m(j)i,Sim the output of Sim in round j for position
i. Recall that if Sim outputs same in round j for position i, then the output of the
experiment in the corresponding position, denoted m̃
(j)

























= 0 | mij = 1]
Note that since Sim does not see the original message, we have that for each j ∈ [k]:












= same ∧m(k+1)ij = 0 ∧ UPij | mij = 0]
= Pr[UPij | mij = 0] · Pr[m
(k+2)
ij ,Sim
= same | mij = 0 ∧ UPij ]
· Pr[m(k+1)ij = 0 | mij = 0 ∧ UPij ]
= 0.67 · p0up,j · 0.5, (6.2.2)
Where the first equality follows since (m
(k+2)
ij ,Sim




0 | mij = 0∧UPij) are independent events and the last line follows from Fact 6.2.1,




= same ∧m(k)ij = 0 ∧ UPij | mij = 1]
= Pr[UPij | mij = 1] · Pr[m
(k+2)
ij ,Sim
=| mij = 1 ∧ UPij ]
· Pr[m(k+1)ij = 0 | mij = 1 ∧ UPij ]
= 0.67 · p1up,j · 0.5
= 0.67 · p0up,j · 0.5, (6.2.3)
where the second to last line follows from Fact 6.2.1, items (a) and (c), and the last
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= same ∧m(k+1)ij = 0 ∧ UPij | mij = 0]
= Pr[UPij | mij = 0] · Pr[m
(k+2)
ij ,Sim
= same | mij = 0 ∧ UPij ]
= 0.33 · p0up,j, (6.2.4)




= same ∧m(k+1)ij = 0 ∧ UPij | mij = 1] = 0, (6.2.5)




Given Lemma 6.2.3, in order for Sim to succeed, if the original message was
~m = ~0, then m
(k+2)
iJ∗ ,Sim
must be equal to 0 with probability (nearly) 0.7, whereas if
the original message was ~m = ~1, then m
(k+2)
iJ∗ ,Sim
must be equal to 1 with probability










· (Pr[m(k+2)ij ,Sim = same ∧m
(k+1)
ij














· (0.67 · p0up,j · 0.5 + 0.33 · p0up,j + p00,j), (6.2.6)
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where the second equality follows due to the fact that if m
(k+2)
ij ,Sim













), and the last
line follows due to (2) and (4). On the other hand we have:
0.3 + negl(λ) =
∑
j∈[k]






· (Pr[m(k+2)ij ,Sim = same ∧m
(k+1)
ij




















· (0.67 · p0up,j · 0.5 + p00,j). (6.2.7)
where the second equality follows due to the fact that if m
(k+2)
ij ,Sim














to last line follows due to (3) and (5) and the last line follows due to (1)(b). But





· p0up,j ≥ 0.4, which is
impossible since for each j ∈ [k], p0up,j ≤ 1. Thus we have reached contradiction and
so the theorem is proved.
We conclude by proving the Lemma.








(Ĉ1) The proof relies
on the fact that, in the (k+2)-nd round, decode takes as input D(y0j∗ , FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xk))
in Case 1 and D(y1j∗ , FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xk)) in Case 2, Now note that, due to the struc-
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ture of the Sunflower, updates to positions i0, . . . , ij∗−1, ij∗+1, . . . , ik do not modify







D(y0j∗ , Fĉ0(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk)) = 0 with overwhelming probability
and D(y1j∗ , Fĉ1(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk)) = 1 with overwhelming proba-
bility, since when Xj = same, the rewind attack has no effect and decode outputs the
original message.
Moreover, due to Claim 6.2.1 and the fact that y0j∗ (resp. y
1
j∗) is fully deter-
mined by Ĉ0 (resp. Ĉ1), which is part of the description of the compression function
FĈ0 (resp. FĈ1), we have that for every Ĉ0 ← E(0 . . . 0) and Ĉ1 ← E(1 . . . 1):
1. The statistical distance between (y0j , FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk))
and (y0j , FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xk)) is at most 0.1, with probability at least 0.8 over
j∗ ∼ [k].
2. The statistical distance between (y1j , FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk))
and (y1j , FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xk)) is at most 0.1, with probability at least 0.8 over
j∗ ∼ [k].
Hence each will not be satisfied with probability at most 0.2. Now, conditioned on
each being satisfied, it can be concluded from (1) that the probability of
D(y0j , FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xk)) = 1 is at most 0.1. Similarly from (2),
D(y1j , FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xk)) = 0 with probability at most 0.1. Taking a union bound,
we have that in each case, the D procedure will fail to output the original message
with probability at most 0.3. This means that with probability at least 0.7 over all
coins, D(y0j∗ , FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xk)) = 0, and with probability at least 0.7 over all coins
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D(y1j∗ , FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xk)) = 1, completing the proof of the claim.
6.3 Extending Lower Bound to Randomized Decode/Update
In this section we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.3.1. Let λ be security parameter and let Π = (E,D, UP) be a locally de-
codable and updatable non-malleable code that has non-adaptive decode and update
with randomized accesses which takes messages over alphabet Σ and outputs code-
words over alphabet Σ̂, where log |Σ|, log |Σ̂| ∈ poly(λ), in a threat model which al-
lows for a rewind attack. Then, for n := n(λ) ∈ poly(λ), Π has locality δ(n) ∈ ω(1).
As before, we denote by X := log |Σ̂| ∈ poly(λ) the number of bits in each
block of the codeword. For purposes of the lower bound, we can take X to be any
polynomial in λ (or smaller).
In the following, we assume that Π = (E,D, UP) is a locally decodable and
updatable non-malleable code with non-adaptive decode and update with randomized
accesses and with constant locality. We then present an efficient rewind attacker
along with an updater that break the security of Π, thus proving the theorem.
The formal analysis is at some points quite similar to the analysis in Sec-
tion 6.2. For completeness, we present the full proof. To aid the reader, we point
out which parts of the proof are similar to the previous analysis and which parts are
significantly different.
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6.3.1 Applying the Sunflower Lemma
As in Section 6.2, we will use the access patterns to define a sunflower, but
since the access patterns are now randomized, we will have to take into account
the randomness of the decode/update procedures as well as the position i ∈ [n].
For i ∈ [n], r ∈ {0, 1}ρ(λ) the sets Si,r ⊆ [n̂] correspond to the blocks (each of
size X ) of the codeword accessed in order to update/decode mi with randomness r
(i.e. the set Si,r := S
D
i,r ∪ SUPi,r where SDi,r, SUPi,r are the sets of blocks accessed when
the decode/update procedures are run with randomness r ∈ {0, 1}ρ(λ)). For i ∈ [n],
let Ri correspond to a particular access pattern consisting of a set of c blocks that
occurs with probability at least 1/n̂c when decoding/updating position i (note that
such an access pattern must exist by an averaging argument). For simplicity of
notation, we assume that each such set Ri corresponds to random coins r∗i ∈ {0, 1}ρ,
where ρ := ρ(λ) := c · log(n̂) = O(log λ) (i.e. for i ∈ [n], Si,r∗i = Ri). We also
require a larger sunflower for the randomized case. Consider the system of sets
{S1,r∗1 , . . . , Sn,r∗n}. By hypothesis, we have that for i ∈ [n], |Si,r∗i | = c, for constant
c. Choose n = X c′ ∈ poly(λ), where c′ is a constant such that
X c′ > c! · (15, 840, 011 · c2 · X )c
Then by the Sunflower Lemma, {S1,r∗1 , . . . , Sn,r∗n} contains a sunflower with k+ 1 :=
15, 840, 011 · c2 · X + 1 petals and core core. Let SF := {S`0,r∗`0 , S`1,r∗`1 , . . . , S`k,r∗`k},
where `0, . . . , `k ∈ [n]. As before, for codeword Ĉ, let core(Ĉ) denote the content of
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the set of blocks that make up the core of the sunflower. Additionally, we slightly
extend the previous notation as follows: For set S`,r, ` ∈ [n], let set`,r(Ĉ) denote the
content of the blocks in set S`,r and for j ∈ [k], let set−`j ,r∗`j (Ĉ) denote the content
of the blocks in set S−`j ,r∗`j
, where S−`j ,r∗`j
:= S`j ,r∗`j
\ core. Let Shi denote the set
of blocks of the codeword that are accessed by D[i], UP[i, v] with probability at least
1/11c over random choice of i ∈ [n] and over choice of random coins (note that
by the non-adaptivity assumption, the set does not depend on the value v input to
UP). Note that |Shi| ≤ 11c2. We remove the at most 11c2 sets S`j ,r∗`j from SF such
that S−`j ,r∗`j
∩ Shi 6= ∅. This step was not needed for the analysis in Section 6.2,
but will be necessary to complete the analysis in the proof of Lemma 6.3.1. Let
SF− := {Si0 , Si1 , . . . , Sik̃} denote the remaining sets. Note that SF
− is a sunflower
that has size at least k̃ + 1 ≥ 15, 840, 000 · c2 · X + 1.
6.3.2 The Compression Functions
Given a fixed initial codeword Ĉ, sunflower SF− := {Si0 , . . . , Sik̃}, where
i0, . . . , ik̃ ∈ [n] (as defined above) with k̃ + 1 := 15, 840, 000 · c2 · X + 1 petals,
and random subset T ⊆ [k̃] of size k′ := 1, 440, 000 · c · X , where T = {z1, . . . , zk′}
(where we assume the zi’s are ordered in lexicographic order), define the following
(randomized) function FĈ,T ,r : {0, 1, same}k
′ → {0, 1}X·c as follows:
• On input x1, . . . , xk′ ∈ {0, 1, same}
• Parse r := r1, . . . , rk′+1
• For j = 1 to k′:
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– If xj = same, run UP
Ĉ(j)(i0, 0; rj).
– Otherwise run UPĈ
(j)
(izj , xj; rj).




• Output the contents of core(Ĉ(k′+1)+), where Ĉ(k′+1)+ denotes the contents of
the codeword immediately after the k′ + 1-st update.
Note that the subset T was not needed in the analysis in Section 6.2, and is
added here since it will be used in the attack in Section 6.3.4 and in the proof of
Lemma 6.3.1. Otherwise, the compression function defined above is essentially the
same as before, except the randomness for encode/decode is “hardwired” into the
compression function.
6.3.3 Closeness of Distributions
For ` ∈ [k′], let X` be a random variable distributed as X, where X is dis-
tributed as U{0,1,same}, i.e. its value is chosen uniformly from the set {0, 1, same}.
Let Ĉ0 ← E(0 . . . 0) and Ĉ1 ← E(1 . . . 1). For zj ∈ T , let y0j := setizj (Ĉ0) \ core(Ĉ0)
denote the contents of the positions in Ĉ0 corresponding to decoding of izj , mi-
nus the contents of the blocks in the core of the sunflower. Similarly, let y1j :=
setizj (Ĉ1) \ core(Ĉ1) denote the contents of the positions in Ĉ1 corresponding to de-
coding of izj , minus the contents of the blocks in the core of the sunflower. We
prove the following claim (similar to Claim 6.2.1 in Section 6.2, but with different
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parameters), which will be useful in the subsequent analysis.
Claim 6.3.1. For every r and every Ĉ0 ← E(0 . . . 0) and Ĉ1 ← E(1 . . . 1), we have
that:
• With probability at least 0.9 over j ∼ [k′], the statistical distance between
FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′) and FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj−1, 1, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′)
is at most 0.1.
• With probability at least 0.9 over j ∼ [k′], the statistical distance between
FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′) and FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xj−1, 0, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′)
is at most 0.1.
Proof. First, by Lemma 6.2.2 and the fact that FĈ is a compression function, we




































Applying Markov’s inequality again, we have that with probability at least 0.95 over
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choice of j ∼ [k],





where the final equality holds since we take k′ + 1 := 1, 440, 000 · c · X + 1.
Similarly, we can repeat the above analysis to obtain that with probability at
least 0.95 over choice of j ∼ [k′],





and that with probability at least 0.95 over choice of j ∼ [k′],





Finally, since the above hold for every Ĉ, we have by a union bound that for
every Ĉ0 ← E(0 . . . 0), and Ĉ1 ← E(1 . . . 1):
• With probability at least 0.9 over j ∼ [k′], the statistical distance between
FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′) and FĈ0(X1, . . . , Xj−1, 1, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′)
is at most 0.1.
• With probability at least 0.9 over j ∼ [k′], the statistical distance between
FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xj−1, same, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′) and FĈ1(X1, . . . , Xj−1, 0, Xj+1, . . . , Xk′)
is at most 0.1.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
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The following claim can be verified by inspection:
Claim 6.3.2. The following two distributions D, D′ are equivalent:
D:
1. Choose r uniformly at random from {0, 1}(k′+1)ρ
2. Choose ~x uniformly at random from {0, 1, same}k′
3. Choose T ⊆ [k̃] uniformly at random from all subsets of [k̃] of size k′. Set
T = {z1, . . . , zk′}, where the elements are in lexicographic order.
4. Choose j∗ uniformly at random from [k′].
5. Choose `∗ uniformly at random from [n]
6. Output (r, ~x, T , j∗, `).
D′:
1. Choose r̂ := r̂1, . . . , r̂k′ , rk′+1 uniformly at random from {0, 1}(k
′+1)ρ.
2. Choose ~̂x := x̂1, . . . , x̂k′ uniformly at random from {0, 1, same}k
′
.
3. Choose T − := {z1 . . . , zk′−1} uniformly at random from all subsets of [k] of
size k′ − 1.
4. Choose z∗ uniformly at random from [k̃] \ T −. Set T := T − ∪ {z∗}.
5. Choose `∗ uniformly at random from [n].
6. Set j∗ to the lexicographic index of element z∗ in the set T . Let {z1, . . . , zk′}
denote the lexicographical ordering of T and note that zj∗ := z∗.
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7. Set r := r̂π(1), . . . , r̂π(k′), rk′+1 and ~x := x̂π(1), . . . , x̂π(k′), where π(i) := j iff z
j
is the element with lexicographic index i in the set T .
8. Output (r, ~x, T , j∗, `).
Again, the above distributions did not appear in the analysis in Section 6.2,
and are added here since they will be used in the proof of Lemma 6.3.1.
6.3.4 The Attack
In this section we describe the polynomial-time attacker and updater. At a
high-level, the attack is similar to the one from Section 6.2.5. However, the defini-
tion of the sunflower is slightly different, the attack employs the additional set T ,
and the parameters of the attack are different.
Description of attacker:
• For i ∈ [n], find the sets Ri corresponding to the set of c blocks that is accessed
with probability at least 1/n̂c by D and UP for position i and the corresponding
random coins r∗i ∈ {0, 1}ρ, where ρ := c · log(n̂) = O(log λ) in polynomial
time.3
• Find the Sunflower (with petals containing blocks from the set Shi removed)
SF− := {Si0,r∗0 , . . . , Sik̃,r∗i
k̃
}, where i0, . . . , ik̃ ∈ [n] and k̃ + 1 := 8, 640, 000 · c2 ·
3This can be done by, for each i ∈ [n], taking a sufficiently large (but still polynomial) set of
random coins r ∈ {0, 1}ρ, running D and UP for position i on an arbitrary codeword Ĉ for each
r in the set, and selecting the access pattern, Ri, that appears a sufficient number of times. By
standard Chernoff bounds, a sufficiently good set, Ri, will be selected with high probability.
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X + 1, contained in {S1,r∗1 , . . . , Sn,r∗n} in polynomial time time.
4
• Choose a random subset T ⊆ [k̃] of size k′ and choose j∗ ∼ [k′].




which returns Leaked, i.e. the contents of the positions in Ĉ corresponding to
decoding of iz∗j with randomness r
∗
z∗j
, minus the contents of the blocks in the
core of the sunflower.5
• Wait until the (k′ + 2)-nd round. In the (k′ + 2)-nd round, choose tampering
function f which replaces the contents of set−iz∗
j
,r∗zj∗
(Ĉ(k+1)+), i.e. the positions
in Ĉ(k+1)+—where Ĉ(k+1)+ denotes the contents of the codeword immediately
after the (k + 1)-st update–corresponding to decoding of izj∗ with randomness
r∗zj∗ , minus the contents of the blocks in the core of the sunflower, with the
values, Leaked, that were leaked via `.
Description of Updater:
• Choose x1, . . . , xk′ ∼ {0, 1, same}k
′
.
• For j = 1 to k′:
– If xj = same, request UP
Ĉ(j)(i0, 0)
4As mentioned previously, the original inductive proof of the Sunflower lemma by Erdős and
Rado yields an efficient (polynomial in (n, c, k̃)) algorithm for finding the sunflower.
5If the attacker may leak only a single bit per round, we instead add here r < X · c number
of rounds where in each round the attacker leaks a single bit from set−iz∗
j
,r∗zj∗
(Ĉ). During each of
these rounds, the updater requests a “dummy” update, UPĈ
(j)
(i0, 0). In order for the analysis to
go through, we must increase the size of k so that the ratio of (k
′+1+c·X )c
k−k′ ≤ 0.2 (in the current





– Otherwise request UPĈ
(j)
(izj , xj)
where Ĉ(j) denotes the codeword immediately before the j-th update.




We begin with some notation and basic facts. Let J∗ be the random variable
corresponding to choice of j∗ in the attack described above. Let L∗ be a random
variable chosen uniformly at random from [n]\T . For zj ∈ T , let UPizj be the event
that location izj gets updated and let UPizj be the event that location izj does not get
updated. Recall that ~m ∈ {0n, 1n} denotes the original message. For j ∈ [n], mj
denotes the original message in block j. m
(t)
j denotes the decoding of Ĉ
(t) in the j-th
position, where Ĉ(t) denotes the codeword immediately before the t-th update. m
(t)+
j
denotes the decoding of Ĉ(t)+ in the j-th position, where Ĉ(t)+ denotes the codeword
immediately after the t-th update. We have the following properties, which can be
verified by inspection:
Fact 6.3.1. (a) For j ∈ [k′], Pr[UPizj | ~m = ~0] = Pr[UPizj | ~m = ~1] = 0.67;
Pr[UPizj | ~m = ~0] = Pr[UPizj | ~m = ~1] = 0.33.
(b) For j ∈ [k′], if the original message was ~0, then conditioned on an update
occurring on block izj , m
(k′+1)
izj










(c) For j ∈ [k′], if the original message was ~1, then conditioned on an update
occurring on block izj , m
(k′+1)
izj








(d) Sim must output same for each position i ∈ [n] in rounds 1, . . . , k′+ 1, since no
tampering of the codeword occurs before round k′ + 2.






, since in the k′ + 1-st round only the position
i0 gets updated.
The following is the main technical lemma of this section. Note that the lemma
differs significantly from the analogous lemma (Lemma 6.2.3) in Section 6.2.6. The
lemma below considers the probability of the decoding of position iL∗ being equal to 0
or 1, conditioned on another event occurring in position izJ∗ , whereas Lemma 6.2.3
considered only the probability of the decoding of position iJ∗ being equal to 0 or 1.
Lemma 6.3.1. For the attack and updater specified in Section 6.3.4, the probability
that all three of the following events occur simultaneously is at least 1/ poly(λ), both
when the original message was ~m = ~0 and when the original message was ~m = ~1:













Moreover, we have the following:
Case 1: If the original message was ~m = ~0, then conditioned on (a), (b), and (c)
occurring, we have that m
(k′+2)
iL∗
= 0 with probability at least 0.9.





= 1 with probability at least 0.9.
We first show how to use Claim 6.3.1 to complete the proof of Theorem 6.3.1
and then present the proof of Claim 6.3.1.
Proof (of Theorem 6.2.1.). We show that the above claim implies that the candidate
scheme is not secure under Definition 3.2.3 and Definition 3.2.4. Definition 3.2.4
requires the existence of a simulator Sim which (for the above attack and updater)
outputs one of {same,⊥} ∪ {0, 1}κ for the decoding of each position i ∈ [n] in each
round j ∈ [k′ + 2]. We denote by m(j)i,Sim the output of Sim in round j for position
i. Recall that if Sim outputs same in round j for position i, then the output of the
experiment in the corresponding position, denoted m̃
(j)






















































= 1 | ~m = ~1 ∧ UPizj ]
Note that since Sim does not see the original message, we have that for each
j ∈ [k′], ` ∈ [n]:
















Since the output of the ideal experiment (IdealSim,U ,~0) is computationally in-
distinguishable from the output of the real experiment (CTamperLeakA,U ,~0), if the
original message ~m = ~0, then by Lemma 6.3.1, we must have:
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0.9− negl(λ) ≤ Pr[m̃(k
′+2)
iL∗ ,Sim


































































































Where (9) follows since by Fact 6.3.1, Sim outputs same for each position in
















6= ⊥), then Sim cannot output same or ⊥ in position izJ∗ and






∈ {0, 1}. (11) follows since if Sim does not
output same or ⊥ in position izJ∗ then Sim also cannot output same in position iL∗
(by definition of the ideal experiment IdealSim,U ,~0). And (12) follows since the event
that position izJ∗ gets updated to 0 (resp. updated to 1) occurs with probability 1/2,
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conditioned on (UPizJ∗ ∧ ~m = ~0) (see Fact 6.3.1) and is independent of the event
that Sim outputs 1 (resp. outputs 0) in position izJ∗ .
Similarly, by Lemma 6.3.1 we also must have:
0.1 + negl(λ) ≥ Pr[m̃(k
′+2)
iL∗ ,Sim


























































































∗ = j] · (p′1,1up,j + p′
0,1
up,j)
But by (6.3.1) we must have
∑
j,` Pr[J


















thus leading to contradiction.
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We conclude by proving the Lemma.
Proof (of Lemma 6.3.1). We prove that (a), (b), (c) occur with probability at least
1/ poly(λ) when ~m = ~0 and we prove that if the original message was ~m = ~0, then
conditioned on (a), (b), (c) occurring, we have that m
(k′+2)
iL∗
= 0 with probability at
least 0.9. The proof for the case ~m = ~1 is entirely analogous.
Recall that random variables ~X := X1, . . . , Xk′ are i.i.d. variables distributed
uniformly in {0, 1, same}. We define the random variables CW(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, var),
C̃W(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, var) as follows, where CW represents the value of the codeword im-
mediately before the tampering occurs in round k′ + 2, C̃W represents the value of
the codeword immediately after the tampering occurs in round k′ + 2.
CW(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, var):
1. Parse r = r1, . . . , rk′+1
2. Set Xj∗ := var, where var ∈ {same, 1}.
3. For j = 1 to k′:
• If Xj = same, run UPĈ
(j)
0 (i0, 0; rj).
• Otherwise run UPĈ
(j)
0 (ij, Xj; rj).
where Ĉ
(j)
0 denotes the codeword immediately before the j-th update.
4. Run UPĈ
(k′+1)
0 (i0, 0; rk′+1).
5. Output the contents of Ĉ
(k′+1)+
0 , where Ĉ
(k′+1)+
0 denotes the codeword immedi-
ately after the k′ + 1-st update.
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C̃W(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, var):






2. Parse r = r1, . . . , rk′+1
3. Set Xj∗ := var, where var ∈ {same, 1}.
4. For j = 1 to k′:
• If Xj = same, run UPĈ
(j)
0 (i0, 0; rj).
• Otherwise run UPĈ
(j)
0 (ij, Xj; rj).
where Ĉj0 denotes the codeword immediately before the j-th update.
5. Replace the current contents of set−ij∗ ,r∗j∗
(Ĉ
(k′+)










0 (i0, 0; rk′+1).
7. Output the contents of Ĉ
(k′+2)
0 , where Ĉ
(k′+2)
0 denotes the codeword immediately
before the k′ + 2-st update.
Note that for any setting of ~X := X1, . . . , Xk′ and any setting of var,
core(CW(r, Ĉ, T , ~X, j∗, var)) ≡ FĈ0,T ,r(X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, var, Xj∗+1, . . . , Xk′) (6.3.7)
and
core(C̃W(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, var)) ≡ core(CW(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, var)). (6.3.8)
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To prove Lemma 6.3.1, we show that (1) with probability at least, 1/5n̂c =
1/ poly(λ) it is the case that position izj∗ is updated to 1 in round j
∗ ∈ [k′] (and
so decodes to 1 in round k′ + 1) and decodes to 0 in round k′ + 2; (2) regardless of
the decoding of position izj∗ , position `
∗ decodes to 0 with probability at least 0.9 in
round k′ + 2.
Showing that w.h.p., position izj∗ is updated to 1 but decodes to 0 after
tampering The proof relies on the fact that, when decoding the tampered codeword,
assuming position iz∗j has been updated to 1 during the first k
′ rounds, decode for
position iz∗j takes the following as input: (a) randomness r
′;
(b) set−ij∗ ,r′(C̃W(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j
∗, 1)); (c) core(C̃W(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, 1)).





(Ĉ0), First, note that due to correctness of DEC,
Pr[D(set−izj∗ ,r∗zj∗
(CW(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, same), core(CW(r, T , Ĉ0, ~X, j∗, same))) = 0] = 1,
(6.3.9)
Since in experiment CW(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X), j∗, same), the original message is ~m := ~0, no
update occurs to position izj∗ (since Xj∗ is set to same) and no tampering occurs.
We next consider a sequence of hybrid distributions and show that consecutive













r, T , Ĉ0, ~X, j∗, same
)))
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where r is chosen at random from {0, 1}(k′+1)ρ, T is a set of size k′ chosen at
















r, T , Ĉ0, ~X, same
)))
where
• r̂ := r̂1, . . . , r̂k′ , rk′+1 is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}(k
′+1)ρ.
• ~̂x := x̂1, . . . , x̂k′ is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, same}k
′
.
• T − := {z1 . . . , zk′−1} is chosen uniformly at random from all subsets of [k] of
size k′ − 1.
• z∗ is chosen at random from [k] \ T − and T := T − ∪ {z∗}.
• `∗ is chosen at random from [n].
We then set j∗ to the lexicographic index of element z∗ in the set T , set r :=
r̂π(1), . . . , r̂π(k′), rk′+1, and set ~x := x̂π(1), . . . , x̂π(k′), where π(i) := j iff z
j is the
element with lexicographic index i in the set T .
Claim 6.3.3. Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1 are identical.







r, T , Ĉ0, ~x, same
)))
where
1. r̂ := r̂1, . . . , r̂k′ , rk′+1 is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}(k
′+1)ρ.
2. ~̂x := x̂1, . . . , x̂k′ is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1, same}k
′
.
3. T − := {z1 . . . , zk′−1} is chosen uniformly at random from all subsets of [k] of
size k′ − 1.
4. z∗ is chosen at random from [k] \ T − and T := T − ∪ {z∗}.
5. `∗ is chosen at random from [n].
We then set j∗ to the lexicographic index of element z∗ in the set T , set zk′ := zj∗ :=
z∗, set r := r̂π(1), . . . , r̂π(k′), rk′+1, and set ~x := x̂π(1), . . . , x̂π(k′), where π(i) := j iff z
j
is the element with lexicographic index i in the set T .
Claim 6.3.4. Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 are 0.8-close.
Proof. We show that for every setting of ~̂x, r̂, with probability 0.8 over choice of
T , j∗
set−izj∗ ,r∗zj∗
(CW(r, Ĉ0, T , j∗, ~X, same)) = y0j∗ , (6.3.10)
Note that (6.3.10) holds as long as none of the updates made during experiment
C̃W(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X) modify blocks in S−izj∗ ,r∗zj∗ . To show that this is indeed the case,
observe that the updates corresponding to positions i0, iz1 , . . . , izk′−1 touch at most
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(k′ + 1) · c positions outside the core, core, and that these positions are completely
determined immediately after Step 3 in the sampling procedure above (i.e. imme-
diately after r̂, ~̂x and T − are sampled). This is due to the fact that the position
corresponding to iz∗ = izj∗ will never be updated since var := same in experiment
CW(r, T , Ĉ0, ~x, j∗, same) and the fact that for j ∈ [k′], the accessed positions cor-
responding to izj depend only on r̂j, x̂j, but not on the contents of the codeword.
Additionally all of the accessed positions corresponding to i0 also depend only on
r̂j, x̂j, but not on the contents of the codeword. Now, due to the structure of the
Sunflower, these positions can modify at most (k′ + 1) · c petals out of the k petals
in the Sunflower. Thus, the probability that z∗ chosen at random from [k̃] \ T − in
Step 4 hits one of these petals is at most
(k′ + 1) · c
k̃ − k′
≤ 2 · k
′ · c
k̃ − k′ · c
≤ 2 · 1, 440, 000 · c
2 · X
14, 400, 000 · c2 · X
= 0.2.




modified at all, which means that
setiz∗ ,r∗z∗ (CW(r, Ĉ1, T , j
∗, ~X)) = setizj∗ ,r
∗
izj∗






r, T , Ĉ0, ~X, j∗, same
)))
where r is chosen at random from {0, 1}(k′+1)ρ, T is a set of size k′ chosen at
random from [k], j∗ is chosen at random from [k′] and ~X is chosen at random from
{0, 1, same}k′.
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Claim 6.3.5. Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 are identical.
This follows again by Claim 6.3.2.
Hybrid 4 (
y0j∗ , FĈ0,r,T (X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, Xk′)
)
where r is chosen at random from {0, 1}(k′+1)ρ, T is a set of size k′ chosen at random
from [k], j∗ is chosen at random from [k′] and X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, Xk′ are
chosen at random from {0, 1, same}k′.
Claim 6.3.6. Hybrid 3 and Hybrid 4 are identical.
This follows from Equation (6.3.7).
Hybrid 5 (
y0j∗ , FĈ0,T ,r (X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, 1, Xj∗+1, Xk′)
)
where r is chosen at random from {0, 1}(k′+1)ρ, T is a set of size k′ chosen at random
from [k], j∗ is chosen at random from [k′] and X1, . . . , Xj∗−1, same, Xj∗+1, Xk′ are
chosen at random from {0, 1, same}k′.
Claim 6.3.7. Hybrid 4 and Hybrid 5 are 0.8-close.
Proof. We argue that with probability at least 0.9 over j∗ ∼ [k], the statistical
distance between Hybrid 5 and Hybrid 6 is at most 0.1. This follows from Claim 6.2.1
and the fact that y0j∗ is fully determined by Ĉ0, which is part of the description of







r, Ĉ0, T , j∗, ~X, 1
)))
where r is chosen at random from {0, 1}(k′+1)ρ, T is a set of size k′ chosen at
random from [k], j∗ is chosen at random from [k′] and ~X is chosen at random from
{0, 1, same}k′.
Claim 6.3.8. Hybrid 5 and Hybrid 6 are identical.













r, T , Ĉ0, ~X, j∗, 1
)))
where r is chosen at random from {0, 1}(k′+1)ρ, T is a set of size k′ chosen at
random from [k], j∗ is chosen at random from [k′] and ~X is chosen at random from
{0, 1, same}k′.
Claim 6.3.9. Hybrid 8 and Hybrid 9 are identical.
This follows from the definition of C̃W(r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, 1).
Now, conditioned on r′ = r∗j , the view of the decode algorithm in position j
∗












r, T , Ĉ0, ~X, j∗, 1
)))
.
Thus, combining (6.3.13) and Claims 6.3.3, 6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.3.6, 6.3.7, 6.3.8,
244
6.3.9 we have that, conditioned on r′ = r∗j∗ and Xj∗ = 1, the D algorithm outputs 0
for position izj∗ in round k
′ + 1 with probability at least 0.6. Thus, the probability
that position j∗ is updated to 1 in round j∗ ∈ [k′] (and so decodes to 1 in round k′)
and decodes to 0 in round k′ + 1 is




Showing that w.h.p. position `∗ decodes to 0 in round k′+ 2 Let r′′ denote
the randomness of the decode for position `∗ in round k′ + 2. First, as long as














































r, Ĉ0, T , ~X, j∗, 1
)))
,
(where r′′ is chosen uniformly at random, r is chosen uniformly at random, T is




, does not intersect with S`∗,r′′. We have already upperbounded
(1) by .001. To upperbound (2), fix T , j∗ and thus the set S−j∗,r∗
j∗
. Since, by construc-
tion, S−j∗,r∗
j∗
∩ Shi = ∅, we have that the probability over random choice of `∗ ∈ [n]





at most c · 1
11c














6.4 Matching Upper Bound
As discussed earlier in Section 6.1.2.4, the locally decodable and updatable
NMC of [54] is constructed from a symmetric encryption scheme
E = (Gen,Encrypt,Decrypt), a standard non-malleable code NMC = (E′,D′), and
a collision resistant hash function family H. We also stated that the construction
of [54] provides computational security against polynomial size tampering functions
f = (f1, f2) such that f1 ∈ F tampers with c independently, where the underlying
non-local NMC (E′,D′) is secure against F . Whereas f2 tampers with rest of the
codeword arbitrarily. In fact, the locally decodable and updatable non-malleable code
of [54] provides computational security against a slightly more general tamper class.
Specifically, they achieve computational tamper resilience against the tampering class
F̄ where f ∈ F̄ satisfies the following: f = (f1, f2) where f1 gets access to the entire
codeword but it is required that f1 restricted in the first block (corresponding to c) is
in tampering class F . As in the previous case f2 can be arbitrary poly-size tampering
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function which tampers with the encryptions and Merkle tree (and does not get access
to c). In this work we achieve tamper resilience against the same tampering class
as [54], for the formal definition of F̄ refer to Theorem 6.4.2.
We now show how to construct a locally updatable and decodable non-malleable
code with super-constant locality. This is achieved by replacing the Merkle Tree in the
construction presented in [54] by a new data structure, t-slice Merkle Tree which we
defined below (see Definition 6.4.1). Intuitively, the locality of updating/decoding in
the construction given by Dachman-Soled et al. [54] is lower-bounded by the depth of
the Merkle Tree, since, in order to detect tampering, each update/decode instruction
must check the consistency of a leaf by traversing the path from leaf to root. Our
initial idea is to replace the binary Merkle Tree of depth log(n) with a t-ary Merkle
tree (where t is a super-constant function of n defined below) of constant depth.
Unfortunately, this simple solution does not quite work. Recall that in order to verify
consistency of a leaf in a standard Merkle tree, one needs to access not only the path
from leaf to root, but also the siblings of each node on the path. This would mean
that in the t-ary tree, we would need to access at least Ω(t) sibling nodes, where t is
super-constant, thus still requiring super-constant locality. Our solution, therefore,
is to construct t-ary Merkle trees of a particular form, where verifying consistency
of a leaf can be done by traversing only the path from leaf to root, without accessing
any sibling nodes. We call such trees t-slice Merkle trees. Details of the construction
follow in Definition 6.4.1, and Algorithms 1, 2, 3 and 4. Finally, in Theorem 6.4.1
we show that the t-slice Merkle Tree is collision resistant, which allows us to retain
security while replacing the Merkle tree in the construction of [54] with our t-slice
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Merkle Tree. This then leads to our matching upper bound in Theorem 6.4.2.
Definition 6.4.1 (t-slice Merkle Tree). Let X , t ∈ N and let X be a multiple of t.
Let h : {0, 1}X → {0, 1}X/t be a hash function that maps a block of size X to block
of size X/t. Denote a block of data at level j with index i by αji and the input data
by M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) ∈ {0, 1}X·n. Let α0i := mi+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. A t-slice
Merkle Tree Treeth(M) is defined recursively in the following way:
• Bottom layer of the tree contains n blocks of data each of size
X , i.e., (α00, α01, . . . , α0n−1).
• To compute the content of non-leaf node at level j with index i set αji :=
h(αj−1i·t ) || . . . || h(α
j−1
((i+1)·t)−1).
• Once a single block αj0 remains, set the root of Merkle Tree Roothth(M) := α
j
0
and the height of tree H := j + 1 and terminate.
The internal blocks of Merkle Tree (including the root) are denoted as Treeth(M).
Definition 6.4.2 (kth-slice). Let αji be a block in Merkle Tree Tree
t
h. We divide α
j
i
into t parts of size χ
t
, and call these individual smaller parts as slices. Then, for k ∈
{0, 1, . . . , t−1} the kth-slice, denoted by αji [k] is the slice consisting (
k·χ
t











































Figure 6.2: Illustration of 3-slice-Merkle Tree: The figure shows a 3-slice Merkle tree with
n = 81 number of blocks, where each block has size X . The hash function h
maps inputs of size X to outputs of size X/3. As a concrete example, starting
from leaf block α045, we apply the hash h to obtain the leftmost (0-th) slice of
block α115. Next, hashing α
1
15, we obtain the leftmost (0-th) slice of block α
2
5.
Then, hashing α25, we obtain the rightmost (2-nd) slice of block α
3
1. Finally,
hashing α31, we obtain the middle (1-st) slice of block α
4
0. Thus, in order to
check consistency or update leaf block 45 at the bottom, we need to access only








0), as described above.
Note that no sibling nodes are accessed.
249
Lemma 6.4.1. Let X ∈ Ω(λ1/µ), h : {0, 1}X → {0, 1}Xµ, and t := X 1−µ, for
constant 0 < µ < 1. Assuming n = poly(λ) := X c for constant c, the height of the
t-slice Merkle Tree will be constant H = c
1−µ + 1.
Proof. In the beginning the message blocks M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) are at the leaves
of the tree and size of each block is X , i.e. |mi| = X . After applying a hash function
to each of the blocks separately, their size becomes X µ and by concatenating X 1−µ
number of hashes a single block of size X will be formed. In this level there will
therefore be X
c
X 1−µ = X
c+µ−1 block of size X . Applying hash function to each of them
will form new blocks of size X µ and there will be X c+2µ−2 blocks of size X . In general
in level i-th there will be X c+iµ−i blocks of size X . The root of the t-slice Merkle Tree
is of size X which is just a single block, so the height of the tree is for the case where
X c+iµ−i = 1 (= X 0) resulting in i as c
1−µ . Since i starts from 0 the total height of
the tree is given by H = c
1−µ + 1.
We next present various algorithms which are used to manipulate the t-slice
merkle tree data structure. Specifically, Parent (see Algorithm 1), returns the par-
ent of a node, Path (see Algorithm 2), returns the path from a leaf to the root,
consistencyCheck (see Algorithm 3), checks the consistence of a path with a given
root, and Update (see Algorithm 4), updates a leaf of the tree and the corresponding
path. It may be helpful for the reader to refer to Figure 6.2 alongside the following
algorithms.
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Algorithm 1 Parent(Treeth,H, node): Returns the parent of the block node in Treeth
of height H
1: procedure Parent(Treeth,H, α
j
i )
2: if j = H then
3: print “ Rooth
t
h does not have any parent. ”
4: return NULL
5: else
6: ĵ := j + 1
7: î := b i
t





Algorithm 2 Path(Treeth,H, node): Returns the path to the root of the tree
(Rooth
t
h) from the block node as a list of blocks starting at node.
1: procedure Path(Treeth,H, α
j
i )
2: path := φ . Initialize an empty list to store the path
3: currentNode := αji
4: while currentNode 6= NULL do
5: path.append(currentNode) . Add current block to the path.







h): Returns boolean value TRUE if given







2: ` := length(path) . function length(·) returns the total number of elements
in the list.
3: valid = TRUE . Initializing the boolean flag to be returned.
4: for j = 0 to `− 2 do
5: αj+1i := pathj+1 . Here pathj is j
th element of the list.
6: αji := pathj
7: k := imod t
8: if αj+1i [k] == h(α
j
i ) then
9: valid = valid ANDTRUE
10: else






h 6= path`−1 then
16: valid = FALSE
17: else




Algorithm 4 Update(Treeth,H, i,m′i): Updates the tree Treeth by replacing leaf α0i
by m′i and re-computing the necessary internal blocks.
1: procedure Update(Treeth,H, i,m′i)
2: α0i := m
′
i
3: path := PATH(Treeth,H, α0i )
4: for j = 0 to H− 2 do
5: αj` := pathj
6: k := `mod t
7: pathj+1[k] := h(pathj) . Note that here the value is written in the Tree
t
h




Theorem 6.4.1. Let X ∈ Ω(λ1/µ), h : {0, 1}X → {0, 1}Xµ, and t := X 1−µ, for
constant 0 < µ < 1. Assume h is a collision resistant hash function. For any mes-
sage M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) ∈ {0, 1}X·n, where n := X c, consider the corresponding
t-slice Merkle Tree, Treeth with root Rooth
t
h. Then for any i ∈ [n] and any polynomial
time adversary A,
Pr
 mi 6= m
′






Moreover, given a path path passing the leaf mi, and a new value m
′
i, the
Update algorithm computes Rooth
t
h(M
′) in time Θ(H), where H := c
1−µ + 1, where
M ′ = (m1, . . . ,mi−1,m
′
i,mi+1, . . . ,mn).
Proof. The second part of Theorem 6.4.1 is immediate by inspection of Algorithm 4.
For the first part of the theorem, we assume towards contradiction that for some
message M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) with mi ∈ {0, 1}X , there is an efficient adversary A
such that
Pr
 mi 6= m
′






for non-negligible ε(·). Let path be the path returned by Path (see Algorithm 2) on
input (Treeth,H, α0i = mi). Note that path0 = mi. We construct adversary A′ which
finds a collision in hash function h with non-negligible probability. The procedure is
as follows:
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1. On input h, adversary A′ instantiates A on input (M,h).
2. Adversary A returns (m′i, path′), where path′ := path′0, . . . , path′H−1.
3. A′ checks that path′H−1 = Roothth(M).
4. For j ∈ [H − 2], if path′j+1 = pathj+1 and path′j 6= pathj, then A′ returns
collision (path′j, pathj).
We must first argue that there must be some j ∈ [H− 2] for which the condition in
Item (4) evaluates to TRUE. Specifically, there must be some j ∈ [H− 2] such that
path′j+1 = pathj+1 and path
′
j 6= pathj. To see why this is so, recall that we require
m′i 6= mi and so by definition we must have path′0 6= path0. On the other hand,
path′H−1 = pathH−1 = Rooth
t
h(M). Thus, there must be some j ∈ [H− 2] such that
path′j+1 = pathj+1 and path
′
j 6= pathj.
Next, we argue that for j ∈ [H − 2] such that path′j+1 = pathj+1 and
path′j 6= pathj, (path′j, pathj) yields a collision on h. This follows from the defi-
nition of the consistencyCheck algorithm in Algorithm 3 and the fact that, by as-
sumption, consistencyCheck(path′,Rooth
t
h) = TRUE. Specifically, we know that both
consistencyCheck(path,Rooth
t




TRUE. Therefore, during the runs of both algorithms, it must be the case
that, for j as above, the condition in Line 8, αj+1i [k] == h(α
j
i ), evaluated
to True. Let us now look at the settings of αj+1i and α
j
i during the runs of
consistencyCheck(path,Rooth
t




TRUE. In Line 5 of the run of consistencyCheck(path,Rooth
t
h) = TRUE, α
j+1
i
is set to αj+1i := pathj+1, while in Line 6, α
j
i is set to α
j
i := pathj. Thus,
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the condition in Line 8 ensures that pathj+1[k] = h(pathj). On the other hand,
in Line 5 of the run of consistencyCheck(path′,Rooth
t
h) = TRUE, α
j+1
i is set to
αj+1i := path
′
j+1, while in Line 6, α
j




j. Thus, the con-
dition in Line 8 ensures that path′j+1[k] = h(path
′
j). However, recall that we
chose j such that path′j+1 = pathj+1 and path
′
j 6= pathj. Therefore, this implies
that h(path′j) = path
′
j+1[k] = pathj+1[k] = h(pathj). We therefore conclude that
(path′j, pathj) yields a collision on h.
Thus, the above adversary A′ will succeed with same probability as the adver-
sary A and breaks collision resistance of h with non-negligible probability ε(λ). Thus,
we arrive at contradiction and so the theorem is proved.
Theorem 6.4.2. Assume there exists a semantically secure symmetric encryption
scheme, and a non-malleable code against the tampering function class F , and leak-
age resilient against the function class G. Then there exists a locally decodable and
updatable non-malleable code that has non-adaptive decode and update with deter-




f : Σ̂2n+1 → Σ̂2n+1 and |f | ≤ poly(k), such that :
f = (f1, f2), f1 : Σ̂
2n+1 → Σ̂, f2 : Σ̂2n → Σ̂2n,
∀(x2, . . . , x2n+1) ∈ Σ̂2n, f1( · , x2, . . . , x2n+1) ∈ F ,




and is leakage resilient against the class
Ḡ def=

g : Σ̂2n+1 → Y and |g| ≤ poly(k), such that :
g = (g1, g2), g1 : Σ̂
2n+1 → Y ′, g2 : Σ̂2n → Σ̂2n,
∀ (x2, . . . , x2n+1) ∈ Σ̂2n, g1( · , x2, . . . , x2n+1) ∈ G.

.
Moreover, for n := X c ∈ poly(λ), the coding scheme has locality δ(n), for any
δ(n) ∈ ω(1).
Our construction is exactly the same as that of Dachman-Soled et al. [54],
except we replace their (standard) Merkle tree with our t-slice Merkle tree with the
parameters described above. We note that the only property of the Merkle hash
used in the security proof of [54] is the “collision resistance” property, analogous
to our Theorem 6.4.1 above for the t-slice Merkle tree. Thus, our security proof
follows exactly as theirs does and we therefore omit the full proof. On the other
hand, as described in Algorithms 4 and 3, updates and consistency checks require
time and number of accesses to memory proportional to the height of the tree, H,
which is c
1−µ + 1 for our choice of parameters, as shown in Lemma 6.4.1 above.
Since n = X c ∈ poly(λ), it means that the height of the tree will always be less than
δ(n), for any δ(n) ∈ ω(1). On the other hand, [54] used a standard (binary) Merkle
tree with height Θ(log n). Therefore, while [54] requires locality Θ(log n), we achieve
locality δ(n), for any δ(n) ∈ ω(1).
Finally, we give a concrete example of the resulting leakage and tampering
classes we can tolerate via Theorem 6.4.2 when instantiating the underlying non-
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malleable code with a concrete construction. Specifically, we consider instantiat-
ing the underlying non-malleable code with the construction of of Liu and Lysyan-
skaya [100], which achieves both leakage and tamper resilience for split-state func-
tions. Combining the constructions of [100] and [54] yields codewords consisting of
2n+ 1 blocks. We next describe the leakage and tampering classes Ḡ, F̄ that can be
tolerated on the 2n + 1-block codeword. Ḡ consists of leakage functions g such that
g restricted to the first block (i.e. g1) is any (poly-sized) length-bounded split-state
function; g2 on the other hand, can leak all other parts. F̄ consists of tampering
functions f such that f restricted to the first block (i.e. f1) is any (poly-sized) split-
state function. On the other hand f restricted to the rest (i.e. f2) is any poly-sized
function. We also remark that the function f2 itself can depend on the split-state
leakage on the first part.
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Chapter 7: Upper and Lower Bounds for Continuous Non-Malleable
Codes
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC) and analyze
the minimal computational assumptions required to construct CNMC.
Recall, that CNMC with respect to a tampering class F is informally defined as
follows: Given a coding scheme Π = (E,D), where E is the encoding function and D is
the decoding function, the adversary interacts with an oracle OΠ(C), parameterized
by Π and an encoding of a message m, C ← E(m). We refer to the encoding C as the
“challenge” encoding. In each round, the adversary submits a tampering function
f ∈ F . The oracle evaluates C ′ = f(C). If D(C ′) = ⊥, the oracle outputs ⊥ and
a “self-destruct” occurs, aborting the experiment. If C ′ = C, the oracle outputs a
special message “same.” Otherwise, the oracle outputs C ′. We emphasize that the
entire tampered codeword is returned to the adversary in this case. A CNMC is
secure if for every pair of messages m0,m1, the adversary’s view in the above game
is computationally indistinguishable when the message is m0 or m1.
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Information-theoretic impossibility. The original CNMC paper of [71] showed an
information-theoretic impossibility result for 2-split-state CNMC. To aid the subse-
quent discussion, we present an outline of this result. The impossibility result consid-
ers a property of 2-split-state CNMC known as (perfect) “uniqueness.” Informally,
perfect uniqueness means that there do not exist triples (x, y, z) such that either (1)
y 6= z∧D(x, y) 6= ⊥∧D(x, z) 6= ⊥ OR (2) x 6= y∧D(x, z) 6= ⊥∧D(y, z) 6= ⊥. First,
a perfectly unique CNMC cannot be information-theoretically secure since, given L,
the split-state tampering function can find the unique R such that D(L,R) 6= ⊥ and
then tamper based on m = D(L,R). On the other hand, if the CNMC is not perfectly




′ such that D(L′1, R
′) 6= ⊥ and D(L′2, R′) 6= ⊥, the adversary can learn
L bit-by-bit by using the following tampering function in the i-th round: fL does the
following: If the i-th bit of L is equal to 0, replace L with L′1. Otherwise, replace L
′
with L′2. fR always replaces R with R
′. Now, in the i-th round, if the oracle returns
(L′1, R
′), then the adversary learns that the i-th bit of L is equal to 0. If the oracle
returns (L′2, R
′), then the adversary learns that the i-th bit of L is equal to 1. Once
L is fully recovered, the adversary can tamper based on m = D(L,R).
The computational setting. The above shows that the CNMC setting is distin-
guished from other NMC settings, since information-theoretic (unconditional) se-
curity is impossible. Prior work has shown how to construct 2-split-state CNMC
in the CRS model under the assumptions of collision-resistant hash functions and
NIZK. On the other hand, CNMC’s imply commitment schemes, which in turn imply
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OWF. It remains to determine where CNMC lies in terms of complexity assumptions
and what are the minimal computational assumptions needed to achieve CNMC. As
mentioned previously, a very recent work of Ostrovsky et al. [105] addressed minimiz-
ing computational assumptions under a relaxed definition of CNMC. See Section 2.3
for more details.
Black-box reductions. In general, it is not feasible to unconditionally rule out the
construction of a primitive G from a cryptographic assumption H, since uncondi-
tionally ruling it out is as hard as proving P 6= NP . Despite this, we can still
show that the proof techniques we have at hand cannot be used to construct G from
assumption H. In the literature, this is typically done by showing that there is no
black-box reduction from primitive G to assumption H. In this work, what we mean
by a black-box reduction is a reduction that accesses the adversary in an input/output
fashion only. However, we allow non-black-box usage of the assumption H in both
the construction and the proof (see Definition 7.2.3 for a formal definition tailored to
CNMC). While there are some exceptions [21,25], the vast majority of cryptographic
reductions are black-box in the adversary.
7.1.1 Our Results
We present upper and lower bounds for CNMC in the 2-split-state model. First,
we show that with no CRS, single-bit CNMC in the 2-split-state model (with a black-
box security proof) is impossible to construct from any falsifiable assumption.
Theorem 7.1.1 (Informal). There is no black-box reduction from a single-bit, 2-
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split-state, CNMC scheme Π = (E,D) to any falsifiable assumption.
On the other hand, in the CRS model, we show how to achieve single-bit CNMC
in the 2-split-state model from injective one-way functions.
Theorem 7.1.2. Assuming the existence of an injective one-way function family,
there is a construction of a 2-split-state CNMC for encoding single bit, in the CRS
model. Moreover, the corresponding reduction is black-box.
Actually, we show a somewhat more general result: First, we define a (to the
best of our knowledge) new type of commitment scheme called one-to-one commit-
ment schemes in the CRS model. Informally, these commitment schemes have the
additional property that with all but negligible probability over Σ produced by CRS
generation, for every string com, there is at most a single string d that will be
accepted as a valid decommitment for com (See Definition 7.2.5 for a formal def-
inition). We also define the notion of a 2-split-state CNM Randomness Encoder,
which is the continuous analogue of the non-malleable randomness encoder recently
introduced by [91] (See Definition 7.2.1). We then show the following:
Theorem 7.1.3. Assuming the existence of one-to-one commitment schemes in the
CRS model, there is a construction of a 2-split-state CNM Randomness Encoder in
the CRS model. Moreover, the corresponding reduction is black-box.
One-to-one commitment schemes in the CRS model can be constructed from
any injective one-way function family. Furthermore, we show (in Section 7.4.1)
that 2-split-state CNM Randomness Encoders in the CRS model imply 2-split-state
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CNMC for encoding single bit, in the CRS model. We therefore obtain Theorem 7.1.2
as a corollary. Moreover, CNMC with perfect uniqueness in the CRS model implies
one-to-one commitment schemes in the CRS model in a straightforward way.
We leave open the question of constructing CNMC in the CRS model from
(non-injective) one-way functions and/or showing a black-box separation between the
two primitives. Finally, we extend the techniques from our single-bit construction
above to achieve the following:
Theorem 7.1.4. Assuming the existence of one-to-one commitment schemes in the
CRS model, there is a construction of a multi-bit, 4-split-state CNMC in the CRS
model. Moreover, the corresponding reduction is black-box.
Are prior CNMC reductions “black-box”? Prior CNMC reductions often proceed
in a sequence of hybrids, where in the final hybrid, the description of the adversary is
incorporated in the definition of a leakage function. It is then shown that the leakage-
resilience properties of an underlying encoding imply that the view of the adversary
is statistically close when the encoded message is set to m0 or m1. While this may
seem like non-black-box usage of the adversary, we note that typically the leakage-
resilience of the underlying encoding is information-theoretic. When converting a
hybrid-style proof to a reduction, the reduction will choose one of the hybrid steps at
random and use the fact that a distinguisher between some pair of consecutive hybrids
implies an adversary breaking an underlying assumption. Therefore, reductions of
the type discussed above are still black-box in the adversary, pairs of consecutive
hybrids whose indistinguishability is implied by a computational assumption yield a
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reduction in which the adversary is used in a black-box manner.
7.1.2 Technical Overview
Lower bound. Recall that prior work has shown that if a CNMC is not perfectly
unique, then there is an efficient attack (with non-uniform advice). Thus, it remains
to show that there is no black-box reduction from a single-bit, perfectly unique CNMC
scheme to any falsifiable assumption. We use the meta-reduction approach, which
is to prove impossibility by showing that given only black-box access to the split-
state adversary, A = (AL, AR), the reduction cannot distinguish between the actual
adversary and a simulated (efficient) adversary (which is possibly stateful). Since
the view of the reduction is indistinguishable in the two cases, the reduction must
also break the falsifiable assumption when interacting with the simulated adversary.
But this in turn means that there is an efficient adversary (obtained by composing
the reduction and the simulated adversary), which contradicts the underlying falsi-
fiable assumption. Consider the following stateless, inefficient, split-state adversary
A = (AL, AR), which leverages the uniqueness property of the CNMC scheme: The
real adversary, given L (resp. R), recovers the corresponding unique valid codeword
(L,R) (if it exists) and decodes to get the bit b. If b = 0, the real adversary encodes
a random bit b′ using internal randomness that is tied to (L,R), and outputs the
left/right side as appropriate. If b = 1 or there is no corresponding valid codeword,
the real adversary outputs the left/right side of a random encoding of a random bit,
b′′ (generated using internal randomness that is tied to L or R respectively). The
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simulated adversary is stateful and keeps a table containing all the L and R values
that it has seen. Whenever a L (resp. R) query is made, the simulated adversary
first checks the table to see if a matching query to R (resp. L) such that D(L,R) 6= ⊥
was previously made. If not, the simulated adversary chooses a random encoding,
(L′, R′), of a random bit b′, stores it in the table along with the L/R query that was
made and returns either L′ or R′ as appropriate. If yes, the simulated adversary
finds the corresponding R (resp. L) along with the pair (L′, R′) stored in the table.
The simulated adversary then decodes (L,R) to find out b. If b = 0, the simulated
adversary returns either L′ or R′ as appropriate. Otherwise, the simulated adver-
sary returns the left/right side of an encoding of a random bit b′′. The uniqueness
property allows us to prove that the input/output behavior of the real adversary is
identical to that of the simulated adversary. See Section 7.3 for additional details.
For a discussion on why our impossibility result does not hold for the relaxed CNMC
notion considered by [105], see Section 2.3.
Upper bound. For the upper bound, we construct a new object called a continuous
non-malleable randomness encoder (see Definition 7.2.1), which is the continuous
analogue of the non-malleable randomness encoder recently introduced by [91]. Infor-
mally, a continuous non-malleable randomness encoder is just a non-malleable code
for randomly chosen messages. It is then straightforward to show that a continu-
ous non-malleable randomness encoder implies a single-bit continuous non-malleable
code (see Section 7.4.1).
At a high level, the difficulty in proving continuous non-malleability arises
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from the need of the security reduction to simulate the interactive tampering oracle,
without knowing the message underlying the “challenge” encoding. The approach of
prior work such as [71] was to include a NIZK Proof of Knowledge in each part of
the codeword to allow the simulator to extract the second part of the encoding, given
the first. This then allowed the simulator (with some additional leakage) to respond
correctly to a tampering query, while knowing only one of the two split-states of the
original encoding. In our setting, we cannot use NIZK, since our goal is to reduce
the necessary complexity assumptions; therefore, we need a different extraction tech-
nique.1 Our main idea is as follows: To respond to the i-th tampering query, we
run the adversarial tampering function on random (simulated) codewords (L′, R′)
that are consistent with the output seen thus far (denoted outi−1A ) and keep track of
frequent outcomes (occurring with non-negligible probability) of the tampering func-
tion, L̂, R̂. I.e. SL (resp. SR) is the set of values of L̂ (resp. R̂) such that with
non-negligible probability over choice of L′ (resp. R′), it is the case that L̂ = fL(L
′)
(resp. R̂ = fR(R
′)). We then show that if the outcome of the tampering function
applied to the actual “challenge” split-state L or R is not equal to one of these fre-
quent outcomes (i.e. fL(L) /∈ SL or fR(R) /∈ SR), then w.h.p. the decode function D
outputs ⊥. This will allow us to simulate the experiment with only a small amount
of leakage (to determine which of the values in SL/SR should be outputted). Note
that, while the sets SL/SR are small, and so only a few bits are needed to specify
the outcome, conditioned on the outcome being in SL/SR, the CNMC experiment
1Note that our extraction technique is inefficient. This is ok, since the goal of the extraction
technique is simply to show that the view of the adversary can be simulated given a small amount
of leakage on each of the two split-states. Then, information-theoretic properties of the encoding
are used to show that the view of the adversary must be independent of the random encoded value.
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runs for an unbounded number of times, and so even outputting a small amount of
information in each round can ultimately lead to unbounded leakage. To solve this
problem, we also consider the most frequent outcome in the sets SL/SR. This is
the value of L̂ (resp. R̂) that occurs with the highest probability when fL(L
′) (resp.
fR(R
′)) is applied to consistent L′ (resp. R′). Note that if a value L̂′ (resp. R̂′) is
not the most frequent value, then it occurs with probability at most 1/2. We argue
that, for each round i of the CNMC experiment, the probability that a value L̂′ (resp.
R̂′) that is not the most frequent value is outputted by fL (resp. fR) and self-destruct
does not occur is at most 1/2. This allows us to bound, w.h.p., the number of times
in the entire tampering experiment that the value outputted by fL (resp. fR) is not
the most frequent value. Thus, when the value outputted by fL (resp. fR) is the most
frequent value, the leakage function outputs nothing, since the most frequent value
can be reconstructed from the given information. In contrast, if the value outputted
by fL (resp. fR) is not the most frequent value, but is in the sets SL/SR, then it
has a small description and, moreover, this event occurs a bounded number of times.
Therefore, we can afford to leak this information up to some upperbounded number
of rounds, while the total amount of leakage remains small relative to the length
of the encoding. Looking ahead, our construction will use a two-source extractor,
whose properties will guarantee that even given the leakage (which contains all the
information needed to simulate the CNMC experiment), the decoded value remains
uniform random.
To show that if the outcome of the tampering function is not in SL or SR,
then decode outputs ⊥ w.h.p., we first use the “uniqueness” property, which says
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that for every L̂ = fL(L) (resp. R̂ = fR(R)), there is at most a single “match”, R̂
′
(resp. L̂′), such that DΣ(L̂, R̂
′) 6= ⊥ (resp. DΣ(L̂′, R̂) 6= ⊥). Given the “uniqueness”
property, it is sufficient to show that for every setting of L,outi−1A
Pr[fR(R) = R̂
′ ∧ R̂′ /∈ SR | L ∧ outi−1A ] ≤ negl(n) (7.1.1)
and that for every setting of R ∧ outi−1A
Pr[fL(L) = L̂
′ ∧ L̂′ /∈ SL | R ∧ outi−1A ] ≤ negl(n). (7.1.2)
To prove the above, we first argue that for the “challenge” codeword, (L,R),
the split-states L and R are conditionally independent, given outi−1A (assuming no ⊥
has been outputted thus far) and an additional simulated part of the codeword. This
means that the set of frequent outcomes SL (resp. SR) conditioned on out
i−1
A is the
same as the set of frequent outcomes SL (resp. SR) conditioned on both out
i−1
A and
R (resp. L). So for any R̂ /∈ SR,
Pr[fR(R) = R̂ | L ∧ outi−1A ] ≤ negl(n)
and for any L̂ /∈ SL,
Pr[fL(L) = L̂ | R ∧ outi−1A ] ≤ negl(n).
Since R̂′ (resp. L̂′) is simply a particular setting of R̂ /∈ SR (resp. L̂ /∈ SL), we have
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that (7.1.1) and (7.1.2) follow.
For the above analysis, we need the encoding scheme to possess the following
property: The L,R sides of the “challenge” codeword are conditionally independent
given outi−1A (and an additional simulated part of the codeword), but any tampered
split-state fL(L) or fR(R) created by the adversary has at most a single “match,”
R̂′ or L̂′.
To explain how we achieve this property, we briefly describe our construction.
Our construction is based on a non-interactive, equivocal commitment scheme in
the CRS model and a two-source (inner product) extractor. Informally, an equivocal
commitment scheme is a commitment scheme with the normal binding and hiding
properties, but for which there exists a simulator that can output simulated commit-
ments which can be opened to both 0 and 1. In the CRS model, the simulator also
gets to sample a simulated CRS. Moreover, the CRS and commitments produced by
the simulator are indistinguishable from real ones.
To encode a random value m, random vectors cL, cR such that 〈cL, cR〉 = m are
chosen. We generate a commitment com to cL||cR. The commitment scheme has the
additional property that adversarially produced commitments are statistically binding
(even if an equivocal commitment has been released) and have at most a single
valid decommitment string. The left (resp. right) split-state L (resp. R) consists
of com and an opening of com to the bits of cL (resp. cR). The special properties
of the commitment scheme guarantee the “perfect uniqueness” property of the code.
In the security proof, we replace the statistically binding commitment com in the
“challenge” codeword with an equivocal commitment. Thus, each split-state of the
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challenge encoding, L (resp. R), contains no information about cR (resp. cL).
Moreover, assuming “⊥” is not yet outputted, the output received by the adversary
in the experiment at the point that the i-th tampering function is submitted, denoted
outi−1A is of the form (f
1
L(L) = v1, f
1
R(R) = w1), . . . , (f
i−1
L (L)) = vi−1, f
i−1
R (R) =
wi−1), where for j ∈ [i − 1], vj is equal to the left value outputted in response to
the j-th query and wj is equal to the right value outputted in response to the j-th
query. (note that vj/wj can be set to “same” if the tampering function leaves L/R
unchanged). This allows us to argue that the distribution of L | outi−1A , R (resp.
R | outi−1A , L) is identical to the distribution of L | out
i−1
A (resp. R | out
i−1
A ) which
implies that the left and right hand sides are conditionally independent given outi−1A
and the equivocal commitment, as desired. See Section 7.4 for additional details.
Extension to 4-state CNMC in CRS model from OWF. To encode a message m we
now generate random (cL,1, cR,1, cL,2, cR,2) conditioned on 〈cL,1, cR,1〉+〈cL,2, cR,2〉 = m
(where addition is over a finite field). Now, we generate a commitment com to
cL,1||cR,1||cL,2||cR,2. Each of the four split states now consists of com and an opening
of com to the bits of cL,b (resp. cR,b). The analysis is similar to the previous case
and requires the property that at each point in the experiment the distribution of
〈cL,1, cR,1〉 (resp. 〈cL,2, cR,2〉) is uniform random, conditioned on the output thus far.
Our techniques are somewhat similar to those used in [60] in their construction of 2t-
split-state continuously non-malleable codes from t-split-state one-way continuously
non-malleable codes. See Section 7.5 for additional details.
269
7.2 Preliminaries
In this section we will provide some more definitions and background required
for our constructions and results presented in chapter 7.
7.2.1 Randomness Extractors
The following lemma is from [108].
Lemma 7.2.1 (Inner-Product Two-Source Extractor). Let ~X, ~Y, Z be correlated




and λ|`, and are indepen-
dent conditioned on Z. Let Uλ be uniform and independent on F2λ. Then
∆((Z, 〈 ~X, ~Y 〉), (Z,Uλ)) ≤ 2−s
for some s ≥ 1 + 1
2
(kX + kY − `− λ), where kX := H̃∞( ~X|Z), kY := H̃∞(~Y |Z)
7.2.2 Continuous Non-Malleable Randomness Encoder
The following definition is an adaptation of the notion of Non-Malleable Ran-
domness Encoders [91] to the continuous setting.
Definition 7.2.1. Let Code = (CRSGen,CNMREnc,CNMRDec) be such that CRSGen
takes security parameter λ as input and outputs a string of length crs1 = poly(λ)
as CRS. CNMREnc : {0, 1}crs1 × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}λ × ({0, 1}n1 , {0, 1}n2) is defined as
CNMREnc(r) = (CNMREnc1,crs(r),CNMREnc2,crs(r)) = (m, (x0, x1)) and CNMRDec :
{0, 1}crs1 × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n2 → {0, 1}λ.
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We say that (CRSGen,CNMREnc,CNMRDec) is a continuous non-malleable
randomness encoder with message space {0, 1}λ and codeword space {0, 1}n1×{0, 1}n2,





[CNMRDeccrs(CNMREnc2,crs(r)) = CNMREnc1,crs(r)] = 1
• Continuous Non-Malleability:
(crs,CNMREnc1,crs(R), outcrs,A(R)) ≈c (crs, Uλ, outcrs,A(R))
where crs← CRSGen(1λ), R is a uniform random variable over {0, 1}r, Uλ is
a uniform random variable over {0, 1}λ and outcrs,A(R) is defined as follows:
outcrs,A(R)← AOCNM(crs,(X0,X1),(·,·)) : (X0, X1)← CNMREnc2,crs(R)
where OCNM runs with CNMRDec as decoding algorithm.
Next, we present definitions related to falsifiable assumptions and black-box
reductions, strong one-time signature schemes, and equivocal commitment scheme.
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7.2.3 Falsifiable Assumptions and Black-Box Reductions
Definition 7.2.2. A falsifiable assumption consists of ppt interactive challenger
C(1λ) that runs in time poly(λ) and a constant 0 ≤ δ < 1. The challenger C
interacts with a machine A and may output special symbol win. If this occurs, A is








where the probability is taken over the random coins of A and C. The assump-
tion associated with the tuple (C, δ) states that for every (non-uniform) adversary




If the advantage of A is non-negligible in λ then A is said to break the as-
sumption.
Definition 7.2.3. Let Π = (E,D) be a split-state CNMC. We say that the non-
malleability of Π can be proven via a black-box reduction to a falsifiable assumption,
if there is an oracle access machine M(·) such that for every (possibly inefficient)
Π-adversary P∗, the machineMP∗ runs in time poly(λ) and breaks the assumption.
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7.2.4 (Strong) One-Time Signature Schemes
A digital signature scheme consists of a triple of ppt algorithms (Gen, Sign,Verify)
such that:
• Gen takes the security parameter 1λ as input and generates a pair of keys: a
public verification key vk, and a secret signing key sk.
• Sign takes as input a secret key sk and a message m, and generates a signature
σ. We write this as σ ← Signsk(m).
• Verify takes as input a verification key vk, a message m, and a (purported)
signature σ and outputs a single bit indicating acceptance or not.
For correctness, we require that for all (vk, sk) output by Gen(1λ), for all messages
m, and for all σ ← Signsk(m), we have Verifyvk(m,σ) = 1.
7.2.5 Equivocal Commitment Scheme
We start by defining the basic commitment schemes and then present the notion
of equivocal bit-commitment schemes introduced by Di Crescenzo et al. in [58].
Definition 7.2.4 (Commitment Scheme). A (non-interactive) commitment scheme
in the CRS model for the message space M, is a triple (CRSGen,Commit,Open)
such that:
• crs← CRSGen(1λ) generates the CRS.
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• For all m ∈ M, (com, d) ← Commitcrs(m) is the commitment/opening pair
for the message m. Specifically; com is the commitment value for m, and d
is the opening.
• Opencrs(com, d) → m̃ ∈ M ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is returned when com is not a
valid commitment to any message.
The commitment scheme must satisfy the standard correctness requirement,
∀λ ∈ N,∀m ∈M and crs ∈ CRS, Pr [Opencrs(Commitcrs(m)) = m] = 1
where, CRS is the set of all possible valid CRS’s generated by CRSGen(1λ) and
where the probability is taken over the randomness of Commit.
The commitment scheme provides the following 2 security properties:
Hiding: It is computationally hard for any adversary A to generate two messages
m0,m1 ∈M such that A can distinguish between their corresponding commit-




crs← CRSGen(1λ), (m0,m1, α)← A1(crs), b← {0, 1},
(com, d)← Commitcrs(mb), b′ ← A2(com, α)
 ≤ 12+negl(λ)
Binding: It is computationally hard for any adversary A to find a triple (com, d, d′)
such that both (com, d) and (com, d′) are valid commitment/opening pairs for
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some m,m′ ∈M respectively, and m 6= m′. Formally, for any PPT adversary
A it should hold that:
Pr




crs← CRSGen(1λ), (com, d, d′)← A(crs),
m← Opencrs(com, d),m′ ← Opencrs(com, d′)
 ≤ negl(λ)
Definition 7.2.5 (One-to-One Commitment Scheme in the CRS Model). Let
(CRSGen,Commit,Open) be a bit-commitment scheme in CRS model. We say that
(CRSGen,Commit,Open) is a one-to-one commitment scheme if with all but negligi-
ble probability over b← {0, 1}, crs← CRSGen(1λ), (com, d)← Commitcrs(b), d′ = d
is the unique string such that Open(com, d′) 6= ⊥.
Definition 7.2.6 (Non-Interactive Equivocable Bit-Commitment Scheme). Let
(CRSGen,Commit,Open) be a bit-commitment scheme in CRS model. We say that
(CRSGen,Commit,Open) is a non-interactive equivocable bit-commitment scheme
in the CRS model if there exists an efficient probabilistic algorithm SEq which on
input 1λ outputs a 4-tuple (crs′, com′, d′0, d
′
1) satisfying the following:
• Pr[Opencrs′(com′, d′b) = b] for b ∈ {0, 1}.
• For b ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that outCommit(b) ≈ε outSEq(b) where the random vari-
ables outCommit(b) and outSEq(b) are defined as follows:
crs← CRSGen(1λ); (com, d)← Commitcrs(b);











We now present variant of the commitment scheme presented by Naor in [101],
specifically we present the same construction in CRS model. This is also presented
in [58].
Let λ > 0 be an integer, let G : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}3λ be a pseudo-random gener-
ator.
• CRSGen(1λ): Output a uniform random string crs of length 3λ.
• Commitcrs(b): Choose uniform random seed s ∈ {0, 1}λ and compute t = G(s).
If b = 0, set com := t. If b = 1, set com := t ⊕ crs. Output c. Output
decommitment d = s.
• Opencrs(com, d): If com = G(d), then output 0. Else if, com = G(d) ⊕ crs,
then output 1. Output ⊥ otherwise.
Claim 7.2.1.The scheme presented above is equivocal commitment scheme.
In order to prove claim 7.2.1 we need to show an efficient simulator SEq which
outputs (crs′, com′, d′0, d
′
1) on input 1
λ. Following is the description of SEq: On input
1λ, SEq chooses two uniform random seeds s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}λ and computes u = G(s0)
and v = G(s1). Set crs
′ = u⊕ v, com′ = u, and for b ∈ {0, 1}, set d′b = sb.





for any algorithm distinguishing between real transcript and interaction with SEq
we can present a distinguisher which breaks the security of G with same advantage.
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This can be achieved by replacing the string v by the challenge string in the pseudo-
random generator experiment.
7.2.6 One-to-one Equivocal Commitment
We present a modification of the above scheme that allows us to achieve an
equivocal commitment scheme with the one-to-one property: for every statistically
binding commitment, there is at most a single opening string that will be accepted by
the receiver during the decommitment phase. As an underlying ingredient, we use
any commitment scheme Π = (CRSGenΠ,CommitΠ,OpenΠ) (not necessarily equivo-
cal) with the above property.
Let λ > 0 be an integer, let G1 : {0, 1}λ
′ → {0, 1}3λ′ and G2 : {0, 1}λ →
{0, 1}t·λ′ be pseudo-random generators.
• CRSGen(1λ): Run CRSGenΠ(1λ) to generate crsΠ. Output crs = crsΠ, crs1, crs2
where crs1, crs2 are uniform random strings of length 3λ.
• Commitcrs(b): Choose uniform random seeds s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}λ and compute t1 =
G(s1), t2 = G(s2). Choose β ∈ {0, 1}. Set c1 = t1 ⊕ (b · crs1). Set c2 =
t2⊕ (β · crs2). Generate (comβ, dβ) = CommitcrsΠ(s1||s2) and (com1−β, d1−β) =
CommitcrsΠ(0
2n). Output commitment com := (c1, c2, com0, com1). Output
decommitment information s := (s1, s2, dβ).
• Opencrs(com, s): Parse com = (c1, c2, com0, com1) and s = s1||s2||d. If c2 =
G(s2), set β = 0. If c
2 = G(s2)⊕ crs2, set β = 1. Run OpencrsΠ(comβ, d) and
check that it outputs s1||s2. Otherwise, output ⊥. If c1 = G(s1), output 0. If
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c1 = G(s1)⊕ crs1, output 1. Output ⊥ otherwise.
Clearly, by the binding of the original commitment scheme and the unique
string decommitment property of Π, the modified scheme has the unique string de-
commitment property.
To create equivocal commitments/openings one can do the following: Run
CRSGenΠ(1








2 ∈ {0, 1}λ














2). Choose β ← {0, 1}









Set c1 = t01. Set c
2 = t02. Set crs1 = c
1 ⊕ t11. Set crs2 = c2 ⊕ t12. Output commitment
com′ := (c1, c2, com0, com1).
To open the commitment to a 0, output (s01||s
β
2 ||dβ), where dβ is the decommit-
ment information for comβ.
To open the commitment to a 1, output (s11||s
1−β
2 ||d1−β), where d1−β is the
decommitment information for com1−β.
7.2.7 Equivocal Commitment (with extra properties) in the CRS
model
Let Π′ = (Gen′Com,Com
′,Open′, S′Eq), be an equivocal, one-to-one `-bit commit-
ment scheme in the CRS model (given in Section 7.2.6). Let (GenSign, Sign,Verify) be
a strong, one-time signature scheme. We construct Π = (GenCom,Com,Open, SEq),
which is an equivocal commitment scheme, with several additional properties that we
describe at the end of the section and which will be useful for our constructions in
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Sections 7.4 and 7.5.
Key generation GenCom is as follows: On input security parameter 1
λ, run




Eq)]i∈[t], where t is the length
of the verification key vk output by GenSign.
Commitment Com is as follows: To commit to a message m of length `, gener-
ate a key pair (vk, sk)← GenSign. For i ∈ [t], generate (comi, di)← Com′(Σvki,i,m),
where comi is the commitment and di is the decommitment information. Generate
σ ← Signsk([comi]i∈[t]). Output commitment c = (vk, [comi]i∈[`], σ). A sender can
decommit separately to any set of bits of the message m. Decommitment informa-
tion for a set S of message bits consists of d[S] = [di,j]i∈[t],j∈[S], where di,j is the
decommitment information contained in di corresponding to the j-th bit.
Decommitment Open w.r.t. a set S: Given a set S, a commitment com, and
an opening [di,j]i∈[t],j∈S, Open does the following: Parse commitment as
(vk, [comi,j]i∈[t],j∈[`], σ). (1) Check that Verifyvk([comi,j]i∈[t],j∈[`], σ) = 1 (2) For i ∈ [t],
j ∈ S, check that di,j is a valid decommitment for comi,j w.r.t. CRS Σvki,i.
Equivocal CRS generation and commitment SEq is as follows: On in-
put security parameter 1λ, generate a key pair (vk, sk) ← GenSign. Run S′Eq t





Com t times to generate [Σ
1−vki,i]i∈t.
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Eq)]i∈[t]. Compute σ ← Signsk([comi]i∈[t]).
Output (crs = ΣEq, c = (vk, [comi]i∈[`], σ), d
0 = [d0i,j]i∈[t],j∈[`], d
1 = [d1i,j]i∈[t],j∈[`]).
Additional check functionality: Given a Σ and commitments
com = (vk, [comi]i∈[`], σ), com
′ = (vk′, [com′i]i∈[`], σ
′), checkΣ(com, com
′) outputs 1 if





1. With overwhelming probability over generation of Σ, for every set S ⊆ [`] and
every string com, there is at most a single string d[S] such that
OpenΣ(S, com, d[S]) = 1. This property is achieved by using the equivocal,
one-to-one, commitment scheme given in Section 7.2.6 as the underlying com-
mitment scheme.
2. Given a pair (Σ, com), a PPT adversary outputs com′ such that com 6= com′
but checkΣ(com, com
′) = 1 with negligible probability. This property follows
from the security of the one-time signature scheme.
3. Given equivocal commitment (ΣEq, com), for every string com
′, if
checkΣEq(com, com
′) = 0 then (with overwhelming probability over generation
of ΣEq) com
′ has at most one valid opening. Specifically, for every set S ⊆ [`],
there is at most a single string d[S] such that OpenΣEq(S, com
′, d[S]) = 1.
Again, this property is achieved by using the equivocal, one-to-one, commit-
ment scheme given in Section 7.2.6 as the underlying commitment scheme.
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7.3 Impossibility of CNMC with no CRS
In this section we present Theorem 7.3.1, stating the impossibility of construct-
ing CNMC without CRS.
Theorem 7.3.1. There is no black-box reduction from a single-bit CNMC scheme
Π = (E,D) to any falsifiable assumption, unless the assumption is false.
We know from prior work that continuous NMC are impossible in the info-
theoretic setting. Assume we have a construction of single-bit, continuous NMC
from some falsifiable assumption with no CRS. We only allow black-box usage of the
adversary in the reduction. However, the underlying assumption can be used in a
non-black-box way in the construction/proof.
Preliminaries. Given adversary A = (AL, AR), we say that A has advantage α in
the simplified no-Σ CNMC game against construction Π = (E,D) if:
∣∣∣Pr[D(AL(L), AR(R)) 6= ⊥ | (L,R)← E(1n, 0)]
−Pr[D(AL(L), AR(R)) 6= ⊥ | (L,R)← E(1n, 1)]
∣∣∣ = α,
Clearly, if A = (AL, AR) has non-negligible advantage in the simplified no-Σ CNMC
game, it can be used to break the CNMC security of Π = (E,D).
Definition 7.3.1. A tuple (x, y, z) is bad relative to CNMC scheme Π = (E,D) if
either:
• y 6= z ∧ D(x, y) 6= ⊥ ∧ D(x, z) 6= ⊥ OR
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• x 6= y ∧ D(x, z) 6= ⊥ ∧ D(y, z) 6= ⊥.
Definition 7.3.2. A single-bit CNMC Π = (E,D) in the standard (no CRS model)
is perfectly unique if there exist no bad tuples relative to Π = (E,D).
We next present the following two lemmas, which, taken together, imply The-
orem 7.3.1.
Lemma 7.3.1. If a single-bit CNMC scheme Π = (E,D) is not perfectly unique
then it is insecure.
This is immediate, since if a bad tuple exists, it can be given to the adversary
as non-uniform advice. Then the same attack from the literature (reviewed in the
introduction) can be run.
Lemma 7.3.2. There is no BB reduction from a single-bit CNMC scheme Π =
(E,D) which is perfectly unique to any falsifiable assumption.
The basic idea is that, given only black-box access to the split-state adversary,
A = (AL, AR), the reduction cannot tell the difference between the actual adversary
and a simulated adversary. The simulated adversary simply waits to get matching
L and R queries from the reduction, decodes, and re-encodes a fresh value that is
related to the decoded value. The challenges are that the L and R queries are not
received simultaneously. In fact, there could be many queries interleaved between a
L and R match. So the simulated adversary must return a value upon seeing the
L or R half before seeing the other half and before knowing whether the encoded
value is a 0 or a 1. Therefore, the simulated adversary does the following: It keeps a
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table containing all the L and R values that it has seen. Whenever a L or R query
is made, the simulated adversary first checks the table to see if a matching query
was previously made. If not, the simulated adversary chooses a random encoding,
(L′, R′), of a random bit b′, stores it in the table along with the L/R query that was
made and returns either L′ or R′ as appropriate. If yes, the simulated adversary
finds the corresponding L/R along with the pair (L′, R′) stored in the table. The
simulated adversary then decodes (L,R) to find out b. If b = 0, the simulated
adversary returns either L′ or R′ as appropriate. Otherwise, the simulated adversary
returns the left/right side of an encoding of a random bit b′′. We prove that the view
generated by the reduction interacting with this adversary is identical to the view
of the reduction interacting with the following real adversary: The real adversary,
given L or R, recovers the corresponding unique valid codeword (L,R) (if it exists)
and decodes to get the bit b. If b = 0, the real adversary encodes a random bit b′ =
RO1(L||R) using randomness r = RO2(L||R) (where RO1,RO2 are random oracles
internal to the real adversary that are used to generate consistent randomness across
invocations) and outputs the left/right side as appropriate. Otherwise (i.e. if the
corresponding unique codeword does not exist or if D(L,R) = 1), the real adversary
outputs the left/right side of encoding of a random bit, b′′ = RO3(L) (or b
′′ =
RO3(R)) using randomness r
′′ = RO4(L) (or r
′′ = RO4(R)) (where RO3,RO4 are
random oracles internal to the real adversary that are used to generate consistent
randomness across invocations). Note that since the CNMC is perfectly unique, the
real adversary obtains non-negligible advantage of 1− negl(n) in the simplified no-Σ
CNMC game.
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Proof. We will construct a meta-reduction as follows:
Consider the following inefficient, split state adversary A = (AL, AR) with
internal random oracles RO1,RO2, RO3, and RO4:
AL: On input L, find the unique R such that D(L,R) 6= ⊥ (if it exists). Let b :=
D(L,R). If b = 0, encode b′ = RO1(L||R) using randomness r = RO2(L||R) to
obtain (L′, R′) := E(b′; r) and output L′. If such R does not exist or if b = 1,
compute a random encoding of a random bit b′′ = RO3(L) using randomness
r′′ = RO4(L) to obtain (L
′′, R′′) := E(b′′, r′′) and output L′′.
AR: On input R, find the unique L such that D(L,R) 6= ⊥ (if it exists). Let b :=
D(L,R). If b = 0, encode b′ = RO1(L||R) using randomness r = RO2(L||R) to
obtain (L′, R′) := E(b′; r) and output R′. If such L does not exist or if b = 1,
compute a random encoding of a random bit b′′ = RO3(R) using randomness
r′′ = RO4(R) to obtain (L
′′, R′′) := E(b′′, r′′) and output R′′.
Clearly, A succeeds with advantage 1− negl(n) in the simplified no-Σ CNMC
game.
The following adversary A′ simulates the above efficiently: Let T be a table
that records internal randomness. T is initialized to empty. A′ is a stateful adversary
that proceeds as follows:
1. On input L, check if the corresponding R such that D(L,R) 6= ⊥ has been
queried. If yes, decode to get bit b := D(L,R). If b = 0, check the table
T to recover (R,L′, R′). Output L′. Otherwise, if L ∈ T then output L′′
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corresponding to entry (L,L′′, R′′). If L /∈ T , choose a random encoding of a
random bit b′′: (L′′, R′′)← E(b′′). Store (L,L′′, R′′) in T . and output L′′.
2. On input R, check if the corresponding L such that D(L,R) 6= ⊥ has been
queried. If yes, decode to get bit b := D(L,R). If b = 0, check the table
T to recover (L,L′, R′). Output R′. Otherwise, if R ∈ T then output R′′
corresponding to entry (R,L′′, R′′). If R /∈ T , choose a random encoding of a
random bit b′′: (L′′, R′′)← E(b′′). Store (R,L′′, R′′) in T and output R′′.
By properties of the random oracle, the view of the reduction Red when
interacting with A versus A′ are equivalent.
Since the reduction succeeds when interacting with Real adversary A with non-
negligible probability p and since the view of the reduction is identical when inter-
acting with A or A′, Red interacting with A′ must also succeed with non-negligible
probability p. But Red composed with A′ yields an efficient adversary, leading
to an efficient adversary breaking the underlying falsifiable assumption, which is a
contradiction.
7.4 2-State CNMC for One-Bit Messages
In this section we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 7.4.1. Assuming the existence of one-to-one commitment schemes in the
CRS model, there is a construction of a 2-split-state CNM Randomness Encoder in
the CRS model.
The corollary is immediate, given the following transformation.
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7.4.1 CNM Randomness Encoder to Single-Bit CNMC
Let Π = (CRSGen,E = (E1,E2),D) be a CNM Randomness Encoder. To con-
struct a CNMC for a single bit from Π, we must show how to use E to encode
a message b ∈ {0, 1}. In the case of the CNM Randomness Encoder given in Sec-




, conditioned on the parity
of 〈cL, cR〉 being equal to b. and then running E(cL||cR||renc||rL||rR) In general, one
can run E(r) repeatedly until E2(r) outputs a random message m with parity equal
to b. (this will give an encode algorithm that runs in polynomial time with all but
negligible probability).
Now, it can be immediately seen that an adversary who breaks the security
formulation of CNMC given in Definition 3.2.11 must also break the security of the
CNM Randomness Encoder, given in Definition 7.2.1.
Corollary 7.4.1. Assuming the existence of one-to-one commitment schemes in the
CRS model, there is a construction of a single-bit, 2-split-state CNMC in the CRS
model.
Notation and parameters. λ is security parameter and length of encoded random-
ness. ` = `(λ) ∈ Θ(λ2) and we assume for simplicity that λ|`. Sets SL, SR ⊆ [2`]
are defined as follows: SL = [`], SR = [2`] \ [`]. yo = yo(`) ∈ Θ(`1/2), yt = yt(`) ∈
Θ(`1/2).
The construction of the 2-state CNM Randomness Encoder is given in Figure 7.1.
To prove Theorem 7.4.1, we show that the construction above is a secure CNM
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Let (CRSGenCom,Com,Open, SEq) be the non-interactive, equivocal, one-to-one com-
mitment in the CRS model given in Section 7.2.7.
CRSGen(1λ): Σ← CRSGenCom(1λ). Output Σ.
EΣ(cL||cR||rcom):





2. (com, d = d1, . . . , d2`)← ComΣ(cL||cR; rcom)
3. Let d[SL] (resp. d[SR]) correspond to the decommitment of com to the bits
corresponding to SL (resp. SR).
4. E2,Σ outputs L = (com, d[SL]); R = (com, d[SR]). E1,Σ outputs 〈cL, cR〉.
DΣ(L̃, R̃):
1. Parse L̃ = (c̃om, d̃[SL]), R̃ = (c̃om
′, d̃[SR]).
2. Check that c̃om = c̃om′.
3. Let c̃L = OpenΣ(SL, c̃om, d̃[SL]) and c̃R = OpenΣ(SR, c̃om, d̃[SR]). Check that
c̃L 6= ⊥ and c̃R 6= ⊥.
4. If all the above checks pass, output 〈c̃L, c̃R〉. Otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 7.1: Construction of 2-State, Continuous, Non-Malleable Randomness Encoder.
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Randomness Encoder, via the following sequence of hybrids.
Hybrid 0: This is the “Real” security experiment.
Hybrid 1: The experiment is identical to Hybrid 0 except we modify the decode
algorithm from DΣ to D
1
Σ to abort if the tampered codeword submitted is differ-
ent from the challenge codeword and the check function outputs 1. Specifically, let
(L := (com, d[SL]), R = (com, d[SR])) be the “challenge” codeword (i.e. the codeword
generated by the security experiment).
D1Σ(L̃, R̃):
1. Parse L̃ = (c̃om, d̃[SL]), R̃ = (c̃om
′, d̃[SR]).
2. If L̃ 6= L and checkΣ(com, c̃om) = 1 or R̃ 6= R and checkΣ(com, c̃om′) = 1
then output ⊥.
3. Check that c̃om = c̃om′.
4. Let c̃L = OpenΣ(SL, c̃om, d̃[SL]) and c̃R = OpenΣ(SR, c̃om, d̃[SR]). Check that
c̃L 6= ⊥ and c̃R 6= ⊥.
5. If all the above checks pass, output 〈c̃L, c̃R〉. Otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 7.2: Decode in Hybrid 1.
Hybrid 2: The experiment is identical to Hybrid 1, except we switch to equivocal
commitments in the codeword (L,R) that is given to the adversary. Specifically,
CRSGen is replaced with CRSGen2 and the challenge codeword is generated as shown
in Figure 7.3.
Hybrid 3: The experiment is identical to Hybrid 2, except we modify D1 to D3,
which aborts if the outcome of f iL(L) or f
i
R(R) is not a “likely value.”
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CRSGen2(1λ): (ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
2`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
2`)← SEq(1λ). Output ΣEq.
Challenge codeword:





2. Set d[SL] := [d
cL[i]
i ]i∈SL ; Set d[SR] := [d
cR[i]
i ]i∈SR ;
3. Output L = (com, d[SL]); R = (com, d[SR]).
Figure 7.3: Gen and Challenge Codeword generation in Hybrid 2.
Specifically, given (ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
2`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
2`) and the adversary’s
current output outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A , we define the sets SL, SR, S ′L, S ′R as follows:
• SL contains all values of L̂′ that occur with probability at least ε = 1/2yo/3,
where values of L̂′ are sampled as follows: Sample ĉL conditioned on the out-
put of the experiment in Hybrid 2 thus far being equal to outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A .
Compute equivocal decommitment of com: d̂[SL] := [d
ĉL[i]
i ]i∈SL. Apply f
i
L to
L̂ = (com, d̂[SL]) to obtain L̂
′ (or “same” if the output is L̂ itself).
• SR contains all values of R̂′ that occur with probability at least ε = 1/2yo/3,
where values of R̂′ are sampled as follows: Sample ĉR conditioned on the out-
put of the experiment in Hybrid 2 thus far being equal to outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A .
Compute equivocal decommitment of com: d̂[SR] := [d
ĉR[i]
i ]i∈SR. Apply f
i
R to
R̂ = (com, d̂[SR]) to obtain R̂
′ (or “same” if the output is R̂ itself).
• Let S ′L ⊆ SL be the set of L̂′ such that there is a “matching” R̂′ ∈ SR such
that D1ΣEq(L̂
′, R̂′) 6= ⊥.
• Let S ′R ⊆ SR be the set of R̂′ such that there is a “matching” L̂′ ∈ SL such
that D1ΣEq(L̂
′, R̂′) 6= ⊥.
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Note that the decode oracle is now stateful and depends on the current round
of interaction, as well as the outputs returned in previous rounds. Specifically, note
that the sets S ′L, S ′R change in each round i, since the likely outputs depend on the
tampering function (f iL, f
i
R) submitted by the adversary in round i, and are con-
ditioned on the output outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A seen by the adversary thus far in rounds






1. Check that L̃ ∈ S ′L and that R̃ ∈ S ′R. If not, output ⊥.
2. Parse L̃ = (c̃om, d̃[SL]), R̃ = (c̃om
′, d̃[SR]).
3. Check that c̃om = c̃om′.
4. Let c̃L = OpenΣ(SL, c̃om, d̃[SL]) and c̃R = OpenΣ(SR, c̃om, d̃[SR]). Check that
c̃L 6= ⊥ and c̃R 6= ⊥.
5. If all the above checks pass, output 〈c̃L, c̃R〉. Otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 7.4: Decode in Hybrid 3.
Hybrid 4: The experiment is identical to Hybrid 3, except we modify D3 to D4





the outcome of f iL(L) (resp. f
i
R(R)) is not the most “likely value”. Specifically, at
the beginning of the experiment, we initialize counters countL, countR to 0. We also
define L∗ (resp. R∗) to be the element of S ′L (resp. S ′R) that occurs most frequently.
More precisely, we consider the sets
L∗ := argmaxL′∈S′L Pr[f
i
L(L̂) = L




R∗ := argmaxR′∈S′R Pr[f
i
R(R̂) = R
′ | outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A ].






1. Check that L̃ ∈ S ′L and that R̃ ∈ S ′R. If not, output ⊥.
2. If L̃ 6= L∗, then set countL := countL + 1.
3. If R̃ 6= R∗, then set countR := countR + 1.
4. If countL > yt or countR > yt, output ⊥.
5. Parse L̃ = (c̃om, d̃[SL]), R̃ = (c̃om
′, d̃[SR]).
6. Check that c̃om = c̃om′.
7. Let c̃L = OpenΣ(SL, c̃om, d̃[SL]) and c̃R = OpenΣ(SR, c̃om, d̃[SR]). Check that
c̃L 6= ⊥ and c̃R 6= ⊥.
8. If all the above checks pass, output 〈c̃L, c̃R〉. Otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 7.5: Decode in Hybrid 4.
Claim 7.4.1. Hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
This follows from the additional properties of the equivocal commitment scheme
given in Section 7.2.7.
Claim 7.4.2. Hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable.
This follows from the security of the equivocal commitment scheme.
Claim 7.4.3. Hybrids 2 and 3 are ε · 2q-close, where ε = 1/2yo/3 and yo ∈ O(`1/2).
Proof. To prove indistinguishability of Hybrids 2 and 3, it is sufficient to show that




R(R)) 6= ⊥] ≤ ε and Pr[f iL(R) /∈




R(R)) 6= ⊥] ≤ ε. The result then follows by a union bound over
the q LHS and q RHS queries.
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To bound the above, we in fact show something stronger: (1) for each i ∈ [q],
each value of outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A (which does not contain a ⊥ output) and each value
of R = R̂,




R(R)) 6= ⊥ | R = R̂ ∧ outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )] ≤ ε;
and (2) for each i ∈ [q], each value of outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A (which does not contain a ⊥
output) and each value of L = L̂,




R(R)) 6= ⊥ | L = L̂ ∧ outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )] ≤ ε.
We first fix (ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
2`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
2`). Note that for fixed
ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
2`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
2`, there is a bijection φL (resp. φR) between
cL (resp. cR) and (com, d[SL]) (where d[SL] := [d
cL[i]
i ]i∈SL). Therefore the probability
of a particular value of cL (resp. cR) occurring is equivalent to the probability of
L = φL(cL) (resp. R = φR(cR)) occurring. Additionally, Let ρL (resp. ρR) be the
function that given f iR(R) (resp. f
i
L(L)) returns the unique L
′ (resp. R′) if it exists
such that, D1ΣEq(L
′, f iR(R)) 6= ⊥ (resp. D1ΣEq(f
i
L(L), R
′) 6= ⊥). Note that L′ (resp.
R′) is equal to “same” if and only if f iR(R) = “same” (resp. f
i
L(L) = “same”). To see
why this is so, recall that in D1, ⊥ is outputted if L̃ 6= L and checkΣ(com, c̃om) = 1
or R̃ 6= R and checkΣ(com, c̃om′) = 1. Now, if L′ is equal to same, then it must be
that checkΣ(com, c̃om) = 1. Therefore, by the above, the only value of f
i
R(R), for
which ⊥ will not be output is f iR(R) = “same′′. The same is true for the case that
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f iR(R) = “same
′′.
We first show that for i ∈ [q], cL, cR are conditionally independent given
outiA = Ôut
i
A. This follows from the fact that the information contained in Ôut
i
A is
of the form (f 1L(φL(cL)) = v1, f
1
R(φR(cR)) = w1), . . . , (f
i
L(φL(cL)) = vi, f
i
R(φR(cR)) =
wi), where for j ∈ [i], vj is equal to the L′ value outputted in response to the
j-th query and wj is equal to the R
′ value outputted in response to the j-th
query. (note that vj/wj can be set to “same” if the tampering function leaves





R(φR(cR)) = w1), . . . , (f
i
L(φL(cL)) = vi, f
i
R(φR(cR)) = wi) is equal to (U` |
(f 1L(φL(U`)) = v1, . . . , f
i
L(φL(U`)) = vi))×(U` | (f 1R(φR(U`)) = w1, . . . , f iR(φR(U`)) =
wi)). Moreover, due to the discussion above, L,R are also conditionally independent
given outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A . Therefore, to show (1), we note that for every (L̂, R̂, Ôut
i−1
A ),
Pr[L = L̂ | R = R̂ ∧ outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )] = Pr[L = L̂ | outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )]. So we
have that for every fixed R = R̂ (for which Pr[R = R̂∧outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )] > 0), and
every L′ /∈ S ′L, Pr[f i(L) = L′ | R = R̂ ∧ outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )] ≤ ε. Therefore,




R(R)) 6= ⊥ | R = R̂ ∧ outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )]
= Pr[f iL(L) /∈ S ′L ∧
(








The proof for (2) is analogous.
Claim 7.4.4. Hybrids 3 and 4 are statistically indistinguishable.
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Proof. To prove indistinguishability of Hybrids 3 and 4, we must show that the










R(R)) 6= ⊥ occurs
more than yt times in a single execution is at most (1/2)
yt .
We first analyze the event (1). Recall that set S ′L contains values, L′, that occur
with probability p in some experiment. By “most frequent value” in S ′L, we mean
the value L′ in S ′L with the maximum associated probability p. Note that if L′ is not
the most frequent value, the associated probability p is at most 1/2, since otherwise,
the probabilities will sum to more than 1. More precisely, if f iL(L) = L
′ is not the
most frequent query in S ′L then, by definition of the set S ′L and the above argument,
Pr[f iL(L̂) = L
′ | outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A ] ≤ 1/2. Recall that in the proof of the previous
claim, we have shown that for i ∈ {0, . . . , q}, L,R are conditionally independent
given outiA. Therefore, Pr[f
i
L(L) = L
′ | outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A ∧ R = R̂] ≤ 1/2. This
implies that for every fixed R = R̂ (for which Pr[R = R̂ ∧ outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A ] > 0),




R(R)) 6= ⊥ | R = R̂ ∧ outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A )]




We consider the number of adversarial queries such that both f iL(L) = L
′ is




R(R)) 6= ⊥. (note that the
total number of adversarial queries can be much higher). By the above argument,









R(R)) 6= ⊥ is at most
(1/2)yt ∈ negl(λ). Thus, we have concluded the proof for event (1). The proof for
event (2) is analogous.
We finally show the main technical claim of this section, which completes the
proof of Theorem 7.4.1.
Claim 7.4.5. In Hybrid 4, the encoded randomness 〈cL, cR〉 is statistically close to
uniform, given the view of the adversary.
Proof. Towards proving the claim, we consider the following leakage functions:
Leakage function on cL: Fix ΣEq, com, d
0, d1, universal hash h : {0, 1}α →
{0, 1}yo ∈ H (where α is the length of a single split-state of the encoding) and
adversary A. On input cL, set output outA to “” and outL to “”. Set L =
(com, [d
cL[i]
i ]i∈[`]). Repeat the following in rounds i = 1, 2, . . .:
1. Obtain the next tampering function (fL, fR) from adversary A. If A terminates
then terminate with output outL.
2. Set L′ := fL(L). If L
′ ∈ S ′L, then:
(a) Find the unique R̂′ ∈ S ′R such that D1ΣEq(L
′, R̂′) 6= ⊥. Return (L′, R̂′) to
the adversary. Set outA = outA||(L′, R̂′).
(b) If L′ is not the most frequent output in S ′L, set outL := outL||(i||h(L′)) If
|outL| > (log(q)+yo)·yt then terminate with output outL := outL||(i||⊥).
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3. If L′ /∈ S ′L, output ⊥ to the adversary and terminate with output outL :=
outL||(i||⊥).
The leakage function for the RHS is analogous.
We now show that given outL and outR we can reconstruct the full output
sequence for the adversary’s view with probability 1 − 2q





Fix ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
2`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
2`, universal hash h← H and adver-
sary A. Set output outA to “” and outL to “”. Repeat the following in rounds
i = 1, 2, . . . , q:
1. Obtain the next tampering function (fL, fR) from adversary A given its current
view, outA.
2. If (i,⊥) ∈ outL or (i,⊥) ∈ outR, set outA = outA||⊥ and abort.
3. If (i, y) ∈ outL, for some y 6= ⊥, set L′ = L̂′ such that L̂′ ∈ S ′L and h(L̂′) = y.
4. If (i, ·) /∈ outL, set L′ = L̂′ such that L̂′ ∈ S ′L is the most frequent value.
5. If (i, y) ∈ outR, for some y 6= ⊥, set R′ = R̂′ such that R̂′ ∈ S ′R and h(R̂′) = y.
6. If (i, ·) /∈ outR, set R′ = R̂′ such that R̂′ ∈ S ′R is the most frequent value.
7. If L′ = “same” and R′ = “same” output “same” and set outA = outA||“same”.
8. Else if one of L′, R′ is “same” and not the other, set outA = outA||⊥ and
abort.
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9. Else Parse L′ := (com, d[SL]) and R
′ := (com′, d[SR]). If com 6= com′, set
outA = outA||⊥ and abort.
10. Otherwise, set outA = outA||(L′, R′).
It can be determined by inspection that the incorrect value is output only if
in one of the at most 2q instances, there are two distinct values L̂′, L̂′′ ∈ S ′L or
R̂′, R̂′′ ∈ S ′R such that h(L̂′) = h(L̂′′) or h(R̂′) = h(R̂′′). Due to universality of h




Since |outL| ≤ (log(q)+yo) ·yt ≤ 2yo ·yt ≤ c ·` for constant c < 1 and |outR| ≤
(log(q) + yo) · yt ≤ 2yo · yt ≤ c · ` for constant c < 1, we can use the properties of the
inner product extractor given in Lemma 7.2.1 to argue that 〈cL, cR〉 is statistically
close to uniform random, given outL,outR. Moreover, since we have shown that the
view of the adversary in the Hybrid 4 can be fully reconstructed given outL,outR,
we have that, in the Hybrid 4, the encoded randomness 〈cL, cR〉 is statistically close
to uniform, given the adversary’s view in the CNMC experiment.
7.5 4-State CNMC for Multi-Bit Messages
In this section we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 7.5.1. Assuming the existence of one-to-one commitment schemes in the
CRS model, there is a construction of a multi-bit, 4-split-state CNMC in the CRS
2 Recall that S ′L ⊆ SL, and SL contains all the values of L̂′ which occur with probability at
least ε. Therefore |SL| ≤ 1/ε (and thus |S ′L| ≤ 1/ε), since otherwise the sum of the probabilities
would exceed 1. A similar argument is true for S ′R.
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model.
Notation and parameters. λ is security parameter and length of encoded mes-
sage. ` = `(λ) ∈ Θ(λ2) and we assume for simplicity that λ|`. k = 2λ. Sets
SL,1, SR,1, SL,2, SR,2 ⊆ [4`] are defined as follows: SL,1 = [`], SR,1 = [2`] \ [`],
SL,2 = [3`] \ [2`], SR,2 = [4`] \ [3`]. yo = yo(`) ∈ Θ(`1/2), yt = yt(`) ∈ Θ(`1/2).
The construction of the multi-bit, 4-state CNMC is presented in Figure 7.6.
Let (CRSGenCom,Com,Open, SEq) be the non-interactive, equivocal, one-to-one com-
mitment in the CRS model given in Section 7.2.7.
CRSGen′(1λ): Run Σ← CRSGenCom(1λ). Output Σ.
E′Σ(m) for m ∈ {0, 1}λ:
1. Choose at random m1,m2 ∈ F2λ such that m1 +m2 = m.





〈cL,b, cR,b〉 = mb.
3. (com, d = d1, . . . , d4`)← ComΣ([cL,b||cR,b]b∈{1,2})
4. For b ∈ {1, 2}, let d[SL,b] (resp. d[SR,b]) correspond to the decommitment of
com to the bits corresponding to SL,b (resp. SR,b).
5. Output L1 = (com, d[SL,1]); R1 = (com, d[SR,1]); L2 = (com, d[SL,2]); R2 =
(com, d[SR,2]).
D′Σ(L̃1, R̃1, L̃2, R̃2): //For simplicity of notation, we assume D
′ can take its inputs in
any order.
1. For b ∈ {1, 2}, parse L̃b = (c̃omb, d[SL,b]), R̃b = (c̃om′b, d[SR,b]).
2. Check that c̃om1 = c̃om
′
1 = c̃om2 = c̃om
′
2.
3. For b ∈ {1, 2}, let c̃L,b = OpenΣ(SL,b, c̃om, d̃[SL,b]) and c̃R,b =
OpenΣ(SR,b, c̃om, d̃[SR,b]). Check that c̃L,b 6= ⊥ and c̃R,b 6= ⊥.
4. For b ∈ {1, 2}, compute m̃b = 〈cL,b, cR,b〉.
5. If all the above checks pass, output m̃1 + m̃2; otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 7.6: Construction of 4-state Continuous, Non-Malleable Code.
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To prove Theorem 7.5.1, we show that the construction above is a secure multi-
bit CNMC, via the following sequence of hybrids.
Hybrid 0: This is the Experiment from Definition 3.2.11.
Hybrids 1 and 2 are analogous to the first and second hybrids in Section 7.4.
We therefore give an abbreviated description.
Hybrid 1: The experiment is identical to Hybrid 0 except we modify the decode algo-
rithm from D′Σ to D
′1
Σ to abort if the tampered codeword (L̃1, R̃1, L̃2, R̃2) is different
from the challenge codeword (L1, R1, L2, R2) but the corresponding commitment is
not statistically binding.
Hybrid 2: The experiment is identical to Hybrid 1, except we switch to equivocal
commitments in (L1, R1) (resp. (L2, R2)) that is given to the adversary. We de-
note the corresponding CRS’s, and equivocal commitment and decommitments by
ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
4`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
4`.
We now define some terminology which will be needed for the next sequence of
hybrids. Given (ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
4`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1





for b ∈ {1, 2}, we define the sets SL,b, SR,b, S ′L,b, S ′R,b as follows:
• SL,b contains all values of L̂′b that occur with probability at least ε = 1/2yo/3,
where values of L̂′b are sampled as follows: Sample ĉL,b conditioned on out
i−1
A,b .
Compute equivocal decommitment of com: d̂[SL,b] := [d
ĉL,b[i]
i ]i∈SL,b. Apply f
i
L,b
to L̂b = (comb, d̂[SL,b]) to obtain L̂
′
b (or “same” if the output is L̂b itself).
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• SR,b contains all values of R̂′b that occur with probability at least ε = 1/2yo/3,
where values of R̂′b are sampled as follows: Sample ĉR,b conditioned on out
i−1
A,b .
Compute equivocal decommitment of com: d̂[SR,b] := [d
ĉR,b[i]
i ]i∈SR,b. Apply f
i
R,b
to R̂b = (comb, d̂[SR,b]) to obtain R̂
′
b (or “same” if the output is R̂b itself).





b, ·, ·) 6= ⊥.





b, ·, ·) 6= ⊥.






1. For b ∈ {1, 2}, check that L̃b ∈ S ′L,b and that R̃b ∈ S ′R,b. If not, output ⊥.
2. For b ∈ {1, 2}, parse L̃b = (c̃omb, d̃[SL,b]), R̃b = (c̃om′b, d̃[SR,b]).
3. Check that c̃om1 = c̃om
′
1 = c̃om2 = c̃om
′
2.
4. For b ∈ {1, 2}, let c̃L,b = OpenΣ(SL,b, c̃om, d̃[SL,b]) and c̃R,b =
OpenΣ(SR,b, c̃om, d̃[SR,b]). Check that c̃L,b 6= ⊥ and c̃R,b 6= ⊥.
5. For b ∈ {1, 2}, compute m̃b = 〈c̃L,b, c̃R,b〉.
6. If all the above checks pass, output m̃1 + m̃2; otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 7.7: Algorithm D′3ΣEq .
For the following decode algorithm, we assume that at the beginning of the
experiment, for b ∈ {1, 2}, counters countL,b, countR,b are initialized to 0. We also
define L∗b (resp. R
∗
b) to be the element of S ′L,b (resp. S ′R,b) that occurs most frequently.
We next present a sequence of intermediate hybrids H2 = H2,0,b, H2,1,a . . . ,







1. Check that L̃ ∈ S ′L and that R̃ ∈ S ′R. If not, output ⊥.
2. For b ∈ {1, 2}, if L̃b 6= L∗b , then set countL,b := countL,b + 1.
3. For b ∈ {1, 2}, if R̃b 6= R∗b , then set countR,b := countR,b + 1.
4. For b ∈ {1, 2}, if countL,b > yt or countR,b > yt, output ⊥.
5. For b ∈ {1, 2}, parse L̃b = (c̃omb, d̃[SL,b]), R̃b = (c̃om′b, d̃[SR,b]).
6. Check that c̃om1 = c̃om
′
1 = c̃om2 = c̃om
′
2.
7. For b ∈ {1, 2}, let c̃L,b = OpenΣ(SL,b, c̃om, d̃[SL,b]) and c̃R,b =
OpenΣ(SR,b, c̃om, d̃[SR,b]). Check that c̃L,b 6= ⊥ and c̃R,b 6= ⊥.
8. For b ∈ {1, 2}, compute m̃b = 〈c̃L,b, c̃R,b〉.
9. If all the above checks pass, output m̃1 + m̃2; otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 7.8: Algorithm D′4ΣEq .
Hybrid H2,i,a for i ∈ [q]: The experiment is identical to the previous hybrid, except
we respond to the i-th query to the decoding oracle using D′3ΣEq .
Hybrid H2,i,b for i ∈ [q]: The experiment is identical to the previous hybrid, except
we respond to the i-th query to the decoding oracle using D′4ΣEq .
Claim 7.5.1. Hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
This follows from the security of the one-time signature scheme and “unique-
ness of opening” property of the underlying commitment.
Claim 7.5.2. Hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable.
This follows from the security of the equivocal, non-malleable commitment
scheme.








if the marginal distribution over m1 is statistically 2−k-close to uniform random






A,2) and the marginal distribu-















A,2) is good with probability 1− 2−k/q.
Proof. Towards proving the claim, we consider the following leakage functions:
Leakage function on cL,b, for b ∈ {1, 2}: Fix ΣEq, com, d0 = d01 . . . d04`, d1 =
d11 . . . d
1
4`, universal hash h : {0, 1}α → {0, 1}yo ∈ H (where α is the length of a
single split-state of the encoding) and adversary A. On input cL, set output outA,b
to “” and outL,b to “”, and set Lb = (com, [d
cL,b[i]
i ]i∈[`]), for b ∈ {1, 2}. Repeat the
following in rounds i = 1, 2, . . .:
1. Obtain the next tampering function [(fL,b, fR,b)]b∈{1,2} from adversary A. If A
terminates then output outL,b.
2. Set L′b := fL,b(Lb). If L
′
b ∈ S ′L,b, then:





b, ·, ·) 6= ⊥. Return
(L′b, R̂
′
b) to the adversary. Set outA,b = outA,b||(L′b, R̂′b).
(b) If L′b is not the most frequent output in S ′L,b, set outL,b := outL,b||(i||h(L′b))
If |outL,b| > (log(q) + yo) · yt then terminate with output outL,b :=
outL,b||(i||⊥).
302
3. If L′b /∈ S ′L,b, output ⊥ to the adversary and terminate with output outL,b :=
outL,b||(i||⊥).
The leakage function for cR,b is analogous.
We now show that given outL,1, outR,1, outL,2, outR,2 we can reconstruct the




in the following way:
Fix ΣEq, com, universal hash h ← H and adversary A. Set output outA,1 to
“” and outA,2 to “”. Repeat the following in rounds i = 1, 2, . . . , q:
1. Obtain the next tampering function (fL,1, fR,1, fL,2, fR,2) from adversary A
given its current view, outA = (outA,1,outA,2).
2. If for b ∈ {1, 2}, (i,⊥) ∈ outL,b or (i,⊥) ∈ outR,b, then for b ∈ {1, 2}, set
outA,b = outA,b||(i,⊥) and abort.
3. If for b ∈ {1, 2}, (i, y) ∈ outL,b, for some y 6= ⊥, set L′b = L̂′b such that
L̂′b ∈ S ′L,b and h(L̂′b) = y.
4. If for b ∈ {1, 2}, (i, ·) /∈ outL,b, set L′b = L̂′b such that L̂′b ∈ S ′L,b is the most
frequent value.
5. If for b ∈ {1, 2}, (i, y) ∈ outR,b, for some y 6= ⊥, set R′b = R̂′b such that
R̂′b ∈ S ′R,b and h(R̂′b) = y.
6. If for b ∈ {1, 2}, (i, ·) /∈ outR,b, set R′b = R̂′b such that R̂′b ∈ S ′R,b is the most
frequent value.
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7. If for all b ∈ {1, 2}, L′b = “same” and R′b = “same” output “same” and for
b ∈ {1, 2}, set outA,b = outA,b||“same”.
8. Else if at least one of [L′b, R
′
b]b∈{1,2} is “same” but not all, then for b ∈ {1, 2},
set outA,b = outA,b||⊥ and abort.
9. Else for b ∈ {1, 2}, parse L′b := (comb, d[SL,b]) and R′b := (com′b, d[SRb ]). Check
that com1 = com
′
1 = com2 = com
′
2. If not, set outA,b = outA,b||⊥ and abort.
10. Otherwise, for b ∈ {1, 2} set outA,b = outA,b||(L′b, R′b).
It can be determined by inspection that the incorrect value is output only if
in one of the at most q instances, for some b ∈ {1, 2}, there are two distinct values
L̂′b, L̂
′′








b ). Due to
universality of h and the fact that for b ∈ {1, 2}, |S ′L,b| = |S ′R,b| ≤ 1/ε, this can occur
with probability at most 4q
ε2·2yo , as claimed.
Since for b ∈ {1, 2}, |outL,b| ≤ (log(q) +yo) ·yt ≤ 2yo ·yt ≤ c · `, and |outR,b| ≤
(log(q) + yo) · yt ≤ 2yo · yt ≤ c · `, for constant c < 1, we have that with probability






A,2), the min-entropy of cL,b








A,2) is at least c
′ · ` for
constant c′ < 1. We can use the properties of the inner product extractor given in
Lemma 7.2.1 to argue that 〈cL,b, cR,b〉 is statistically close to uniform random, given
outL,1, outR,1, outL,2, outR,2. Moreover, since we have shown that the view of the
adversary outiA,1,out
i
A,2 can be fully reconstructed given outL,outR, we have that
〈cL,b, cR,b〉 is statistically close to uniform, given the adversary’s view in the CNMC
experiment.
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Claim 7.5.4. For i ∈ {0, . . . , q−1}, Hybrids H2,i,b and H2,i+1,a are 4(ε′+2−k)-close,
where ε′ = (1 + 2−λ)ε.
Proof. To prove indistinguishability of Hybrids 2 and 3, it is sufficient to show that





R,b(Rb), ·, ·) 6= ⊥] ≤ ε′ and





R,b(Rb), ·, ·) 6= ⊥] ≤ ε′. The result then follows
by a union bound.
Given Claim 7.5.3, to bound the above it is sufficient to show: (1) for b ∈ {1, 2},
each good pair outi−1A,1 = Ôut
i−1
A,1 (which does not contain ⊥), outi−1A,2 = Ôut
i−1
A,2 (which










R,b(Rb), ·, ·) 6= ⊥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣







and (2) for b ∈ {1, 2}, each good pair outi−1A,1 = Ôut
i−1
A,1 (which does not contain ⊥),
outi−1A,2 = Ôut
i−1










R,b(Rb), ·, ·) 6= ⊥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣







We first fix (ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
4`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
4`).
Note that fixed ΣEq, com, d
0 = d01 . . . d
0
4`, d
1 = d11 . . . d
1
4` and b ∈ {1, 2}, there is a bi-
jection φL,b (resp. φR,b) between cL,b (resp. cR,b) and (com, d[SL,b]), where d[SL,b] =
[d
cL,b[i]
i ]i∈[`]. Therefore the probability of a particular value of cL,b (resp. cR,b) oc-
curring is equivalent to the probability of Lb = φL,b(cL,b) (resp. Rb = φR,b(cR,b)).
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returns the unique L′b (resp. R
′










b, ·, ·) 6= ⊥). Note that L′b (resp. R′b) is equal to “same” if
and only if f iR,b(Rb) = “same” (resp. f
i
L,b(Lb) = “same”).
Now, note that for b = 1 and every (ĉL,1, ĉR,1) and every good pair ÔutA,1, ÔutA,2):







Pr[cL,2 = ĉL,2, cR,2 = ĉR,2 | outi−1A,2 = ÔutA,2]





Pr[〈cL,2, cR,2〉 = m2 | outi−1A,2 = ÔutA,2]





(2−λ ± 2−k) · Pr[cL,1 = ĉL,1 | cR,1 = ĉR,1 ∧ outi−1A,1 = ÔutA,1 ∧m
2 = m̂2]
(7.5.1)
= (2−λ ± 2−k)
∑
m2
Pr[cL,1 = ĉL,1 | cR,1 = ĉR,1 ∧ outi−1A,1 = ÔutA,1 ∧m
2 = m̂2]
= (1± 2λ−k) · Pr[cL,1 = ĉL,1 | ∧outi−1A,1 = ÔutA,1]
= (1± 2−λ) · Pr[cL,1 = ĉL,1 | cR,1 ∧ outi−1A,1 = ÔutA,1],
where (7.5.1) follows from Claim 7.5.3. An analogous statement holds for b = 2.
Morever, by the same reasoning as in the proof of Claim 7.4.3 (where we showed
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conditional independence of cL,b, cR,b) we have that for every (ĉL,b, ĉR,b, ÔutA,b):
Pr[cL,b = ĉL,b | cR,b ∧ outi−1A,b = ÔutA,b] = Pr[cL,b = ĉL,b | out
i−1
A,b = ÔutA,b].










 ∈ (1±2−λ) Pr[Lb = L̂b | outi−1A,b = Ôuti−1A,b ].
So for every Rb = R̂b, every good pair ÔutA,1, ÔutA,2) and every L
′
b /∈ S ′L,b:
Pr
f iL,b(Lb) = L′b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣

















R,b(Rb), ·, ·) 6= ⊥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣










L,b(Lb) /∈ S ′L,b ∧












The proof for (2) is analogous.
Claim 7.5.5. For i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, Hybrids H2,i,a and H2,i,b are 4(ε′+2−k)-close, where
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ε′ = 2 · ε.
Proof. To prove indistinguishability, we must show that for i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, b ∈ {1, 2}





R,b(Rb), ·, ·) 6= ⊥ occurs more than yt times in H2,i,a is at most





R,b(Rb), ·, ·) 6= ⊥ occurs more than yt times in H2,i,a is
at most ((1 + 2−λ)/2)yt + 2−k.
We first analyze the event (1). If f iL,b(Lb) = L
′
b is not the most frequent query
in S ′L,b then, by definition,
Pr[f iL,b(L̂b) = L
′
b | outi−1A = Ôut
i−1
A ] ≤ 1/2. (7.5.2)
Recall that, by the arguments in the proof of the previous Claim, in H2,i−1,b (and
hence also H2,i,a), for good pairs (outi−1A,1 = Ôut
i−1




f iL,b(Lb) = L′b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣












f iL,b(Lb) = L′b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣






 ≤ (1 + 2−λ)/2.
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≤ (1 + 2−λ)/2.
The probability that this occurs yt times for yt distinct values of j ≤ [i], where






A,2 are good for all j is at most







A,2 are good for all j ∈ [q], the upperbound for event (1)
follows.
The proof for event (2) is analogous.
Claim 7.5.6. In Hybrid 3, for all (even inefficient) distinguishers D, it holds that
Pr[D(outbA) = b] ≤ 1/2 +O(2−λ).
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2 | outA,1,outA,2] · Pr[m1 = m1 +m′2 | outA,1,outA,2]
≥ (2−λ − 2−k) · (
∑
m′2





Pr[m1 = m1 +m
′2 | outA,1,outA,2])
= 2 · (2−λ − 2−k)
= 2 · 2−λ − 2 · 2−k.
where the first inequality follows from Claim 7.5.3.
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So




Pr[m2 = m′2 | outA,1,outA,2] · Pr[m1 = mb +m2 | outA,1,outA,2]
O
≤ (2−λ + 2−k) ·
∑
m′2








2 · 2−λ − 2 · 2−k
≤ 2







Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Directions
In this dissertation, we have shown following contributions to improve the
applicability of non-malleable codes.
• We explore a novel connection between tampering classes of non-malleable
codes and well studied complexity classes. Exploring these connections to com-
plexity theory has made it possible to construct explicit, efficient non-malleable
codes for broader tampering classes. Specifically,
– We construct first explicit, efficient non-malleable codes with information
theoretic security for the tampering functions which can be modeled as
bounded-depth, bounded fan-in circuits. This tampering class includes
NC0.
– We present a general framework to construct non-malleable codes from
average-case hardness properties for various complexity classes which are
known/believed to be strictly weaker from the class of all polynomial time
algorithms (P).
– We construct first explicit, efficient non-malleable codes for AC0, decision
tress of depth nε for constant 0 < ε < 1 in with computational security
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in CRS model. We also construct information theoretically secure, non-
malleable codes for streaming, space-bounded tampering functions.
This line of research has sparked interest in the community and led to follow-up
work focusing on construction of non-malleable codes for well studied complex-
ity classes.
• We present lower and upper bounds on the optimal locality (efficiency), which
is number of codeword blocks required to be accessed in order to decode/update
the codeword, of locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes which
allow random access (i.e. entire codeword need not be read to access just
a single block) to the codeword blocks. Specifically, we show that LDUNMC
allowing rewind attacks cannot have constant locality. We also improve the
locality of previous construction to match the lower bound.
• We show that continuous non-malleable codes, providing security against stronger
attacks which tamper the codeword continually, cannot be constructed from any
falsifiable assumption without CRS for 2-split-state tampering with black-box
reduction security proofs (such reductions have only input/output access to the
adversary breaking the underlying assumption). Prior work already showed
2-split-state CNMC cannot be constructed with information theoretic security.
We then construct CNMC for 2-split-state tampering from injective one-way
functions in CRS model. We also construct CNMC for multi-bit messages




An important future direction would be to find practical applications of non-
malleable codes to achieve tamper resilience. The Rowhammer attack (introduced
by [112]) can be a potential threat to be considered. Since this attack tampers with
the memory but does not interfere with the computation, which is precisely the threat
model considered by non-malleable codes.
Recently, Cojocar et.al [47], studied the effectiveness of error-correcting codes
against the rowhammer attack (introduced by [112]). They [47], tried to inject un-
detectable, silent corruptions in ECC memory by combining single bit flips caused
by rowhammer attack and then caused 2 more bits to flip. It is an interesting re-
search direction to explore whether the type of tampering induced by Rowhammer is
captured by local tampering functions. Therefore, studying the effectiveness of non-
malleable codes against such types of attacks can be an interesting step forward in
improving the applicability of non-malleable codes.
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